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Articles 
Comparative Corporate Governance and the 
Theory of the Firm: 
The Case Against Global Cross Reference 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON* 
AND 
JosEPH A. McCAHERY •• 
Professors Bratton and McCahery take up the main 
questions addressed by the literature on comparative 
corporate governance: whether national governance 
systems can be expected to converge in the near future, 
and whether the focal point of that convergence will be 
a new, hybrid governance system comprised of the best 
practices drawn from different systems. This Article 
advances the view that neither global convergence that 
eliminates systemic differences nor the emergence of a 
hybrid best practice safely can be projected because 
each national governance system is a system to a 
significant extent. Each system, rather than consisting 
of a loose collection of separable components, is tied 
together by a complex incentive structure. 
Interdependencies between each system's components 
and the incentives of its actors create significant 
barriers to cross reference to and from other systems. 
The cross reference hypothesis, zn contrast, 
presupposes divisible corporate governance 
institutions-a world zn which one system's 
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components can be adapted for use in the other system 
without significant frictions or perverse effects. 
This Article draws on models of monitoring and 
blockholding articulated in the incomplete contracts 
theory of the firm. Under incomplete contracts theory, 
different governance systems have incentive structures 
that entail different trade-offs-trade-offs between 
ownership concentration and liquidity, between 
monitoring and management initiative, and between 
private rent-seeking and activity benefiting 
shareholders as a group. The trade-offs delimit 
opportunities for productive cross reference. More 
particularly, blockholder systems, such as those in 
Europe, subsidize monitoring by permitting 
blockholders to reap private benefits through self 
dealing and insider trading. Market systems, such as 
those in the United States and Britain, regulate such 
private rent-seeking toward the end of maintaining an 
institutional framework that supports diffuse share 
ownership and liquid trading markets. It follows that 
a legal framework conducive to blockholding may be 
ill equipped to foster dispersed equity ownership and 
thick trading markets, and that a legal framework 
conducive to liquid trading markets may have 
properties that discourage blockholding. This gives 
rise to questions for law reform agendas on both sides 
of the A tlantic. In the United States, proponents ask 
for deregulation of controls on institutional investors, 
looking to encourage blockholding and more effective 
monitoring. In Europe, proponents ask for stronger 
securities regulation, looking to encourage deeper 
trading markets. This Article suggests that each 
reform program may lead to disappointing results 
because neither assures conforming adjustments to the 
pertinent actors' incentives. A lternatively, strict 
reforms that materially change prevailing incentive 
patterns could perversely destabilize workable (if 
imperfect) arrangements without assuring the 
appearance of more effective alternatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In these globalizing times, corporate law's  leading question is 
whether there is a national corporate governance system (or 
component thereof) that possesses relative competitive advantage. 
The question arises in the wake of increased competition in 
international product markets. Such competition is intense enough to 
make it plausible to proj ect that the different systems pursuant to 
which firms are managed and capitalized will become factors at the 
margin of competitive survival . If only the fittest practices can 
survive in the global market, it also becomes plausible to project that 
national governance systems will converge upon them and systemic 
differences will disappear. Related questions about competitive 
advantage and convergence to best practice come up in domestic 
policy discussions in many countries. Concerns about local firms' 
performance in international markets turn attention to alternative 
governance practices identified in international comparisons: if 
competitive advantage lies elsewhere, then domestic practice should 
be reformed to follow the international leader. 
An extensive body of studies addresses these questions, 
identifying and evaluating national variations in management and 
financial practices, industrial organization, and corporate and 
securities laws. Unfortunately, even as these descriptions have 
become thicker and more cogent, answers to the bottom-line 
questions respecting competitive advantage have become more 
elusive and convergence predictions have become more qualified. 
Working hypotheses have changed rapidly, more in response to 
external events than to developments in the discourse .  American 
observers early in the 1990s looked to Japanese governance practices 
for guidance for the reform of their domestic market governance 
system, then viewed to be in the throes of a productivity crisis . 1 Now 
American observers comment on their system' s  robust ability to self-
1. See W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at 
Japan and Germany, in STUDIES fN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FfNANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U . S ., JAPAN, & EUROPE 227,  227-28, 239-4 1 (Donald H. 
Chew ed., 1 997) [hereinafter lNT'L GOVERNANCE]; Michael E .  Porter, Capital Choices: 
Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, in lNT'L GOVER.t'IANCE, supra, at 5 ,  6-8. 
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correct in the wake of external shocks2 and wait for signs of 
American-style refom1 in Japan.3 The change in view corresponds to 
the comings and goings of national economic distress: the United 
States started the 1 990s in a severe recession that tested the resilience 
of its corporate institutions; Japan has experienced an intensifying 
economic and institutional crisis as the decade has progressed.4 
Views about the likelihood of convergence also have changed. 
Although some observers still project convergence as an imminent 
possibility,5 many now offer reasons why convergence should not be 
expected.6 
Comparative governance has this tentative, reactive quality 
because no one has any direct, empirical answers to its basic 
questions . It follows that the principal assertions made in 
comparative discussions-claims respecting relative competitive 
advantage, the appropriate course of national level law reform, and 
the likelihood and shape of systemic convergence-cannot be 
falsified. They can be evaluated only indirectly, through appraisal of 
the theories of the firm and of competitive evolution that support 
them. Unsurprisingly, the comparative governance literature holds 
out alternative theoretical frameworks that support conflicting 
hypotheses. 
The theoretical approach commanding the widest acceptance 
looks at present national regimes and sees suboptimal performance 
2. See generally, Ronald J.  Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese 
Corporate Governance through American Eyes, 1 998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV . 203,205 ( 1 998) 
(noting that American firms have learned Japanese lean production methods and that both 
Japanese cross-holding arrangements and shop floor arrangements have come under 
pressure); Amoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in 
Corporate Governance, in COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 223, 
232-34 ( 1 998) [hereinafter COLUM. CORP. Gov. ]  (discussing American adjustments in the 
1 990s). 
3. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 2 ,  at 206. 
4 .  There is also striking evidence of American corporate success in the 1 990s. In 1 992 
Japanese companies had a 1 7 .5% share of world profits and U . S .  companies had 25%. By 
the third quarter of 1 998 the Japanese share was 7% and the U . S .  share was 3 8%. See Is the 
Stock Market Too High?, Bus. WK., Jan. 25, 1 999, at 1 26 .  
5. See, e.g., W. Carl Kester, American and Japanese Co1porate Governance: 
Convergence to Best Practice?, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALIS M  1 07, 1 23-
24 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1 996) [hereinafter Kester, Convergence]; Kester, 
supra note 1, at 24 1-42; Porter, supra note 1, at 1 6- 1 7  (expressing fear that signs of German 
and Japanese convergence toward American governance will chill reform of American 
system). 
6. See MARK J .  ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FrNANCE 23 8-39, 280-8 1 ( 1 994) which took the lead in articulating 
this position in the corporate governance literature. There is an independent body of theory 
that points in the same direction. See infra notes 1 03-25 and accompanying text. 
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caused by the operation of political forces over time. It thereby 
dismisses the possibility of evolutionary efficiency in its account of 
the status quo. 7 But it nevertheless holds out a brighter future of 
productive cross reference between the two prevailing types of 
national systems: (a) "Market" systems, found mainly in English­
speaking countries and characterized by widely-dispersed 
shareholding and thick, liquid trading markets; and (b) "Blockholder" 
systems, found with many variations in Europe, East Asia and most 
other capitalist economies, and characterized by control in insider 
coalitions or wealthy families and thin trading of non-controlling 
stakes .  8 The assertion is that each system can and should learn from 
the other: the failures of market systems can be ameliorated with 
devices from blockholder systems and devices from market systems 
can ameliorate the failures of blockholder systems. 9  Restated as a 
convergence projection, this cross  reference hypothesis implies that 
global competition will cause the emergence of a hybrid best practice. 
It also suggests that we should assume in the meantime that the 
market and blockholder systems possess equal competitive fitness . 1 0 
7. See, e.g. , Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 1 09 HARV. L .  
REv. 64 1 ,  643-62 ( 1 996) (describing path dependent evolutionary patterns in general and 
corporate governance in particular). 
8. Systemic differences manifest themselves starkly in statistics on shareholder types, 
with institutions being more prominent in blockholder countries. Germany and the 
Netherlands (blockholder) and Britain and the United States (market) compare as follows: 
Distribution of share ownership, 1993: 
Ownership of shares(%) 
-households 
-non-financial enterprises 
-banks 
-investment funds 
-pension funds 
-insurance companies 
-government 
-foreign share 
-share of largest shareholder 
>25% 
>50% 
>75% 
Germany 
1 6.6  
3 8 .8 
1 4 .2 
7 . 6  
1 .9 
5 . 2  
3 . 4  
1 2 .2  
85  
57  
22  
NL 
20.0 
9 .6 
0.7 
1 . 5 
7 .9  
5 .5  
0.0 
54.8 
22 
UK 
17 . 7  
3 . 1  
0 . 6  
9 . 7  
3 4 . 2  
1 7 .2 
1 . 3 
1 6 .3  
1 3  
6 
1 
us 
50.2 
1 4. 1  
0.0 
5 .7 
20. 1 
4 .6  
0.0 
5 .4 
CPB NETHERLANDS, NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS, CHALLENGING 
NEIGHBOURS: RETHINKING GERMAN AND DUTCH INSTITUTIONS 357  tbl . l  0.3 ( 1 997) 
9.  See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
1 0. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
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The leading opposition hypothesis proceeds in the neoclassical 
microeconomic mode to assert that market systems reflect the 
operation of efficient evolutionary processes. Here product market 
competition remains the causal mainspring but has a more powerful 
effect, supporting an assertion that the systemic differences identified 
as material in the cross reference hypothesis are irrelevant. It follows 
that countries with market systems should avoid borrowing from 
blockholder systems and stick to internally-generated governance 
reform agendas. Convergence is a certainty from this perspective, but 
takes the particular form of world-wide hegemony for market 
institutions. 11 
This Article advances a case for a third hypothesis. Under this 
view, which follows from current microeconomic theories of the firm, 
we cannot safely proj ect either global convergence that eliminates 
systemic differences or the emergence of a hybrid best practice . This 
is because each national governance system is a system to a 
significant extent. Each system, rather than consisting of a loose 
collection of separable components, is tied together by a complex 
incentive structure. Interdependencies between each system' s  
components and the incentives o f  its actors create significant bmTiers 
to cross reference to and from other systems. The cross reference 
hypothesis, in contrast, presupposes divisible corporate governance 
institutions�a world in which one system's  components can be 
adapted for use in the other system without significant frictions or 
perverse effects . 
As it makes this case, the Article makes two important 
contributions to theoretical learning in the comparative governance 
field. First, it draws on legal theory, economic theory, and the 
pertinent empirical studies to highlight assumptions and analytical 
infrastructure heretofore obscured in legal literature on comparative 
governance. This results in a taxonomy of comparative governance' s  
leading assertions . Encapsulated as "the corporate governance 
matrix," this framework imports transparency to this increasingly 
complicated subject matter, facilitating a more neutral appraisal of its 
conflicting positions . Second, the Article draws on models of 
monitoring and blockholding articulated within the incomplete 
contracts theory of the firm, a body of economics not yet significantly 
reflected in the comparative legal literature. Under incomplete 
contracts theory, different governance systems have incentive 
structures that entail different trade-offs-trade-offs between 
ownership concentration and liquidity, between monitoring and 
1 1. See infra notes 92- 1 03 and accompanying text. 
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management initiative, and between private rent-seeking and activity 
benefiting shareholders as a group. The trade-offs delimit 
opportunities for productive cross  reference.  More particularly, 
blockholder systems subsidize monitoring by permitting blockholders 
to reap private benefits through self dealing and insider trading. 
Market systems, in contrast, regulate such private rent-seeking toward 
the end of maintaining an institutional framework that supports 
diffuse share ownership and liquid trading markets . It follows that a 
legal framework conducive to blockholding may be ill equipped to 
foster dispersed equity ownership and thick trading markets, and that 
a legal framework conducive to liquid trading markets may have 
properties that discourage blockholding. 12 
The Article ' s  analysis raises important questions for law 
reform agendas on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States 
proponents ask for deregulation of controls on institutional investors, 
looking to encourage blockholding and more effective monitoring. In 
Europe proponents ask for stronger securities regulation, looking to 
encourage deeper trading markets . This suggestion is that each 
reform program may lead to disappointing results because neither 
assures conforming adjustments to the pertinent actors '  incentives. 
Alternatively, strict reforms that materially change prevailing 
incentive patterns could perversely destabilize workable (if imperfect) 
arrangements without assuring the appearance of more effective 
alternatives. 
The analysis seconds the policy recommendations made in 
discussions in the United States by neoclassical critics of the cross 
reference hypothesis . But it does not simultaneously endorse their 
theoretical presuppositions. The incomplete contracts model should 
ultimately prove to be more compatible with the capacious framework 
of reference developed by those articulating the cross reference 
hypothesis. Both make second-best assumptions and recognize the 
salience of political events. The difference lies in the underlying 
theories of the firm. Proponents of cross reference assume that 
improvements in governance institutions would be within easy reach 
but for political barriers and historical path dependencies in the 
regulatory pattern. Our analysis of the incomplete contracts model 
challenges this diagnosis at the level of economic theory. Politics can 
indeed explain why a governance system has not evolved so as to be 
first best. But it cannot by itself show us how to improve that system. 
12.  We do not claim to be the first commentators to make this  point. See, e.g. , Curtis J .  
Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 14 5  ( 1 998). But we believe this article 
to be the first sustained exercise in the legal l iterature of describing and confronting the 
economic theory supporting the point. 
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For that one needs an economic theory of the firm. 13 No economic 
theory yet articulated shows us how to splice blockholder components 
onto market systems so as to effect material improvement. 
Part I of the Article recounts the results of the corporate 
governance comparison, describing the elements that distinguish 
market and blockholder systems. 
Part II looks at comparative corporate governance' s  
theoretical infrastructure . Here we compare assumptions and 
assertions basic to the cross reference hypothesis and the neoclassical 
critique. We also draw on the economics of systemic convergence to 
show the thin foundation underlying strong convergence predictions . 
Comparative governance emerges as a debate over two closely-related 
points . Participants make basic choices between (a) the strong and 
weak convergence perspectives, and (b) alternative descriptions of 
governance institutions as either divisible and fitted for cross 
reference or indivisible and not so fitted. We plot these four positions 
on a matrix that shows four contrasting perspectives and go on to 
consider the taxonomy' s  implications for corporate governance 
debates. 
Part III lays foundations for our case against cross reference. 
Here we show how existing comparative studies confirm the salience 
of barriers to cross reference-such as the shareholder free rider 
problem in market systems and the provision of private benefits in 
blockholder systems-without offering any cogent suggestions as to 
how they might be overcome. 
Part IV describes breakthrough applications of incomplete 
contracts theory and highlights their implications for legal policy. 
This theory teaches us that the market and blockholder systems ' 
contrasting features do not imply unexploited complementarities. 
They instead should be read to follow from second-best choices in a 
world of complex trade-offs . The model tries to work through the 
trade-offs so as to show us what features we might see in an optimal 
hybrid system. But the incentive problems bound up in the trade-offs 
prove destabilizing to hybrid structures. Absent private benefits and 
the incentives they import toward block formation, we can never be 
sure that blocks will appear when monitoring is needed. Such blocks 
as they appear will be unstable and will tend to be larger than 
necessary, sacrificing liquidity even as they solve the monitoring 
problem. Allowance of private benefits through self dealing and 
insider trading solves these problems only to create new problems, for 
13. Indeed, it needs to make reference to a theory of the firm to show that an evolved 
system is deficient in the first place. 
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there is no way to assure private benefits provision to an incentive­
compatible degree. Finally, only a subset of firms will need block 
monitoring in the first place. 
Part V concludes that a system must go one way or the other, 
either controlling access to private benefits for the purpose of 
protecting its liquid trading markets or not doing so in order to 
support blockholding. The theory of the firm holds out no solid 
middle ground. Accordingly, the primary message of comparative 
governance for domestic legal policy lies in an unsuspected quarter. 
Market systems depend on legal protections for outside investors. 
Blockholder systems lack these protections. Caution respecting their 
diminution is the indicated course. 
I. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMPARISON 
This Part sets out the results of the governance comparison, 
describing the interrelated strengths and weaknesses of the market 
and blockholder systems and reporting on empirical findings. Bottom 
line results tum out to be thin : We have no empirical basis for 
ascribing comparative advantage to either system, and most observers 
accordingly assume the systems to be equally competitively fit. 
A.  Elements of Market Systems 
Market corporate governance systems are characterized by 
dispersed equity holding, 14 a portfolio orientation among equity 
holders, and a broad delegation to management of discretion to 
operate the business. Ownership and control are separated. This 
leads to two chronic productivity disadvantages. 
The first disadvantage is the shareholder-management agency 
problem. Collective action problems prevent close monitoring of 
management performance by widely-dispersed shareholder owners 
holding small stakes. Imperfect performance incentives result for 
managers, who may rationally sacrifice shareholder value to pursue 
their own agendas. The classic case of this occurred with the 
American conglomerate firms of a generation ago : Managers built 
large empires by making investments that yielded uncompetitive 
returns and sacrificed shareholder value even as they caused the firm 
14. In the case of some large firms, they are also characterized by dispersed debt 
holdings. 
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to growY Market systems provide three corrective mechanisms to 
address this management incentive problem and ameliorate the 
structural barrier to direct shareholder oversight. These are the hostile 
takeover, derivative lawsuits against management self dealing, 16 and 
the inclusion of outside monitors on boards of directors. 1 7  
The second productive disadvantage o f  the market system is a 
time-horizon cost that stems from the shareholders ' tendency to rely 
on short-term performance numbers . This problem has been 
attributed to information asymmetries. Management has superior 
information respecting investment policy and the firm's  prospects, but 
this information tends to be either soft or proprietary and therefore 
cannot credibly be communicated to actors in trading markets. 1 8  It 
has been said that management as a result is disinclined to make long­
term capital investments necessary for international competitiveness. 
The problem becomes more severe as the takeover deterrent becomes 
more vigorous, causing managers to look for quick fixes to keep the 
shareholders satisfied. 19 To restate this point in more general terms, 
market systems fail to provide clear-cut protections to managers who 
15. See generally Porter, supra note I .  
16. Different national systems emphasize different protections. The United States at 
present holds the derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty, whereas Britain holds out few 
incentives to plaintiffs but maintains a more robust takeover market. See Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast between the United 
States and England, 1 998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 5 1 ,  52-53 ( 1 998). 
1 7. See Erik Berg!Of, Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the European 
Agenda, in ECONOMIC POLICY: A EUROPEAN FORUM 9 3 ,  97-99 ( 1 997).  Unsurprisingly, in 
both the United States and Britain, studies on governance focus on how to improve the 
operation of the board. See Stephen Woolcock, Competition Among Forms of Corporate 
Governance in the European Community: The Case of Britain, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 5 ,  at 1 79 ,  1 8 3 .  
18. See Roe, supra note 7 ,  a t  649. Roe adds a third cost, a n  industrial organization cost 
stemming from American firms '  tendency to resort to vertical integration as the solution for 
the commitment problems attending incomplete relational contracts with significant suppliers 
and customers. See id. Full vertical integration implies the incentive problems attending and 
deadweight costs of bureaucratized management. In the Japanese keiretsu (and to a lesser 
extent in Germany), cross-holdings of shares between the vertically related firms ameliorate 
the commitment problem without carrying the costs of full vertical integration. See Ronald J. 
Gilson & Mark J .  Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate 
Governance and Industrial Organization, 1 02 YALE L.J .  87 1 ,  882-88 ( 1 993) .  
Roe suggests that in market systems, stronger financial intermediaries "might have linked 
related suppliers and customers with partial cross-ownership, but without tight (and 
sometimes costly) vertical organization." Roe, supra note 7, at 649 . This pattern does not 
occur in Japan, where significant nonfinancial cross-ownership invariably accompanies 
financial ownership. See Kester, supra note 1 ,  at 23 1 tbl. 1 .  Nor would it appear to be 
implicated in bank holding and voting patterns in Germany. See RoE, supra note 6, at 1 7 1-
77.  
19. See Porter, supra note I, at 6. 
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make firm-specific investments of human capital, 20 a failure due in · 
part to the systems '  reliance on takeovers, proxy fights, and 
boardroom coups to control agency costs. 
Market systems have countervailing advantages. Their -. 
shareholders can cheaply reduce their risk through diversification� . 
Relative to shareholders in blockholder systems, they receive high: 
rates of return. The systems'  deep trading markets facilitate greater .. 
shareholder liquidity. These capital markets also facilitate corporate.
": 
finance, providing management with greater flexibility as to the type 
and sources of new capital than do markets in blockholder systems.21, _ 
More generally, they provide an environment relatively more 
conducive to management entrepreneurship, 22 as reflected in 
increased investment in new technologies .23 Finally, although market 
system shareholders and their outside-director agents cannot access 
full information about firm operations, their very distance from 
operations yields a countervailing benefit. Distance makes them 
relatively immune to capture by the management interest and assures 
objective evaluation of the information they do receive. 24 A practice 
of objective evaluation means relatively fewer barriers to 
disinvestment and related features of downside restructuring. 25 
B. Elements of Blockholder Systems 
Blockholder systems are characterized by maj ority or near­
maj ority holdings of stock held in the hands of one, two, or a small 
group of large investors. 26 In Europe, the largest block investors tend 
20. See Boot & Macey, supra note 2, at 219-24. 
2 1 .  See Bergli:if, supra note 17, at 113. 
22. This point is developed in the abstract in the incomplete contracts l iterature. The 
idea is that a more generous extension of discretion from capital to management promotes 
innovation, and contrariwise that there is such a thing as excessive monitoring. See, e.g. , 
Mike Burkart et a! . ,  Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J. 
EcoN. 693, 693-94 (1997). For a discussion of this l iterature see infra notes 242-52 and 
accompanying text. 
23. See Is the Stock Market Too High?, supra note 4, at 126 (attributing recent U.S.  
competitive success to corporate-led transition to an information-based economy). 
24. See Boot & Macey, supra note 2, at 225. 
25. Cf Porter, supra note 1, at 5, 11-12; Roe, supra note 7, at 650; Gilson, supra note 
2, at 216-17 (suggesting that the market system in the United States showed that it had the 
flexibility to restructure in the 1 980s where the Japanese main bank system might lack 
aptitude to respond similarly). 
26. In Germany, 64% of large firms have a majority owner, in France 59%. See Paul 
Windolf, The Governance Structure of Large French Corporations: A Comparative 
Perspective, in COLUM. CORP. Gov., supra note 2, 705, 725. See also supra note 8.  
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· to be individuals or rich families, with nonfinancial firms and banks ·making a secondary appearance in some countries, particularly 
. Germany and Sweden. 27 Other European control blocks result from 
cross-holding arrangements among groups of nonfinancial firms.28 In 
the Japanese keiretsu system of blockholding, in contrast, individual 
and family holders are not prominent. There blockholding means 
",.aggregations of smaller blocks than in Europe, held by (a) clusters of 
banks having lending relationships with the issuer firm, and (b) 
· �-.. clusters of other nonfinancial companies, in many cases in supplier or ''; customer relationships29 with the issuer. These corporate holders 
often belong to a formal keiretsu organization along with the issuer, 
· For a detailed report on blockholding patterns in Germany, see TIM JENKINSON & 
:" ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, HOSTILE STAKES AND THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GERMAN CORPORATE 
· GOVERNANCE (Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1695, London 
1997). Following J. Zwiebel, Block Investment and Partial Corporate Control, 62 REv. 
EcoN. STUD. 161 (1995), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist assume three types of firm: (a) firms with 
·many small blocks but without a controlling block; (b) firms with one large block and many 
small blocks; and (c) firms with one very large block and no small blocks. Furthermore, 
there are five economically significant block sizes in Germany: (a) a 95% controlling party 
can compulsorily acquire minorities shares; (b) a 75% super-majority block; (c) a 50% block 
that gives management control of the company; (d) a 25% block that gives veto powers on 
corporate charter amendments and supervisory board changes; and (e) a block less than 25% 
that gives protection against other, larger blockholders. The study shows that just under three 
quarters of all German listed companies have a majority owner: 23.1% have blocks in excess 
of 90% of their equity capital; 18.4% are super-majority controlled; and 30.5% have a simple 
majority owner. 
Only a quarter are not at least majority controlled by a blockholder. Taking a closer look at 
these 141 firms, they show that 86 of these firms have one or more blocking majority stakes, 
where two or three such stakes would amount to majority or super-majority control. The 
remaining 55 firms have no stakes in excess of 25%. 37 of these firms have one or more 
disclosed non-blocking stakes while only 18 firms are widely held. See generally JENKINSON 
& LJUNGQVIST. 
27. See Bergli)f, supra note 17, at 101 tbl.4. Financial advisors in France serve as 
proxies for financial advisors to controlling shareholders. They also figure into complex 
arrangements of cross-shareholdings among private French firms. See generally James A. 
Fanto, The Role of C01porate Law in the Adaptation of French Enterprise, 1998 COLUM. 
Bus. L .  REv. 97, 107 (1998); James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural 
Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. 
INT'L L. & Bus. 119, 184-85 (1996) (discussing French cross-shareholding practices in the 
context of U.S.  disclosure requirements applied to foreign issuers). 
28. See Michael Adams, Cross Holdings in Germany, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL EcoN. 80 (1999) (pointing out that corporate cross-holdings are widespread in 
Germany, that there is little information about the extent of the cross-holdings due to 
inadequate transparency and that disclosure rules which are easy to circumvent, and that such 
cross-holding promotes management entrenchment). 
29. This is not necessarily true. See Kester, supra note 1, at 231 tbl.l, 234 tbl.2; 
Michael I. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, 18 J. JAP. STUD. 79 
(1992) (stating that preferential trading patterns in Japanese industrial organization follow a 
probabilistic rather than deterministic model). 
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ameliorating collective action problems. 30 
Blockholder systems, like market systems, leave management 
in charge of the business plan and operations.3 1 But large-block 
investments imply a closer level of shareholder monitoring.32 In 
addition, the coalescence of voting power in a small number of hands 
means earlier, cheaper intervention in the case of management 
failure .33 The systems' other primary benefit stems from the 
blockholders ' ability to access information about operations .  This 
lessened information asymmetry permits blockholders to invest more 
patiently.34 The longer shareholder time-horizon in tum frees 
management to invest for the long-term and creates a more secure 
environment for firm-specific investments of human capital by the 
firm's  managers.35 
There are corresponding costs and limitations . Where the 
blockholders are firms, internal agency costs can constrain their 
30 .  The Japanese system also is distinguished by close ties between financial 
intermediaries and government regulators. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence From the 
"Jusen" Problem, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 ( 1 997) (describing how regulatory cartels 
among government and private sector actors run according to informal norms and interlinked 
decisionmaking institutions). 
Keiretsu cross-holdings are decreasing as a result of Japan's current economic crisis. At the 
beginning of the 1 990s approximately two-thirds of the shares of Japan's listed companies 
were held via cross-holding networks; now the figure is around 50% and declining. Simply, 
their members have better uses for their capital at this time. See Brian Bremner, Wanted: A 
New Economic Model, Bus. WK., Nov. 30, 1 998, at 44 . If the system survives the crisis (and 
some will predict movement to the market model, see infra note I 02 and accompanying text), 
the question will be whether the groups reform when prosperity returns. 
3 1 .  In France and Germany the family owners employ professional technocrats to do 
the managing, but significant links between the managers and the owners persist. See 
Windolf, supra note 26, at 722 . 
32 .  The incomplete contracts models show this formally. See infra notes 202-06 and 
accompanying text. For empirical studies that support the assertion that ownership 
concentration can improve the control of management and therefore can increase the value of 
the firm, see Michael Hertzel & Richard Smith, Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for 
Placing Equity Privately, 48 J. FIN. 459  ( 1 993). See also Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership 
Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 
3 ,  4 ( 1989) (studying transactions that change ownership and finding value increases 
provided that the level of concentration is less than 25% of the shares). 
33 .  See, e.g. , Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. 
ECON. LIT. I, 14- 1 7  ( 1 990) (discussing Japanese financial systems); Gilson & Roe, supra 
note 1 8, at 880. 
34. Cf Porter, supra note I, at 1 0-1 1 .  
35 .  More generally, there tends to b e  a closer relationship between management and all 
of the stakeholders. When problems come up, stakeholders raise their voices when 
difficulties arise, finding new managers instead of exiting. See Woolcock, supra note 17 ,  at 
1 83 .  
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.. effectiveness as monitors .36 Indeed, whatever the identity of the 
· blockholder, its heightened oversight incentive does not appear in 
practice to result in sharp oversight of management investment 
policy.37 Although closer proximity lessens the information 
, asymmetry problem, there is an accompanying increase in 
·management influence and loss of critical obj ectivity.38 Freedom to 
make long-term investments thus often means pursuit of growth in 
market share at the cost of a suboptimal rate of return on equity 
· investment.39 Trading markets in blockholder countries tend to be 
thinner and less transparent than in market system countries,40 and 
firms in search of financing encounter a more restricted range of 
altematives.4 1  Meanwhile, the blockholders themselves give up the 
benefits of diversification and, given thin trading markets, liquidity 
and the possibility of easy exit through sale. 42 Finally, there is a 
36. See Roe, supra note 7, at 649. 
37. The result is satisficing (as opposed to optimizing) behavior on the part of the 
managers, but satisficing relative to a higher frontier of production for a given level of inputs. 
See Kester, Convergence, supra note 5, at 122-23. 
38. See Boot & Macey, supra note 2, at 225, 237-38 (making reference to sources in 
public choice and psychology). 
39. See Porter, supra note 1, at 12-13. This implies that equity investors in firms in 
blockholder systems settle for lower rates of return than do equity investors in firms 
organized in market systems. In the case of corporate investors, the explanation is that 
offsetting advantages lie in long term business relationships with the issuer. See Kester, 
supra note I , at 22 7. 
40. The comparative figures for Europe show this starkly. The capitalization of the 
London equity market stays at 90 to I 00% of gross domestic product; in Germany and France 
the figure is 20%, for Italy 16%. Britain has 2500 listed companies; Germany 600 (in 1991 ), 
France and Spain 300-400 each, and Italy 200. See Woolcock, supra note 17, at 185. 
41. For a summary of these points in the context of bank lending, see Raghuram G. 
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, 11 J. 
APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 40 (1999). Rajan and Zingales compare relationship lending in East 
Asian countries to arm's length borrower-lender relationships in market systems. In 
developing economies, say Rajan and Zingales, relationships facilitate reputational 
enforcement-a necessity in the absence of reliable legal enforcement. The system discounts 
the importance of transparency, which in turn protects the participants from potential 
competition. The absence of competition and disclosure implies that few price signals exist. 
See id. 
42. See BerglOf, supra note 17, at 96. 
The parallel phenomenon in the banking sector is the loan at a below-market rate of interest. 
But Raj an and Zingales offer an interesting explanation of this phenomenon as an incident of 
a relational lending system in which loan terms result from negotiations rather than from 
price signals in a marketplace. Given negotiations, the costs a borrower may face result from 
the negotiations and may diverge from the lender's risk-adjusted cost. According to Rajan 
and Zingales, in a second-best world an imperfection in cost terms may not be such a bad 
thing. It may be that some firms are important and worth subsidizing because they create 
social value. The lender, meanwhile, takes a long-term view on return on investment. In a 
market system, in contrast, it is unlikely that a lender could make such a loan since it will be 
difficult for the lender to extract his investment from the firm in the long term so as to justify 
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shortage of loyalty. Blockholders, having sacrificed diversification 
and liquidity, extract a return in the form of private benefits yielded 
through self dealing or insider trading. Legal regimes in blockholder 
states facilitate this quid pro quo with lax protection of minority 
shareholder rights and lax securities market regulation. 43 This in turn 
chills the development of robust trading markets . 
C. Empirical Studies, Comparative Advantage, and Equal 
Competitive Fitness 
Which of the two systems, market or blockholder, has 
comparative advantage? Most comparative governance discussants 
decline to answer this question, preferring a working hypothesis of 
equal competitive fitness. In part, caution dictates this position. 
Relative productivity advantage is at bottom an empirical question. 
Although there is an impressive and growing body of empirical 
studies comparing different aspects of national governance systems, 
the studies have not yet attempted to compare productivity.44 Instead 
the studies use comparative data to try to establish causal connections 
between shareholder protection practices and other structural aspects 
of governance and finance. For example, one line of inquiry tests 
national systems against a multipart checklist designed to measure the 
level of investor protection.45 Items on the checklist include rules and 
practices respecting shareholder voting, legal protections against 
management self dealing, creditors' rights, accounting rules ,  and 
enforcement practices. Application of the test shows that: (a) 
common law countries provide the strongest protection for investors; 
below-cost fmancing of the firm in the short term. Lenders in a relationship-based system, in 
contrast, are able to offer below-market loans since they are able to absorb short run losses by 
resorting to their monopoly power to extract above-market rates over the long run. Despite 
these beneficial effects, the fact that relationship-based systems have little regard for price 
signals makes them prone to the misallocation resources and severe economic problems. See 
generally Rajan & Zingales, supra note 4 1 .  
43 .  See Bergl6f, supra note 17 ,  at  96,  98 .  
44 . It may be some time before we see such studies. State of the art work proceeds at a 
more general level .  Compare Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence 
and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 ( 1 998)  (studying the connection between growth rates 
and financial market development and finding that industrial sectors relatively more in need 
of external finance develop more quickly in countries with well-developed financial 
markets), with Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 8 8  
AM. EcoN. REv. 537  ( 1 998) (showing that each of stock market activity and banking 
development positively predict growth, capital accumulation and productivity improvements, 
but that the size of stock market capitalization is not robustly linked with growth). 
45. See RAPHAEL LA PORTA ET AL. ,  LAW AND frNANCE 1 6-3 1 (National Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 566 1 ,  1 996). 
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·(b) France and similar civil law cou�tr�es pr.o':'ide the weak_est level_ of 
protection; and (c) Germany and s1m1lar c1vi1 law countnes prov1de 
an intermediate level of protection.46 The legal systems, thus 
differentiated, are then sorted again in accordance with data 
respecting capital markets .  There results a strong positive correlation 
between the level of legal investor protection on the one hand, and the 
size and depth of the national securities market and the prevalence of 
dispersed shareholding on the other.47 Weak investor protection, in 
contrast, corresponds with blockholding.48 Other studies show 
46. See id. at 1 8. The study assumes that there are two broad traditions, civil and 
common law, and goes on to analyze the rights of investors in 49 countries that have publicly 
traded companies. It appears that relatively few countries have legal rules favoring outside 
shareholders: only 22% mandate one share one vote; only 1 6% allow cumulative voting; and 
only 22% allow voting by mail . See id. Creditors' rights present a more difficult picture. To 
summarize, common law countries simply offer better legal protection for creditors. 
Correspondingly, the French civil law countries treat creditors and shareholders poorly. See 
id. at 24-25. 
47. See Raphael La Porta et a! . ,  Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 
1 1 31 (1997). The study confirms that common law countries have better access to equity 
finance than do civil law countries. The differences between Britain and France are 
particularly significant and strongly suggest that poor investor protection entails lower 
liquidity and smaller markets. See id. at 1 137. Strong anti-director rights (as well as one 
share one vote) are also linked to higher liquidity markets. See id. at 1140. The level of legal 
enforcement and the origin of rules in common law are also correlated to valuation and depth 
of both equity and debt markets. Economic statistics, such as the total capitalization of 
equity held by outside shareholders, show that common law countries tend to have better 
stock markets. See id. at 1146-48. The authors assert that these data confinn the view that 
the nature of legal rules and their efficient enforcement are positively related to the size and 
depth of a country 's  capital market. See also Asli Demirguc-Kunt &Vosislav Maksimovic, 
Law, Finance, and Firm Growth , 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2134 (1998) (showing firms in countries 
with both an active stock market and a well-developed legal system are able to obtain 
external funds for faster growth) .  
48. The logic is straightforward: given weak legal protection, only voting control will 
protect against expropriation by other equity investors. See Raphael La Porta et a! . ,  
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN.  471, 510 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et  
a! . ,  Cmporate Ownership Around the World] . This study investigates the structure of the 20 
largest corporations in 27 different countries, along with smaller firms (in order to maintain 
consistency of size across jurisdictions). Its authors have chosen to bias large corporations 
because it is these firms which are most likely to possess dispersed ownership patterns. Their 
research shows that, based on a data set which included the ten largest publicly traded non­
financial companies in the sample of countries tested and assuming a 20% definition of 
control, that for large firms: (a) nearly 40% world-wide are widely held; (b) 30% are family 
controlled; (c) 18% are state controlled; and (d) the remaining fall into different categories of 
ownership. See id. at 491. The Berle and Means image of the firm with separation of 
ownership and control dominates in Japan, Britain and the United States, while in the rest of 
the world there are few firms that fit this description. In terms of firms with owners, the 
principal owner types, as noted, are families and the state. It follows that countries with poor 
shareholder protection have more concentrated shareholding (and vice versa). See id. at 496-
97. The study also finds that bank control is not common, showing up in only Germany and 
Belgium. See id. at 502. Blockholding, however, is common, with blockholders employing 
control rights devices and other instruments to limit the power of minorities and typically 
participating in the management of the firm. See id. at 491. For an extension, see Raphael 
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analogous correlations. The level of shareholder protection has been 
shown to relate inversely to the size of the premium over the market 
price per share paid for a maj ority voting block-higher premiums are 
commanded in countries with weak protections .49 A direct connection 
between strong shareholder protections and the volume of initial 
public offerings has also been shown. 50 In contrast, relationships 
between Japanese firms and their main banks have been shown to 
result in reduced pain and easier financing during periods of financial · 
distress . 5 1  
What the studies tend to confirm, then, is the accuracy of the 
casual description of systemic differences, advantages, and 
disadvantages set out above .  Subject to  a couple of prominent 
exceptions, they do not purport to address the matter of comparative 
advantage among developed economies.  52 One exception i s  La Porta, 
La Porta et al . ,  Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. EcoN. REv. 333 ( 1 997) [hereinafter La 
Porta et al. ,  Trust in Large Organizations] . This study starts with the proposition that trust is 
needed to support cooperation in large organizations and accepts an empirical measure of 
trust derived from a survey conducted worldwide. Trust is then connected to government 
effectiveness (measured by investor evaluations), civic participation (measured by 
participation rates) and firm size. See id. at 334. Statistically significant results obtain, with 
higher trust countries having higher levels of cooperative success. See id. The lowest levels 
of trust obtain in countries with high rates of membership in hierarchical religions. See id. at 
336.  
49. See Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock 
Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 25 ( 1 994). Zingales shows a high (86%) premium 
for control blocks in companies listed on the Milan exchange, against a world average of 1 0  
to 20%, and a United States average of 5 .24%. See id. 
50. See id. 
5 1. See Takeo Hoshi et al. , Corporate Structure Liquidity and Investment: Evidence 
from Japanese Industrial Groups, 1 06 Q. J. ECON. 33 ( 1 99 1 ); Takeo Hoshi et al . ,  The Role of 
Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 67 ( 1 990). 
52.  Their main normative message lies with developing economies lacking either 
institutions of legal protection or blockholding. For a similar evaluation, see Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance 52 J. FIN. 769-73 ( 1 997). 
Jonathan Macey argues that the studies confirm market system superiority. See Jonathan 
Macey, Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a 
More Scientific Approach, 1 0  J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 1 6  ( 1 998). We strongly disagree. 
Macey cites results on control premiums and IPO activity, and also stresses the fact that 
market systems have hostile takeovers. This all means, he says, that market systems are 
superior in controlling agency costs . The problem with this argument is that it fails to 
confront the results of the comparative exercise. Takeovers, for example, mean that the 
market system has developed means to deal with the agency costs that result from dispersed 
ownership. The comparison asserts that blockholding tends to prevent these costs from 
occurring in the first place. The same comment can be made about the size of control 
premiums. These reflect the presence or absence of legal protection; blockholder systems are 
said to compensate for a lower level of shareholder protection by delimiting the agency costs 
of the separation of ownership and control. It may be that market systems are superior 
overall and that the results Macey cites are suggestive of that superiority. But that case has 
yet to be made as an empirical proposition. At present, the only available support is the 
lesser backup provided by a theory of the firm that privileges market institutions. 
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Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer' s  finding of no significant relationship 
between per capita gross domestic product and the incidence of 
widely-held firms based on a study of twenty developed countries. 53 
An inference of equal competitive fitness arises. The second 
exception is a famous body of work by Kaplan that looks at 
management replacement rates in the United States, Japan, and 
Germany. This finds no significant differences between the three 
countries and both of these studies can be taken to imply equal 
competitive fitness.54 The respective systems '  evolutionary survival 
in the context of national product markets is another fact that (albeit 
weakly) implies equal competitive fitness . 55 
The informal comparison, recounted above,56 provides additional 
indirect support for the equal fitness hypothesis. Each system' s  
weakness appears to b e  matched by a systemic strength o n  the other 
side, and vice versa, as the tables illustrate. Table 1 shows, broadly, 
that stepped up shareholder monitoring under the blockholder system 
comes at the cost of thick trading markets and associated benefits, and 
that thick trading markets exact a monitoring cost. Table 2 looks at 
management policy and shareholder information levels and highlights 
some points of tension in the comparison. Each system' s  investment 
minus is also its plus and each system' s  investment plus is also its 
minus. Thus the market system suffers from short-sightedness 
because it sacrifices long-term projects to the demand for present 
53 .  See La Porta e t  al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48 ,  a t  5 1 0. 
54. See Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in 
Germany, 1 0  J. L .  ECON. & ORG. 1 42 ( 1 994); Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and 
Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U. S ,  1 02 J. PoL. EcoN . 5 1 0 ( 1 994). See 
also Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: 
Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. EcoN. 225 ( 1 994). See also Colin 
Mayer et a!., Who Disciplines Bad Management? (Tilburg University Working Paper 1 998) 
(on file with author), which provides a complementary study of poorly performing firms in 
Britain, comparing the activity of four sets of interested parties-existing holders of large 
blocks of shares, investors acquiring new holdings, creditors, and non-executive directors. 
The study finds a high level of board turnover, which it attributes to the initiatives of 
creditors and the demands of providers of new equity capital. Outside directors perform a 
weak disciplinary function and large blocks have little influence, with the exception of 
holdings held by industrial companies. 
5 5 .  European commentators point to this as a reproach to American suggestions of 
market system superiority. See Windolf, supra note 26, at 7 1 3- 1 4. For additional evidence, 
see Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 47, at 2 1 20-23, which contradicts the 
conventional wisdom that market depth matters for comparative advantage. Their study 
shows that it is activity, or turnover, that matters in a comparison o f  developed and 
developing countries, rather than the market capitalization ratio. See also Raghuram Rajan & 
Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from 
International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1 42 1 ,  1 422 ( 1 995) (showing that debt equity rations are 
roughly equivalent across G-7 countries) .  
56. See supra notes 1�3 and accompanying text. 
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shareholder value; meanwhile, the ability to deliver present 
shareholder value is the market system' s  plus. In contrast, the block-
Table !-Monitoring Versus Markets 
Shareholder monitoring 
Diversification 
Liquidity 
Shareholder legal rights 
Thick trading markets 
Market Blockholder 
Minus Plus 
Plus Minus 
Plus Minus 
Plus Minus 
Plus Minus 
holder system suffers from an excessive growth focus because it does 
not concern itself with shareholder value; meanwhile, these 
suboptimal growth investments display the long-term time horizon 
Table 2-Investment Policy/Information Asymmetry 
Short-term focus 
Shareholder value focus 
Long-term focus 
Growth focus 
Shareholder information level 
Shareholder objectivity 
Market Blockholder 
Minus Plus 
Plus Minus 
Minus Plus 
Plus Minus 
Minus Plus 
Plus Minus 
said to be its plus. A similar plus-is-minus relationship prevails with 
shareholder information. Blockholding ameliorates information 
asymmetries, but the proximity that opens this access implies 
susceptibility to capture by the management interest and a loss of 
objectivity. On the other hand, information asymmetries are more 
pronounced in market systems, but shareholders (and director 
representatives) at a distance from managers evaluate firm 
performance with a clearer eye . 
The literature explores the implications of the equal fitness 
hypothesis in two frameworks .  One framework looks to global-level 
effects of competitive interaction among firms in international 
product markets. The other looks to competitiveness in national 
contexts. Part II recounts and expands on these discussions. 
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II . FRAMEWORKS FOR COMPARING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS-CONVERGENCE AND NONCONVERGENCE, CROSS 
REFERENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY 
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This Part proceeds as follows. Section A describes the 
theoretical frameworks that facilitate projections of global 
convergence as to the terms of governance systems. Contrasting 
scenarios emerge. Some project a process of international cross 
reference that leads to a new hybrid system composed of elements 
drawn from both market and blockholder systems.  Others assert the 
primacy of product market discipline and dismiss comparative 
governance policy inquiry as irrelevant, even as they assert 
evolutionary superiority for the market system and project its eventual 
emergence in global competition. Section B describes a contrasting 
analytical framework that projects persistent variation in national 
institutions even in a global economy. This approach is informed by 
social theory and second-best economics and rejects the technological 
determinism that informs projections of a unitary, global capitalism. 
It acknowledges the possibility of convergence, but at the same time 
emphasizes matters that make convergence unlikely, such as the 
embeddedness of national systems of production and political barriers 
to governance reform. Under this weak convergence perspective, 
comparative governance exercises have their primary bearing in 
domestic policy contexts. In Section C ,  comparative governance 
emerges as a two course menu. Participants make basic choices 
between (a) the strong and weak convergence perspectives, and (b) 
alternative descriptions of governance institutions as either divisible 
and fitted for cross reference or indivisible and not so fitted. We plot 
the four possible selections on a matrix that shows four contrasting 
perspectives .  We then discuss the taxonomy' s  descriptive and 
normative implications . 
A. Comparative Analysis in a Global Framework: Strong 
Convergence and Irrelevance 
Many argue that the globalization of production, finance, and 
trade is causing national economies to converge as to performance, 
and national economic institutions to converge as to form. Global 
competition will mean bigger markets calling for large and capital 
intensive (but specialized) producers and necessitating cross-border 
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collaboration among existing producing organizations .  5 7  These 
producers will access capital in financial markets uncoupled from 
national regulatory restraints.58 Innovative production technologies, 
like capital, will rapidly diffuse to firms worldwide. 59 The same 
should follow for corporate governance institutions. 
Many examples of movement toward corporate governance 
convergence support this prediction. Many of these follow from 
cross-border investment and finance, including mergers and 
acqms1t10ns . For example, hundreds of firms from blockholder 
systems raise equity capital in securities markets in Britain and the 
United States and in consequence must conform to stricter accounting 
standards and incur ancillary regulatory costs. 60 Some of these firms 
have also experienced pressure for American-style governance reform 
upon the acquisition of significant ownership stakes by American 
investment institutions.6 1  Contrariwise, American producers acquired 
by foreign firms have become subject to governance structures unique 
to blockholder systems.62 
Additional evidence of convergence occurs within national 
systems as they change to take on other systems '  characteristics. For 
example, European securities markets have increased in depth in 
recent years, partly due to the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
In Italy, for example, privatization has meant a dramatic increase in 
the number of large-capitalization, widely-held corporations; between 
1 995 and 1 997 the ratio of Italian stock market capitalization to gross 
57. See Robert Boyer, The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still 
the Century of Nations?, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 5, at 
47 .  
58 .  See Milhaupt, supra note 1 2, at  1 1 86-87 .  
59. See id. 
60. At the end of 1 996 there were a total of 784 foreign issuers listed on NASDAQ, the 
NYSE and the Amex. See Amir Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International 
Securities Regulation in A World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J .  INT ' L  L. 563, 
566 ( 1 998). The announcement of a dual listing tends to cause an increase in share value. 
See id. at 634-3 5 .  
6 1 .  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in  Co1porate 
Ownership and Governance, in COLU M .  CORP. Gov., supra note 2, 575,  580.  
62.  The most famous example is the German two-tier board that governs the combined 
Daimler Benz-Chrysler. See Chrysler Corp . ,  Proxy Statement: For a Special Meeting of the 
Stockholders to be held on September 1 8 , 1 998, at 1 6- 1 7  (Aug. 6, 1 998) (on file with the 
SEC) . See also Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The 
Daimler-Chrysler Case, 1 55 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 1 9 ( 1 999) (explaining 
the structure of the merger by reference to German law, in particular its constraints on both 
forward and reverse triangular mergers, and the practice in German corporate law of creating 
capital structures in order to protect firms from opportunistic dissenting shareholders) . 
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domestic product rose from 1 9. 3% to 3 1 . 3%.63 One of these new 
large-capitalization Italian firms has even been the victim of a 
successful hostile takeover. Germany has seen a dramatic increase in 
the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of privately-held firms .  
Its Neuermarkt, set up to attract start-up company listings in  the 
manner of the NASDAQ, 64 will see 1 00 IPOs in 1 999. At the same 
time, large capitalization German conglomerates are undergoing 
American-style unbundling, selling off holdings in subsidiaries and 
affiliates into the Frankfurt Neuermarkt.65 
Meanwhile, governance reform by international cross 
reference also has become an everyday topic in corporate policy 
debates .  The first prominent round of discussions on comparative 
governance occurred in the United States in the early 1 990s, 
prompted by a perception that shortcomings in domestic practice had 
contributed to the failure of American firms in several key sectors to 
compete successfully against foreign rivals .66 Systemic shortcomings 
were alleged-the market system had operated in the United States in 
the 1 980s to favor short term increases in shareholder value and deter 
long-term investment in production processes. As a result, Japanese 
and German producers, which had invested more in search of growth, 
had a product market advantage. It was thought that America ' s  short­
term bias had arisen as a perverse result of widespread hostile 
takeover activity in the 1 980s. Ironically, by the early 1 990s, new 
legal controls constrained takeovers , constraints that also deprived the 
governance system of a principal disciplinary device .  It was thought 
that America therefore needed to look abroad for additional means of 
agency cost control in order to reestablish a competitive position. It 
made sense to make reference to the systems whose firms were seen 
to be beating American firms in product markets-systems which had 
not evolved to rely on takeovers . Thus, European and Japanese 
practices of bank monitoring, cross holding, and blockholding 
presented themselves as simultaneous correctives for both shmi-term 
investment bias and the takeover' s  decline.67 
63. See John C.  Coffee, Jr. ,  The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. REv. 64 1 ,  665 
( 1 999). This is still a small percentage. The figure for Britain in 1 995 was 1 32% and for the 
United States it was nearly 87%. See id. at 663. 
64. See id. at 664-65.  
65. See Jack Ewing et al . ,  Enough Spin-Ojjs to Make You Dizzy, Bus. WK. INT ' L  ED. ,  
May 1 0, 1 999, at 68.  
66. See Porter, supra note 1 ,  at 5-8. 
67. Policy debates respecting participation of institutional investors in governance in 
the United States provided an independent impetus. For discussion, see infra notes 1 44-62 
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Today ' s  Europeans return the favor, looking to the corporate 
governance institutions of the United States to improve the quality of 
boardroom operations and enhance the depth and liquidity of their 
trading markets.68 Toward this end, the Italian government 
and accompanying text. 
68. Three prominent committee reports demonstrate the trend: England's  Cadbury 
Committee, the Netherlands ' Peters Committee, and France 's  Vienot Committee. The best 
practices they recommend will be familiar to American observers. 
(a) England. The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of 
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Dec . 1 992) [hereinafter 
Cadbury Committee Report] develops a Code of Best Practice based on a survey of the 
financial practices of 200 firms in Britain. The Code addresses the design, structure, and 
function of the corporate board. The Committee recommends, inter alia, ( 1 )  that if the same 
person holds the positions of the CEO and executive director, then the board should be 
balanced by the inclusion of a senior non-executive director substantially independent from 
the CEO/executive director; (2) that outside directors have an important p lace on the board, 
and should form and manage special committees on the executive director's compensation; 
(3) that the board form an audit committee including at least three non-executive directors. 
The mechanism of a voluntary code, which presupposes that companies that do not comply 
disclose that fact, seems to have worked reasonably well in Britain. See Committee on 
Corporate Governance, Final Report (Jan. 1 998) [hereinafter Hampel Committee Report] 
(established to review the operations of the Cad bury Committee' s  recommendations). 
(b) The Netherlands. The Committee on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance in 
the Netherlands-Forty Recommendations (June 1 997) [hereinafter Peters Committee 
Report] ,  sets out a l ist of forty recommendations for companies listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. The report provides, inter alia, ( 1 )  that the Dutch supervisory board be 
given formal independence from the managing board in order to guarantee effectively that 
the duties to shareholders are upheld; (2) that executive compensation for supervisory board 
members should be linked to long-tenn investment in the firm and should not be tied to short­
term results; (3) that supervisory board members not gain personally from their role on the 
board; (4) that, toward greater transparency, the annual report should contain information 
about backgrounds of board members, the number of shares held, and business relationships 
with the firm; (5) that an audit committee or the supervisory board should monitor the quality 
of external financial reports, ensure compliance with internal procedures, facilitate external 
communications with auditors, and establish high standards with regard to audits. 
This code, like the British one, contemplates that if a firm decides not to adopt a 
recommendation, then it must explain its action. Moreover, the supervisory board is to assess 
whether the auditors should verify the reporting of implementation of the recommendations. 
Interestingly, a follow-up study prepared by an accounting firm shows that, although 
companies have welcomed the Peters Report with open arms, they have done very little in the 
way of adopting its recommendations. Meanwhile, the Dutch Minister of Finance has warned 
that mandatory rules may be in the offing. 
(c) France. Le Conseil D 'Administracion des Societes Cotees, Raport du Groupe de Travail 
de l 'Association Francaise des Entreprises Pricees et du Conseil National du Patronat 
Francais (July 1 995) [hereinafter Vienot Committee Report], like the British and Dutch 
reports, emanates from the financial community. More particularly, it was appointed by the 
Conseil National du Patronat Francais and the Association Francaise des Enterprises Privees. 
Here the express aim is to assist small investors by providing greater transparency and to 
assist foreign investors newly involved in the French stock market. The committee 
recommends, inter alia, ( I) that the board produce a regular report on the activities of the 
firm; (2) that there be at least two outside directors per listed company; (3) that boards form 
committees to monitor the actions of management, select top executives, and set 
compensation. 
1 999] COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 237 
promulgated a package of securities and corporate law reforms in 
1 998 .69 Japan has removed both process restrictions that inhibit 
shareholder derivative actions 70 and legal restrictions on share 
issuance that prevent issuers from including stock options in 
management compensation arrangements . 7 1  American-style 
shareholder activism is also spreading. For example, French 
shareholders have been forming associations, initiating inquiries, and 
questioning entrenched practices. 72 
The list of confirming examples, although impressive, does 
not tell us much about the degree, character, and speed of the 
convergence being projected. Cross-border stock listing and merger 
and acquisition activity, for example, can continue to increase in 
volume without entailing systemic convergence. The French or 
For commentary, see Karel Lannoo, A European Perspective on Corporate Governance, 37 
J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 269 ( 1 999) (recognizing a contradiction between, on the one hand, 
the globalization of markets, and on the other hand, the insular nature of national corporate 
governance systems in the EU, but acknowledging that the recent, gradual convergence in 
corporate governance regimes, as reflected in the recommendations of the three semi-official 
national committees, Cadbury, Vienot and Peters, constitutes adaptation to globalization). 
69. These include increased disclosure requirements and a requirement of a mandatory 
takeover bid by any person or group acquiring 30% or more of the shares of a publicly held 
company. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 665-66.  
70 .  See generally Mark D .  West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in 
Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L .  REv. 1 436 ( 1 994). 
7 1 .  See Milhaupt, supra note 12, at 1 1 88-89. 
Recent German reforms can also be cited. The Act on Control and Transparency of 
Enterprises (implemented on May 1 ,  1 998) seeks to increase performance of supervisory 
boards, create greater transparency, and strengthen shareholder positions. The new 
legislation also facilitates performance pay (either through share buybacks or other schemes) 
for management. At the same time, the Act attempts to limit the influence of banks on 
voting. The Act provides that: (a) a bank must inform customers whose shares it administers 
that their shares can be exercised by a shareholder association or by the bank; (b) a bank must 
inform its clients when it holds 5% or more of the voting rights of a company or was 
involved with that firm recently as a member of an underwriting syndicate; (c) a bank must 
advise customers if any one of its managers or employees is a member of the management or 
supervisory board of a firm in which the client holds stock. In order to implement these 
changes, banks are required to take steps to ensure that their own interests do not influence 
the voting rights of their customers (that is, to appoint a compliance officer). More 
significantly, the Act, through new sec . 1 35 Is 3 Aktg, provides that a bank may not exercise 
the voting rights of its customers in a corporation in which it holds 5% or more of the shares, 
unless it has obtained specific prior approval or does not exercise its own voting rights; 
amendments refer to the Stock Corporation Act. All of these changes could be denominated 
as movement in the direction of market system regulation. For discussion of this legislation, 
see THEODOR BAVMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY: S YSTEM AND C URRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 1 7- 1 8  (University of Osnabruck Working Paper No. 70, 1 998) .  
72. See Oliver Pastre, C01porate Governance: The End of "L 'exception Francaise "?,  
1 998 COLUM. Bus . L. REv. 79, 86-88 ( 1 998). There is also evidence that the Italian 
Parliament reacted to demands from foreign investors when it increased its disclosure 
standards in 1 998.  See Coffee, supra note 63, at 665-66. 
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German company that avails itself of the New York or London equity 
market remains rooted in its blockholder system of origin even as it 
makes some governance concessions . Indeed, such a firm's  very 
resort to a cross-border transaction to raise equity capital 
demonstrates the continuing salience of systemic differences.  A 
convergence event does occur when the firm consents to a change in 
its governing rules.  But this is  convergence on a company-specific 
basis rather than at the level of a national system. Managers of 
multinational firms have for decades been making reference to 
international sources and engineering changes in internal governance 
processes that similarly imply convergence. In all of these cases, the 
firm's  home governance system continues unchanged. Note that 
convergence events such as these occur in the new global venue-in 
the world of transnational linkages generated by actors in the handful 
of international business centers that provide financial and corporate 
services on a global basis . 73 The vast maj ority of such linkages, to the 
extent they entail legal obligations, rely on conventional national 
systems to guarantee contract and property rights 74 and to create and 
define juridical corporations. Such global transactions and actors 
interact with and influence national systems but have not as yet 
fundamentally transformed them. 
Other items on the list of confirming examples more directly 
signal possibilities for the convergence of national systems. 
Thickening trading markets and related law reform initiatives make 
the German and Italian blockholder systems more market-like; the 
United States'  institutional investor movement seeks a more 
blockholder-like environment. Counter-anecdotes can be cited, 
however. The United States '  institutional investor movement 
succeeded more in changing academic theory than in changing 
embedded market system practices. Europe-wide law reform in the 
form of EU directives related to insider-trading and disclosure of 
significant ownership stakes has been hobbled by slow 
implementation and indifferent compliance. 75 
To catalog anecdotes, then, is to collect evidence of both 
global convergence and persistent national differentials .  The 
collected anecdotes provide little basis for projecting convergence ' s  
degree, character, and speed. To move beyond cataloging and 
73. For a fuller description, see SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
194-2 1 4  ( 1 998) 
74. See id. at 1 99. 
75.  For a description of the difficulties with the transparency directive, see Coffee, 
supra note 63 , at 669-7 1 .  For a description of the difficulties with the insider trading 
directive, see infra note 1 76. 
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evaluate the anecdotes'  meaning requires reference to a theoretical 
framework. To make that reference is to encounter three schools of 
thought, each supporting a different projection. The schools are : (a) a 
strong global perspective that posits a determinative causal link 
between corporate governance institutions and the competitive 
survival of firms in international product markets and stresses both 
the importance of governance reform and the possibility of successful 
systemic cross reference; (b) an irrelevance perspective that posits the 
same causal link but dismisses the importance of governance reform 
and the value of systemic cross reference; and (c) a weak convergence 
perspective that emphasizes impediments to the realization of at-the­
margin competitive dynamics at the global level and questions the 
inevitability of institutional convergence. The strong convergence 
and irrelevance perspectives are discussed below. The weak 
· convergence scenario and the closely related national framework of 
comparative corporate governance inquiry are discussed in Section B .  
1 .  Strong Convergence and Productive Cross Reference 
Strong globalization scenarios depict national economic 
systems as firms competing in a frictionless world market that brings 
national institutions to the margin that determines competitive success 
or failure . Such a market does not in fact occur in the real world, of 
course. But, citing growing international product competition, 
financial deregulation, and trade liberalization, many now hold this 
global, at-the-margin model to provide a plausible basis for making 
predictions about the future development of national economies. 76 A 
series of projections follow. 77 Under the law of a single price, each 
commodity should carry the same price throughout the world market 
and production costs should equalize world-wide . Given free trade 
and complete diffusion of technical knowledge, national productivity 
levels and growth rates should also converge, even assuming 
continued barriers to the movement of labor and capital .78 
This model also projects that competition and emulation 
among producers will lead to homogenous institutional settings . 
Since coordination mechanisms, including corporate governance 
7 6 .  See, e.g. , KENICHI 0HMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE 
INTERLINKED ECONOMY x-xiv, 1 6 1-62 ( 1 990) (contending that national borders will be 
smashed by a new world market lying beyond the capacity of national intervention) .  
7 7 .  For a description, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law 
or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 6 1  Moo. L. REV. 1 1  ( 1 998). 
7 8. See Boyer, supra note 57,  at 30-3 1 .  
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arrangements, figure into produc.
tion costs, the viability �f the best 
arrangements and innovatwns will be tested and proved m product 
and factor markets . Rational actors responding to price competition 
will seek to design or emulate optimal arrangements.79 Actors and 
firms that fail to adopt these superior organizational technologies will 
in the short run lose money and in the long run disappear. 80 Diffusion 
of knowledge respecting the best practices will follow as a practical 
matter from contacts among multinational managers, consultants, 
lawyers, government actors, and academics. 81 Accordingly, the only 
cognizable barrier to actual convergence to best practice comes from 
government controls82 like trade barriers and corporate governance 
mandates .  More generally, to the extent that convergence proves to 
be slow or uncertain, it must be that government actors or rent­
seeking interest groups are using resources generated outside of 
markets to sustain distinctive national institutions.83 
These predictions, if robust, imply a dividing point in the 
history of corporations. We come to a moment-whether in the 
immediate past, the present, or in the near future-at which 
intensifying competition in international product markets for the first 
time turns endowments derived from national governance systems 
into factors relevant to firms' competitive survival . Once this 
industrial divide is crossed, the identification of a material difference 
between two systems ' governance practices gives rise to the 
possibility of, first, long-run relative competitive advantage for firms 
organized in one of the systems (and disadvantage for those in the 
other) and, second, a need to reform the system not presently 
endowed with the better practice . 84 This comparison facilitates a just­
in-time intervention that gives the firm or system with a comparative 
disadvantage a chance to self-correct at an early stage in the history of 
the global market. 
Note also that crossing the divide causes formerly irrelevant 
79.  See generally id. at 34, 54. Under post-war macroeconomic theory, given 
competitive markets and the availability in each country of the same technology, each 
country has the same growth rate. See id. at 34--35.  
80. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 6 1 ,  at 565,  568-69 .  
8 1 .  See Boyer, supra note 57 ,  at 46. 
82. See J.  Mark Ramseyer, Are Co1porate Governance Systems Converging: The 
A-Contextual Logic to the Japanese Keiretsu ,  in COLUM. CoRP. Gov. supra note 2, at 537 ,  
544. 
83. See Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in NA T!ONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM, supra note 5, at 1 .  
84. These are not the only possibilities. The systems, although materially different, also 
could be equally competitively fit. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
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differences in governance practice to start to bear on competitive 
fitness. To see this, continue to take a neoclassical, first-best view of 
the effects of product market competition, and assume further that 
governance institutions bear on product cost and that national product 
competition is keen, but that there is little or no international trade. It 
follows for any given nation that domestic firms following inferior 
governance practices have already disappeared or will do so 
forthwith. To the extent that all surviving firms within a given 
national system follow a common set of practices, the practices do not 
lie at the margin of competitive survival even if they are inferior to 
practices followed abroad. International product markets remain too 
thin to bring them to the margin. 
If we now change the facts and interpose expanding 
international product markets, there follows a projection of a second 
round of competitive testing in the global venue for the governance 
institutions of firms organized within each national system. National 
practices theretofore irrelevant to competitive fitness become 
relevant. No inference of competitive advantage in the new 
international environment arises from the fact of national-level 
survival . Identification of a point of difference between national 
systems can as easily imply future competitive disadvantage as 
advantage for a given set of national firms . 
In a Coasean world, each competing firm would restructure 
itself and the necessary adjustments would occur on an informal, 
decentralized basis. In the real world, in contrast, law and political 
processes will matter for the adjustment of corporate governance 
institutions in the new global venue. Law influences shareholder 
protection, agency cost control, and the investment behavior of 
financial intermediaries and blockholders, and thereby the form and 
relative effectiveness of governance arrangements of firms organized 
in a particular national framework. It follows that law reform can 
figure importantly in a given national system's  adjustment process. 
Assuming no political barriers, it also follows that convergence to 
best practice can be projected not only for firms'  internal 
arrangements, but for national corporate law regimes .  85 
These strong convergence projections presuppose a high 
degree of technological determinism. In the world they posit, all 
firms face the same optimizing problems and seize on the same 
solutions .86 This adaptive dynamic depends on an assumption of 
85. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 6 1 ,  at 575 .  
86 . Carrying this point out to its logical conclusion, the implicit assertion is that there is 
a single optimal way of organizing production among a possible multiplicity of local optima. 
242 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [3 8 :2 1 3 
pervasive and high-powered incentives to innovate. This assumption, 
however, challenges the equal competitive fitness hypothesis, 
discussed above. 87 If the systems are equally fit, it could follow that 
their differences, even their most prominent differences, are irrelevant 
to productivity. 88 Consider the fact that the market and blockholder 
systems share an inability to reduce the agency costs of management 
to zero even as they treat these costs differently. By hypothesis, then, 
each system could be reducing the aggregate of agency and capital 
costs to roughly the same level at roughly the same cost. If all other 
systemic costs and benefits worked out roughly equally, then the 
differences among the systems would not impact on bottom line 
results, at least until a change in the prevailing economic context 
caused the situation of cost equality to change. In this scenario, 
incentives to invest in innovative governance technologies cannot be 
assumed: if nothing disturbs the equilibrium, corporate governance 
does not matter at the margin. It follows that the strong convergence 
proponent who subscribes to the equal competitive fitness view must 
articulate a plausible scenario that highlights a generative incentive to 
invest in governance reform. 
The missing incentive lies encased in the prediction that 
competitive evolution will result in a new hybrid system that adopts 
the best practices on an international menu. 89 Proponents predict that, 
given imperfections in both present systems, there will likely ensue a 
process of borrowing and modification of components of existing 
systems. Certain features of certain national systems will come to be 
seen as possessing problem-solving advantages and come in for 
widespread adoption. The incentive to adopt follows from the 
ordinary stress to reduce costs felt by actors under competitive 
pressure . 
This is plausible enough, but one further operative assumption 
needs to be highlighted. For governance cross reference to offer 
advantageous solutions in which business  actors willingly invest, the 
existing systems must have divisible components. That is, a 
particular feature (or innovation) must be detachable from one system 
and adaptable to another. 90 If the systems are in fact divisible, then 
See Boyer, supra note 57 ,  at 47 .  
87. See supra notes 5 3-54 and accompanying text. 
88 .  One can reach the same insight by juxtaposing the two systems and then viewing 
both from the point of view of an observer in a Third World country. That observer sees 
commonalties for the most part. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 52,  at 7 3 7-3 8 .  
89 .  See Aoki , supra note 3 3 ,  a t  23-24 . See RoE, supra note 6 ,  a t  1 87-94. 
90. See Berger, supra note 83, at 1 2- 1 4. For a speculation as to the components of a 
hybrid corporate governance regime, see Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 ,  at I 08-09.  
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the cross reference hypothesis emerges as robust. Policy discussion 
should anticipate the hybrid' s likely composition so as to identify 
barriers to its realization. Moreover, assuming intense global product 
competition and no other significant frictions, the systems should 
indeed converge in their broad outlines over time. 9 1 
2� Irrelevance and Market Superiority 
The connection just drawn between a strong convergence 
scenario and the cross reference hypothesis has been controverted by 
an irrelevance contention following from neoclassical microeconomic 
assumptions. 
Chicago School critics suggest that governance reform by 
· cross reference at best would be wasted effort and at worst could 
injure market systems.92 They posit a global marketplace just as (and 
perhaps more) competitive than that posited in the strong convergence 
model. Here again product competition determines firm survival and 
any governance arrangement that hobbles a competitor with excess 
costs causes failure. But here it follows that firms not only must 
choose optimal governance arrangements in order to survive, but that 
governance problems take care of themselves in the long run. In that 
long run, therefore, corporate governance policy inquiries are 
irrelevant. 93 In the meantime, the differences between governance 
Kester' s  hybrid, inter alia, preserves some of the shareholder protections and high powered 
incentives of present market systems, but contemplates informal ties among co-operating 
companies as in Japan. 
9 1 .  It should b e  noted that the cross reference hypothesis can be restated i n  a weaker 
form so as to allow for the persistence of national level colorations. See Berger, supra note 
83, at 1 8-1 9. 
92. Cf Merton H.  Miller, Is American Co1porate Governance Fatally Flawed?, in 
lNT'L GOVERNANCE, supra note 1 ,  at 44-45.  
93 . This irrelevance point can be  combined in a unitary description with the irrelevance 
point made above, in the text accompanying supra note 88, despite their different emphases. 
For a first step, juxtapose the two stories: the first focuses on a structural feature of a first­
best world; the second follows from the fortuitous possibility that systemic differences may 
have equivalent cost implications .  The juxtaposition highlights the point that neither 
irrelevance story eliminates the possibility that systemic differences can have important cost 
consequences for competing firms and national economies. A cost difference has the greatest 
impact for a firm at the margin, where any cost disadvantage impairs its survival. Ironically, 
the margin is  the base point for the first story's  irrelevance claim, while under the second 
story it is  the point of greatest relevance for governance difference. This is  because what the 
first story makes irrelevant is less governance itself than governance policy talk. Talk 
matters least at the margin. There the uncompetitive finn runs out of room to maneuver, 
market practice identifies the most productive governance device, and no reference to theory 
Is necessary. 
Let us take a step way from the margin and introduce a small measure of room in which firms 
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systems highlighted in comparative ,discussions are immaterial . !his 
is because blockholder systems components and behavwral 
characteristics can be explained by reference to the same 
microeconomic model that explains the components and 
characteristics of market systems.  94 Convergence at a substantively 
significant level already has occurred. Differences obviously exist, 
but these always can be accounted for as adjustments to legal 
barriers . 95 
This two-sided irrelevance assertion is accompanied by the 
claim that the United States '  market system is substantively sound 
and not in need of reform. 96 Proponents of cross  reference, it is  
argued, overreacted when they claimed at the beginning of the 1 990s 
that recent legal constraints on hostile takeovers created a need to 
look to blockholder systems for alternative arrangements to control 
agency costs .97 Subsequent events have shown that the market system 
has adjusted very well : takeover activity again breaks volume records; 
new strategies for hostile tender offers have been developed; and 
institutional activism has become a governance constant. 98 In the 
alternative, it is admitted that the subset of hostile takeover activity 
with different practices having positive cost implications can survive over an intermediate 
term. Here the relevance of the comparative exercise depends on the observer's  point of 
view. An observer with an investment or citizenship stake in one of the competing systems 
might be quite interested to know whether it possesses the relatively inferior or relatively 
superior practice. But if one changes perspectives and looks at the competing systems from a 
general efficiency point of view, then the comparison loses its urgency once again. From this 
point of view, any needed corrections are assured in the long run, along with the concrete 
identification of the superior practice. Only if all systems produce deadweight losses due to 
some shared perverse feature does this point of view counsel intervention at the planning 
level. 
94. Ramseyer illustrates this point with an historical explanation of the Japanese system 
couched solely in terms of rational, self-interested responses to the national economic and 
legal environment. See Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 7 ,  546-47, 5 5 5 .  Ramseyer admits that 
the explanation is incomplete because it does not explain cross-shareholdings held by 
nonfinancial keiretsu members who do not stand in a vertical supplier-customer relationship 
with the issuer. Since the blocks of stock held by these firms are small on a percentage 
basis-less than 5% of most keiretsu members-he dismisses the phenomenon as trivial or 
symbolic. Id. at 5 5 7 .  
Aoki provides a useful contrast to  this analysis. Here the same microeconomic perspective is  
applied so as to highlight systemic differences. See Aoki, supra note 33,  at 1 8-24. 
95.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?, 
9 J. APPLIED CORP. FrN. 23, 29 ( 1 997);  Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 8 .  
9 6 .  See Ramseyer, supra note 82,  at  540-4 1 (arguing that barriers to  hostile bids do not 
reduce the diffusion of efficient governance strategies.) .  Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Italian 
Governance: One American 's Perspective, 1 998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 2 1 ,  1 24-25 ( 1 998) 
(describing evaluative standards under which the United States emerges as first best) .  
97. See infra notes 1 46-56 and accompanying text. 
98.  See Boot & Macey, supra note 2,  at 232-3 3 ;  Easterbrook, supra note 95,  at 24-25 .  
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decreased in the 1 990s, but it is argued that the decrease does not 
much difference . A potential acquirer with a better governance 
ends up taking over the target one way or the other. If 
regulation forecloses the option of a hostile takeover, then the 
acquirer will win over r�cal�itrant members _
of the defending board 
with side payments d1sgmsed as consultmg agreements or as 
nonsubstantive high paying j obs .  Hostile takeovers accordingly are 
not the only means to the end of bringing new governance strategies 
.to the firms that need them. Friendly mergers and acquisitions can 
substitute for them, with the sole difference going to the pattern of 
distribution of merger gain. 99 
Some commentators in this vein go a step further to argue that 
market systems occupy a higher evolutionary plateau and are 
intrinsically superior to blockholder alternatives .  100 Nothing in 
99. See Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 540--41 .  
100. See, e.g. , Miller, supra note 92, at 3 8--4 1 ;  Easterbrook, supra note 95 ,  at 26 
(comparing Europe and East Asia to the United States in the late nineteenth century); Macey, 
supra note 96, at 1 23-29 (arguing that systemic performance can be gauged by reference to 
barriers against self dealing and robustness of securities markets).  Macey argues that there is 
empirical support for this assertion. See Macey, supra note 96 at 1 24-2 5 .  We refute this 
claim in the text accompanying supra note 52 .  
Rajan and Zingales pursue the superiority argument on a more serious level, in connection 
with their discussion of the current East Asian crisis .  As discussed, Rajan and Zingales 
describe misallocations of capital in the context of relational banking systems, hypothesizing 
that a relationship-based system works better in less developed economies where price 
signals are less effective. They note recent work on the performance of United States 
conglomerates abroad which appears to confirm the view that, despite resource misallocation 
within the firms, these large groups perform better in less developed markets such as India 
and South Africa. Rajan and Zingales attempt to develop a theoretical framework which 
provides a guide to the circumstances supporting the emergence of a relationship approach 
and the circumstances supporting an arm' s  length approach. Under this framework, a 
relationship-based system will emerge when there exists little investment capital and 
contractabi lity is  low. In contrast, an arm' s-length system dominates when there exists 
abundant capital and high-quality proj ects. Both systems are equivalent when there is  little 
available capital but high contractability. Rajan and Z ingales posit that in this last situation, 
the arm's-length system will eventually replace the relationship based approach. See supra 
text accompanying note 4 1 .  
Rajan and Zingales employ their model to explain the recent crisis i n  East Asia. Until 
recently, East Asian economies have been dominated by the relationship-based model. Prior 
to the liberalization of capital, most East Asian markets lacked sufficient capital even though 
good investment projects were abundant. The opening of these markets saw a dramatic shift 
of capital flows toward East Asia. Yet, these systems had few well developed controls in 
place to monitor these loans properly. In effect, the East Asian economies reflected a 
combination of high sources of capital and low contractabi lity, with the result that neither 
system could operate effectively. In response, Western investors took a short-term view in 
order to facilitate easy exit. The compromise was effective until the crisis emerged. The 
crisis led to a massive retreat of short-term capital from these markets, since there existed 
inadequate protection. 
Rajan and Zingales argue that, while moral hazard and panic may have played a role, the 
crisis should be explained by reference to the unhappy encounter of arm' s  length and 
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economic theory makes this assertion untenable . It may be that the 
market system does have superior properties of competitive fitness 
and will achieve hegemony after a period of competitive struggle . 
The convergence events cataloged above also can be  drawn on to 
support this view. 1 01 Firms that opt to list in London and New York 
in effect vote with their feet, seeking to lower their cost of capital by 
bringing themselves in a market system context. In so doing they 
resemble American firms that reincorporate in Delaware. Meanwhile, 
to the extent that firms in market systems have a lower cost of equity 
capital, they have a financing advantage in the emerging global 
takeover market. There results a projection of long iun assimilation 
of firms from blockholder systems into multinational firms with 
market system parents. 102 As more and more firms from blockholder 
systems adopt market institutions by these transactional means, their 
systems of origin become less and less relevant. Presumably, such 
marginalization imports an impetus for adaption of market institutions 
through law reform. Arguably, we see the beginning of this in Europe 
today. 
On this view, present policy discussion in market system 
venues should be directed to the preservation and enhancement of this 
advantage. It also must be noted, however, that nothing in economic 
theory guarantees the correctness of this evolutionary superiority 
claim. If the equal competitive fitness  hypothesis turns out to be 
accurate, then the foregoing scenario does not work. All such 
assertions lie at the level of hypothesis, pending the appearance of a 
decisive empirical literature or the occurrence of the long run. 
A point of tension between the evolutionary superiority claim 
and the irrelevance claim should also be noted. If policy choices 
respecting systemic structure are absolutely irrelevant, then, by 
hypothesis, the Anglo-Saxon market system cannot meaningfully be 
deemed to be evolutionarily superior. The systemic superiority claim 
implies not only relevance for policymaking but an emphatic policy 
agenda. Under this, the market system needs protection from forces 
of interest group rent-seeking, protection that should be secured in 
advance of the promotion of structural change inspired by reference to 
the more primitive systems of Japan and Germany. 
relationship-based systems. The flight of arm's  length capital was rational given the options 
available to investors. At the same time, Rajan and Zingales concede that East Asian 
countries may have made a strategic error in accepting such large flows of near term capital 
without developing adequate institutions to support the new financial environment. See Raj an 
& Zingales, supra note 4 1 ,  at 44-45 . 
1 0 1 .  See supra notes 60--72 and accompanying text. 
1 02. See La Porta et a! . ,  Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2 . 
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B. Weak Convergence and Comparative Governance in a 
National Framework 
1 .  Barriers to Convergence and the Weak Convergence 
Perspective 
247 
A third body of theory controverts both strong convergence 
hypotheses described above, rejecting their technological determinism 
even while acknowledging the existence and importance of the 
emerging global markets . 1 03 This alternative approach also rejects the 
idea that a single production technology always must emerge as the 
winner. 1 04 It instead posits that there may be more than one way to 
solve a given technical problem. Expanding on this point, it also 
suggests that there can be more than one type of capitalism: not only 
may different national systems of production be functionally 
equivalent and equally fit, but national differences may persist 
indefinitely. 1 05 
This perspective draws on social as well as economic theory to 
depict national systems as tightly bundled packages of specific 
resources, institutions, and legacies. The perspective does not deny 
the possibility of convergence to best practice. But it asserts that 
when such convergence does occur, such convergence does not 
follow from the operation of a self-implementing mechanism like the 
at-the-margin adjustment process described in strong convergence 
1 03 .  See Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 ,  a t  1 08-09. 
1 04.  For an example of this thinking, see BUSfNESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEY . ,  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: lMPROVfNG COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL fN GLOBAL 
MARKETS-A REPORT TO THE OECD ( 1 998) (rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach to 
corporate governance, opting for pluralism and adaptability of corporate governance, and 
recommending that nations adapt corporate governance rules suited to changing competitive 
markets, formulate minimum standards of corporate governance designed to promote fairness 
and transparency, issue voluntary best practices for boards to improve accountabil ity, 
encourage common principles for disclosure, and emphasize the impact that corporate law 
rules have for private and public sector). 
1 05 .  A related point of view that favors centralization also should be mentioned. If 
national-level sticking points will prevent convergence to best practice, then international­
level coordination may be called for. See Paul Davies, Issues in Corporate Governance 14  
(Presented at the Single Market and Company Law Conference, European Commission 1 997) 
(on file with author) (addressing corporate governance in the European Community). Davies 
argues that, given the central role of the EC in generating the conditions for effective 
mobility of capital across borders, the EC should promote cross-community action by 
coordinating the corporate governance requirements of national stock markets. Under this 
approach, the articulation of common standards would be developed in a single EC 
instrument. See id. 
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theory. 106 Convergence instead occurs with�n limits s.et by natio�al contexts. Accordingly, its effects are uncertam and vaned, dependmg 
on precise configurations of markets, technical competencies, 107 
property rights institutions ,  and related incentives. 1 08 Nor can we 
safely assume that a best practice will emerge and be adopted 
universally. A materially different national system can survive in a 
competitive global market by finding a niche suited to its particular 
endowments . 1 09 Alternatively, a national system may be disabled 
from adopting a productive technical innovation because the 
necessary implementing reform lacks political feasibility when 
mooted in the context of a tightly-fitted set of national institutions .  
Given barriers such as these, significant, context-breaking steps 
toward convergence are most likely to be taken during the political 
crisis that follows an external economic shock. 1 1 0 
This picture of intermittent movement toward convergence 
can be restated in the terms of second-best microeconomics. 
Movement is intermittent because competition operates imperfectly, 
hobbled by asymmetric information, contracting frictions, sunk costs, 
increasing returns to scale, and public goods problems. 1 1 1  Instead of a 
unique, global equilibrium, then, we should expect unstable, 
punctuated equilibria. Convergence can indeed occur-but so can 
autonomous evolution, partial catch-up followed by collapse, or 
catch-up followed by forging ahead. Strong convergence predictions, 
106 .  There is accordingly no tension between this description and the contemporary 
movement toward partial integration of national systems in Europe and North America. The 
conventional view of harmonization initiatives such as that of the European Union is that 
mutually designed institutional structures faci litate the development of competitive 
techniques in a more open marketplace. The European movement toward harmonization 
assumes partial divergence, in that some countries will be slower in adapting common 
standards due to their relative starting points. 
1 07 .  Technology is not a pure public good. Accordingly, its use depends on learning. It 
follows that different producers will be differentiated in respect of their abi lity to learn a new 
technology-accessibility may presuppose past experience, shutting out some producers. See 
Boyer, supra note 57,  at 50 .  
1 08. See id. at 4 7 .  
1 09. See id. at 3 1 .  This point derives from the observation of national product markets, 
where the same product can be sold for different prices and domestic firms develop niches, 
with different niches possibly calling for specific organizational forms. See id. at 5 0 .  
1 1 0. See Berger, supra note 57 ,  at  1 8- 1 9 ,  2 1 .  This theory appeared in the 1 970s in  
opposition to theories of  technological determinism and strong convergence articulated in  the 
1 950s and 1 960s by both Marxists and liberals. See id. at 2-3 . 
I l l .  Trade theory posits that free exchange causes factor incomes to converge without 
also asserting convergence as to the form of the institutional arrangements of trading nations. 
At the same time, international product competition can lead to several different equilibrium 
results, some of which do not include institutional convergence. See Boyer, supra note 5 7 ,  at 
5 1 -53. 
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meanwhile, credibly can be made only if special conditions obtain, 
including costless availability of requisite technology, total 
divisibility of production institutions, and independent availability on 
the part of each such divisible, systemic component. 1 1 2 
This weak convergence perspective is supported by a body of 
comparative studies of production practices. These antedate the 
comparative governance literature by a generation, looking at the 
shop floor rather than the boardroom. They show that during the 
post-war era different capitalist economies developed fundamentally 
different firm organizations to produce the same products. 1 1 3 The 
different organizational patterns are accounted for as the product of 
domestic interactions between political and social interests and 
economic strategies . 1 1 4 These studies anticipated and paralleled the 
governance literature, articulating a set of distinctions between 
market-based production institutions in English-speaking countries 
and societal and state-coordinated systems of Germany and Japan . 1 1 5 
Additional support for the weak convergence view comes 
from the endogenous growth school of macroeconomic theory. This 
approach rejects earlier models of technologically-driven convergence 
of growth rates. It instead posits an endogenous model under which 
each country' s  equilibrium growth path depends on contextual factors 
such as past investments in research and development and education. 
According to this view, rates of productivity growth will vary from 
country to country 1 16 and movement toward convergence can only be 
expected given a base of similar educational endowments and 
technical policies . 1 1 7 Given similar economies, convergence 
1 12. See id. at 3 1 , 55-58 .  
1 13 .  For studies antedating the comparative corporate governance l iterature, see MARC 
MAURICE ET AL . ,  THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POWER ( 1 986) ;  RONALD DORE, 
BRITISH FACTORY-JAPANESE FACTORY: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL DIVERSITY IN 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ( 1 973) .  For more recent contributions to this literature, see MICHEL 
ALBERT, CAPiTALISM VS. CAPITALISM ( 1 993);  JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD : THE STORY OF LEAN PRODUCTiON ( 1 990). 
1 14. See Boyer, supra note 57, at 45-46 (discussing differentials in the manifestation of 
Fordist production techniques as they diffused during the post-war period) . 
1 15. See Berger, supra note 83 ,  at 4 .  
1 16. See Boyer, supra note 57 ,  at 35 .  
1 1 7 . I t  follows that underdeveloped countries can become trapped. See generally 
GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY, UNEMPLOYMENT: ESSAYS TO CELEBRATE BOB SOLOW'S BIRTHDAY 
(Peter A. Diamond ed., 1 990). 
Empirical tests of convergence hypotheses focus on per capita measures of gross national 
product. These applications of per capita gross national product measures have been applied 
so as to yield productivity levels from the late nineteenth century to the present. The best 
work models the convergence of income across regions, taking into account the interplay of 
net migration pattern and economic growth. See generally Robert J .  Barro & Xavier Sala-i-
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respecting productivity grow�h rates, in . fact, has bee� d.em?�strated 
empirically. But the rate IS slow: g1ven s�rong similantles, the 
underlying speed of convergence has been estimated at two percent 
per year, meaning that it takes 25 years for similar economies to 
reduce an initial productivity gap by 50%. 1 1 8 
Martin, Convergence Across States and Regions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS IN ECON. ACTIVITY 
1 07 ( 1 99 1 ); BART VERSPAGEN, UNEVEN GROWTH BETWEEN INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES 
( 1 993) .  The results support the proposition that convergence depends on similarity. See P. 
Bairoch, Europe 's Gross National Product: 1800-19 75, 5 J .  EUR. EcoN. HIST.  273 ( 1 976) 
(showing divergence in Europe between 1 83 0-80 when more than the top eight countries are 
tested, yet evidence of strong productivity convergence if only the top eight countries are 
tested); W. BAUMOL, S. BLACKMAN & E. WOLFF, PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN 
LEADERSHIP: THE LONG VIEW ( 1 989) (showing convergence among a select club of countries; 
divergence for less developed countries); J .  Bradford Delong & Lawrence Summers, 
Equipment Investment and Economic Growth, 1 0 6  Q.J.  EcoN. 445 ( 1 99 1 )  (looking at 6 1  
countries and arguing that convergence occurs with significant investment, divergence where 
investment is too low) ; Bart Verspagen, A New Empirical Approach to Catching Up or 
Falling Behind, in 2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 359  ( 1 99 1 )  (looking at 1 1 4 
countries and observing that if the technological gap is small enough, then there is 
convergence, but that there is divergence with a large initial gap). 
The basic chronology that emerges from this research supports the proposition that strong 
convergence cannot be assumed as an historical constant. Boyer summarizes the research to 
show that there was significant divergence among countries until the end of the nineteenth 
century. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was some convergence, but this was 
disrupted in the 1 930s. Significant reduction of productivity differences is a more recent 
phenomenon. From the 1 95 0s to the present there has been convergence in productivity. On 
the other hand, in the post- 1 973  era many newly developing countries have fallen behind 
similarly-situated countries due to external shocks and other problems. See B oyer, supra note 
78 ,  at 42-43 . 
1 1 8. See Boyer, supra note 57 ,  at 4 1 .  Barra and Sala-i-Martin show that the speed of 
convergence within the United States in terms of per capita income from 1 880-1 988 was 
around 2% per year (within and across four major regions). They also make similar estimates 
for the 1 963-86 period and find the same estimated rate of convergence in Europe for the 
period 1 950-8 5 .  The effect of net migration on convergence is found to have been quite 
small in the United States. A more complex impact is found for capital mobility, although 
B arro and Sala-i-Martin assume that greater mobility would not lead to higher rates of 
convergence. See generally Barry & Sala-i-Martin, supra note 1 1 7 .  
B lanchard challenges this simple convergence story. See Olivier Jean B lanchard, Comments 
and Discussion, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 5 9  ( 1 99 1 ) . He acknowledges 
that Barra and Sala-i-Martin establish a robust convergence of incomes across regions. Yet 
he doubts their conclusion that convergence is the salient aspect of regional growth in the 
United States. He introduces a simple model of the United States in which he assumes there 
are 50 small economies, and looks for the effect of shocks, technology, and factor mobility. 
He challenges several assumptions of B arro and Sala-i-Martin : (a) he asserts that there is 
substantial evidence showing considerable regional specialization due to increasing returns of 
production; (b) he asserts that persistent regional specificities may explain why certain states 
and nations experience decreases in their terms of trade; (c) he focuses on the mobility of 
factors across jurisdictions; and (d) in contrast to the strong, neo-classical convergence 
model, he assumes that labor is immobile.  
B lanchard offers two special cases to challenge the strong convergence hypothesis.  His first 
case assumes that if (a) labor is immobile so that it is allocated evenly across states, (b) 
capital is mobile, and (c) there is an absence of shocks, then the economy will converge to 
equal per capita output per state. If, however, we change assumptions and introduce state-
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The weak convergence view influences much recent 
commentary on comparative governance. 1 1 9 It now is accepted that 
large, successful firms do not operate at the razor-thin margin 
assumed in strong convergence scenarios. When a competitor' s  
superior governance arrangements yield a product market advantage, 
the disadvantaged firms do not automatically go out of business .  
They can instead offset the disadvantage by cutting supply or other 
production costs, returning less to their equity investors, or, as a last 
resort, securing state subsidies. 1 20 More broadly, national systems 
hold out real and persistent barriers that can prevent the emergence of 
a hybrid corporate governance system, even a hybrid holding out 
productivity advantages (or, in the event of market system superiority, 
that can retard the diffusion of market institutions) . Each of selective 
incentives, 1 2 1 cost barriers, 1 22 interest group politics, 1 23 and structural 
interconnections among systemic components 1 24 can contribute. It 
specific shocks but retain labor immobility, the movement of capital causes the shocks to 
impact on output per capita, and over time will lead to divergence. The second case assumes 
that capital is immobile and labor is mobile.  In this case the economy will  exhibit 
convergence even when the shocks to technology and demand have a permanent aspect. But, 
given the stochastic nature of the shocks, the states do not converge to the same level. 
Eventually a stationary level is achieved, as labor adjusts in response to the shock. 
Blanchard argues that although the economy in this model appears to exhibit signs of 
convergence, true convergence should not be implied. Blanchard contends that an innovation 
in personal income should lead to a permanent increase in the level of employment, as labor 
is attracted to a higher return. Based on this insight, he looks at the long-run elasticity of 
employment in the South and North-Central regions of the U.S .  and finds effects of 
innovation in the South but none in the North-Central region. The conclusion is that there 
appears to be convergence of output across the United States, with labor mobility the crucial 
reason for this outcome. This is not a surprising result given the relative level of economic 
development among the states. 
1 1 9. See, e.g. , Berglof, supra note 1 7, at 1 04-1 1 (commenting on the limited amount of 
actual convergence among European governance systems). In Europe, he says, neither 
globalization nor increased institutional shareholding activism has prompted institut;onal 
changes that lead to more uniformity. See id. 
1 20. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 6 1 ,  at 5 84-85 .  
1 2 1 .  See id. at  5 7 5-78 (noting the possibility that blockholding could persist after 
securities market reforms so long as not accompanied by effective reform of fiduciary law 
causing value of private benefits to b lockholders to exceed proceeds on public sale of b lock, 
and the possibility that dispersed shareholding could persist even though legal barriers to 
blockholding were removed due to resistance of managers seeking to retain positional 
advantage). 
1 22. See id. at 572-74, 579-83 (describing several possible cost frictions, including sunk 
costs, along with the possibility that equal effectiveness denudes the reform movement of 
force). 
1 23. See id. at 5 72-74, 577-78 (noting the possibility of interest group resistance); La 
Porta et al., C01porate Ownership A round the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2  (noting that 
majority shareholders in b lockholder countries tend to oppose law reform that would give 
rights to minority shareholders). 
1 24. See Woolcock, supn note 1 7 ,  at 1 8 1 -82 (noting that each national system in 
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follows that the only safe projection is weak convergence-hybrid 
innovation that supplements existing systems without threatening 
vested interests or requiring law reform. 1 25 
2 .  Comparative Governance in a National Framework 
The weak convergence perspective has negative implications 
for comparative governance analysis in a global framework. If 
convergence due to the operation of global market mechanisms is not 
a significant possibility, then there remains very little "globalized" 
corporate governance subject matter to discuss .  But the weak 
convergence perspective does not thereby imply that comparative 
corporate governance exercises are irrelevant. They retain pertinence 
in national policy frameworks. 1 26 
At the national level, the question is whether alternative 
mechanisms identified in an international comparison can help 
domestic firms solve governance problems . Any such benefit need 
only be potential-an experimental possibility-in order to justify the 
comparative exercise. 1 27 Indeed, so long as different outside practices 
have cost implications, actors with a financial stake in a given 
national system should have an intrinsic interest in trying them. This 
is because the outside practices open an opportunity for domestic 
competitive advantage, provided they are productively superior and 
not culturally, technically, or geographically bound to the country of 
origin. This justification occurs even in the absence of international 
competition. In this scenario ,  competitive survival is exclusively a 
function of the operation of domestic markets .  A new source of 
advantage always will be welcome, whatever its national origin. 
The equal competitive fitness hypothesis holds out no negative 
implications for this domestic exercise. Even if neither the market 
nor the blockholder system has an overall advantage, it may remain 
possible to identify material productivity differences among the 
Europe is made up of a set of linked policies, regulations, practices, and philosophies 
affecting capital markets, corporate structure, and industrial relations). 
1 25. Cf La Porta et a! . ,  Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 3  
(expressing skepticism as to imminent convergence to market system separation of 
ownership and control) ;  David Chamy, The German Cmporate Governance System, 1 998 
COLUM. Bus.  L.  REV.  1 45 ,  1 64 ( 1 998) (proj ecting that Germany wil l  see only convergence 
that does not depend on law reform, such as stepped up market pressures and the appearance 
of a subset of firms governed along American lines). 
1 26 .  Or a regional framework as applies in  the European Union . 
1 27. Cf RoE, supra note 6, at 1 8 7-209 (speculating on the possibility the U.S .  
intermediaries imitate German or Japanese banks). 
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systems'  individual components . The fact that the systems ' '
respective strengths and weaknesses tend to cancel each other out 
suggests potential complementarities. A plus factor in one system 
. rnay yield a productivity advantage if transplanted to firms in the 
�-'' other system. This possibility is strengthened to the extent that the 
.. systems result from accidents of political history.
1 28 American 
· , observers dissatisfied with the amount and quality of shareholder 
monitoring in mature domestic firms thus have looked to the 
stockholding patterns and monitoring activities of financial 
institutions in Japan and Germany to support law reform directed to 
development of home grown institutional monitors. On the contrary, 
European observers, aware that firms in the United States and Britain 
. have the advantage of a wider array of financing modes and sources 
due to deeper domestic securities markets ,  have been looking to 
governance reform to build investor confidence in domestic securities 
markets so as to promote their growth. 
National-level comparison, then, is a cross reference exercise 
in which firms and regulators experiment with new, imported 
techniques-the same exercise carried out in the global framework 
under the rubric of convergence to best practice . The source of the 
competitive imperative differs in the national framework, however. 
On the global level, the incentive lies at the international level and 
implicates a near-term threat of serious competitive disadvantage for 
a given nation' s  producers as a whole. 1 29 On the national level, the 
incentive lies in the search for national-level advantage, with global 
advantage coming to bear as an additional but not essential factor. If, 
for example, institutional monitoring holds a productivity advantage 
for American firms, then some American firms presumably will want 
to try it-and will have an incentive to work toward the removal of 
1 2 8 .  This is Roe ' s  suggestion. See Roe, supra note 7,  a t  644-45 .  
1 29.  There is  at least one practice in corporate law's  past to which we can look as an 
indirect source of historical support This is the evolution of corporate codes and governance 
practices in the United States as it developed as a common market over the last l 00 years. 
Famously, corporate law is generated at the state level, with each of the fifty states having its 
own code and body of cases, and its generation is  at the same time subject to a competitive 
constraint The states compete for rents flowing from corporate charters. The historical 
result of a century of practice is convergence in the outline of the states' corporate codes. 
Any state that fails to conform to this basic outline loses incorporation business to the market 
leader, Delaware. Although each statute varies in its terms to some extent, the variation is 
not thought to create sufficient incidental costs as to justifY a national level harmonization 
movement But, at the same time, the normative implications of the system are hotly 
controverted. The argument is that the tenns of U.S .  corporate law, although constrained by 
competition, remains subject to interest group influence. As a result, the state codes now 
constrain the field of operation of a mainstay of the American market control system, the 
hostile takeover. For discussion, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW 52-84 ( 1 993 ). 
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regulatory barriers-toward the end of  gaining a cost advantage over 
domestic competitors . If no productivity advantage proves out, no 
one should be the worse off since the experiment can be abandoned 
quickly. 
The national and global frameworks overlap in one other 
respect. Extensive national-level experimentation in cross reference 
could mean incidental steps in the direction of global convergence to 
a superior, hybrid governance system. 130 These converging stories 
stem from very different theoretical frameworks, however. In the 
national framework, convergence is only an incidental possibility. No 
deterministic vision of global economic evolution is asserted. 
The national framework thus offers a more robust, less 
demanding base of assumptions than does the global. It implies no 
particular evolutionary projection. It requires no risky appraisals of 
systemic productivity. Yet it promises important contributions to 
domestic policy discussions about governance and productivity in 
many different countries .  
But the national framework still makes a strong assumption 
when it commends domestic experimentation by cross  reference. As 
noted above, 1 3 1  cross reference only works if the different systems 
have divisible components. To the extent that national systems 
resemble the tightly-fitted complexes of diverse elements depicted in 
the weak convergence view, divisibility may be an unsafe 
assumption. The pluses and minuses of the two systems depicted in 
Tables 1 and 2 do not necessarily imply complementarities .  They 
also suggest the presence of internal dependencies .  Each system may 
manifest interconnected trade-offs that strike an overall balance 
among the interests of its various participants. The balances thus 
struck may not be so easily adjusted. 1 32 
Questions accordingly arise as to the likely returns on 
investments in experiments m cross reference. If corporate 
governance institutions tend to be indivisible, returns may be 
nonexistent because frictions prevent experiments from being carried 
out in practice or because such experiments as are carried out fail to 
bring improvements. Alternatively, losses could result if 
130. See Aoki, supra note 3 3 ,  at 22-24; B erg! Of, supra note 1 7, at 1 1 5-1 7 (presenting a 
reform agenda for European corporate governance centered on investor protection) .  
1 3 1 .  See supra text accompanying note 90. 
132. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 659-60 (noting this problem and suggesting by way of 
example that an American monitoring board staffed by outsiders might not make sense in a 
firm in an Asian country in which all other firms in the industry were staffed with personnel 
close to government actors, or alternatively, nominated representatives of trading partners to 
their boards). 
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experimentation occurs but unforeseen interconnections among 
components within a given system lead to perverse effects. Parts III 
and IV take up these problems in detail. 
C. The Comparative Governance Matrix 
Stripped to its essentials, comparative corporate governance 
may be seen as a two-course menu that offers two choices in each 
course. One first chooses a convergence model, strong or weak. This 
choice has determinative implications for the framework in which 
comparison then proceeds . Strong convergence models imply that 
global competitive forces dominate national level evolution. Weak 
convergence implies determinative influence for national social and 
political institutions, but holds open a door for the homogenizing 
influence of competitive forces, whether domestic or global . The 
second menu item is divisibility. Here one decides whether it makes 
sense to view national governance systems as open to significant 
modification by cross reference to other systems' components. This 
choice determines the policy implications of the comparative 
exercise-whether it looks toward or looks away from the 
development of hybrid governance structures. 
The menu implies four basic points of view respecting 
comparative governance. Table 3 plots out the possibilities. 
Table 3-The Comparative Governance Matrix 
Strong 
Convergence 
Weak 
Convergence 
Divisible 
( 1 )  
Global cross 
reference 
(3) National cross 
reference 
Indivisible 
(2) 
Chicago School 
( 4) National 
embeddedness 
Box (1) . Strong convergence and divisibility combine to 
imply a projection of a hybrid but unitary governance system world 
wide . 1 3 3  Skepticism respecting near- or intermediate-term 
1 33 .  See, e.g . . Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 .  
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convergence possibilities makes this a minority point of view. 
Indeed, it is virtually absent from the legal literature. 
Box (2). Strong convergence combined with indivisibility 
implies competitive struggle between entire systems, with one system 
winning in the end. This is the position advanced by Chicago School 
participants in both legal and economic discussions. A caveat needs 
to be entered about the binary characterization of the Chicago 
position, however. Presumably, a Chicago School observer would not 
object if a reforming blockholder system adopted market system 
components piecemeal, even while simultaneously warning of 
potential perverse effects for market systems from experiments in 
cross reference.  Cross reference enters the Chicago story to this 
extent. But it does so only at an intermediate point in the time line. 
In the end, the superior properties of the market system overwhelm 
the blockholder antecedent and no hybrid appears. Such a market 
system triumph is most easily imagined in a crisis :  economic distress 
leads to political disruption, the blockholder system cracks under the 
strain, and there follows root and branch reform designed to foster 
market institutions. Thus the Chicago School ' s  strong evolutionary 
superiority claims imply a long run assertion of indivisibility. In the 
short run, however, cross reference is a productive possibil ity only if 
it goes one way. 
Box (3). An observer who chooses weak convergence and 
divisible institutions makes reference to other governance systems as 
a means to the end of effecting domestic improvements . This 
perspective sees value in cross reference even as it abandons 
breathless projections of near-term international convergence. It is 
manifested both in leading American discussions of Japanese and 
European institutional investors and in European law reform 
initiatives directed to improving the depth of securities markets and in 
responsive economic discussions. 1 34 It fairly may be termed the 
international mainstream approach. 
Box (4) . The fourth and final perspective pairs weak 
convergence with indivisibility to emphasize barriers to both 
convergence and cross referenced governance reform at the national 
level .  This perspective is reflected in the present literature on 
convergence, 1 35 but has shown up only sporadically in legal 
comparative governance discussions . 1 36 It is, however, a possibility 
1 34. See, e.g. , Berg! Of, supra note 1 7 , at 1 1 5� 1 7  (presenting a reform agenda for 
European corporate governance centered on investor protection). 
1 3 5 .  See Boyer, supra note 5 7 ,  a t  45�58.  
1 36. See Fanto, supra note 27 ,  at 1 80�9 1 ;  Woolcock, supra note 1 7 , at 1 8 1 �82 ;  Gregory 
\ \ 
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explored in the economic literature, 137 and much implicated in the 
position articulated in Parts III and IV of this Article. 
Reconsider now the two questions posed at the start of this 
Article in the context of the four perspectives in the matrix. The first 
question goes to the near-term possibility of significant convergence . 
We emerge less with an answer than with a range of possibilities. 
Strong convergence perspectives lie at one end of the range. These 
persist based on indirect empirical support and descriptive 
assumptions derived from microeconomic theory. The closer the 
attachment to the neoclassical model, the stronger the convergence 
claim. Even so, nothing in the literature permits us to dismiss these 
claims altogether. And, even if complete convergence is not 
imminent, the plethora of real world convergence events in recent 
years requires us to take seriously the possibility that the pace of 
convergence will accelerate. At the other end of the range lie weak 
convergence predictions made by theorists predisposed to seeing 
persistent structures amidst thick institutional descriptions. These 
appear to be safer on the state of the empirical studies. 1 38 But even 
the weakest convergence position remains subject to a caveat 
respecting radical change due to external shocks. 
The second question, which concerns relative competitive 
fitness,  now can be restated: Which of the four perspectives implies a 
strategy for governance policy best calculated to enhance the 
productivity of individual firms and national systems? Empirical 
evidence matters here too, but present results remain too thin to 
provide a basis for an educated guess .  The only strong empirical 
result-that significant investment in firms by outside capital 
presupposes the rule of law-does not help us to distinguish among 
the systems in developed countries. There also is indirect but cogent 
empirical backing for the equal competitive fitness hypothesis. 1 39  But 
this does not help us choose a strategy either. We have seen that 
equal competitive fitness synchronizes well both with the global cross 
reference (Box ( 1 )) and national cross reference (Box (3)) 
perspectives . 140 It is compatible with the national embeddedness view 
(Box (4)) for the same reasons . Equal competitive fitness becomes an 
A. Mark, Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and C01porate Governance, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 969, 993-98 ( 1 995) (reviewing ROE, supra note 6).  
1 37 .  See, e.g. , BerglOf, supra note 1 7, a t  1 1 3- 1 6 ; Aoki, supra note 33 ,  a t  23-24 . 
1 3 8. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. 
1 3 9 .  See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
1 40. See supra notes 86--89 and 1 26-29 and accompanying text. 
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issue14 1  only with the Chicago School view of market superiority (Box 
(2)) . Its indirect empirical backing provides a basis for arguing 
against the market superiority view, but does not suffice to falsify it. 
We have, in short, no conclusive basis for assigning equal 
fitness to both systems, for assigning relative advantage to one 
system, or even for assigning equal or relative advantage to an 
internal component of either system. Nor can we falsify the 
assertions basic to any of the perspectives in the matrix. Each of the 
four points of view thus retains some vitality, leaving the literature as 
a whole in a speculative posture. 
The existence of such a broad, active menu of possib ilities 
underscores the determinative role that theory plays here . Recall, by 
way of example, that the cross reference hypothesis derives credibility 
from the assumption that cost savings accruing from improved 
governance lend an incentive to experiment to business  actors . Yet 
absent hard numbers it remains difficult to appraise the magnitude of 
the incentive posited. If business actors are not operating at the 
margin, questions of the magnitude of the gain from experimentation 
will be critical in practice. If only modest or speculative gains are 
projected, then the actors could tum out to be rationally indifferent to 
cross reference possibilities. The cross reference hypothesis 
accordingly needs a cogent, albeit informal, description of the source 
and expected value of this gain. Such a specification can only be 
based on an economic theory of the firm. 
More generally, differences identified in a governance 
comparison can be evaluated only by reference to antecedent theories 
of the firm. It follows that better information about available 
theoretical alternatives means better quality for the proj ections 
emergmg. 
III. COMPARATIVE RESULTS AND THE CASE FOR INDIVISIBILITY 
The question as to the productivity advantages of different 
governance strategies devolves on the utility of cross reference: can it 
improve bottom line results for a given firm or system? Answers to 
this question tum on views as to divisibility. We have seen that 
positive projections of divisibility go together with positive 
predictions respecting cross reference in Boxes ( 1 )  and (3) on Table 
3 . 142 Boxes (2) and ( 4) share suspicion about divisibility and cross 
1 4 1 .  See supra note 1 3 3  and accompanying text. 
1 42. See id. 
·� 'I 
I 
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reference, but for different reasons. The Chicago School holds 
incidents of blockholding to be intrinsically inferior; accordingly, 
cross reference should only proceed in one direction whatever its 
technical feasibility. The Box ( 4) view, in contrast, sees national 
systems as embedded and asks whether cross reference is technically 
feasible in the first place. 
The comparative literature suggests a number of factors that 
could operate to embed governance institutions. Significantly, 
different proj ections tend to follow depending on the factor 
emphasized. For example, leading contributions to the literature 
emphasize past and present political sticking points and assert that but 
for such points economic incentives would prompt cross referenced 
experiments. 143 The result is a straddle between Boxes (3) and ( 4 ) , 
which puts the best gloss on the problematics of cross reference. But 
· for the embedded acts of past legislatures and present public choice 
problems, a fitter hybrid would emerge. 
This Part explores an alternative view, asserting that economic 
factors by themselves make governance systems resistant to cross 
reference. It states this case by reference to the results of the informal 
comparison described in Part I, showing how incentive structures 
built into the market and blockholder systems create barriers to cross 
reference. The implication is that even the qualified case for cross 
reference put forward in the legal literature has been overstated. 
Negative implications also follow for two leading law reform 
questions : (a) whether productive monitoring by institutions and 
blockholders will result from the removal of regulations controlling 
the holding practices of American institutional investors; and (b) 
whether equity trading markets on the European Continent will 
deepen as the result of enactment of regulation mandating 
transparency and barring insider trading. Part IV further develops 
this case by reference to leading exemplars of the incomplete 
contracts theory of the firm. 
A.  Comparative Governance and the Unsolved Free Rider 
Problem 
A question arises when Boxes (3) and ( 4) on Table 3 are 
contrasted with the pluses and minuses juxtaposed on Tables 1 and 
2 : 144 does the mirror-image relationship of the systems' strengths and 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 1 06-- 1 0 .  
144. See supra text accompanying note 56 .  
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weaknesses suggest divisibility or indivisibility? They have 
suggested divisibility to many observers . But there also arises an 
inference of interdependence among elements within a given system 
and thus indivisibility. The results of comparative inquiries provide 
significant support for the latter reading. 
The comparison' s initial impetus came from within the United 
States, where observers were simultaneously dissatisfied with 
perverse effects displayed by the market system during the 1 980s artd 
concerned about anti-takeover legislation's  impact on the system' s  
capacity for agency cost control .  The solution to both problems was 
thought to lie in newly activist institutional shareholders. Institutions 
had come to hold larger proportionate stakes of publicly-traded 
shares. Larger stakes per institution meant higher expected returns 
from costs incurred to monitor individual firms in the institution' s  
portfolio . Even i f  the proportionate stakes o f  individual institutions 
remained below the threshold point at which investment in 
monitoring becomes cost beneficial, it was thought that coalitions of 
institutions could reach the threshold point by pooling their 
resources. 145 But regulatory reform would have to come first, said the 
proponents : politically-generated regulatory barriers were impeding 
the accumulation of large institutional holdings and deterring 
coalition formation. 1 46 
The difficulty for this theory of agency cost control lay in a 
free rider problem. 1 47 An institutional shareholder not participating in 
a coalition would get the same increased returns as a participating 
institution while saving the cost of monitoring. Accordingly, it was 
difficult to see how any given institution could have a financial 
1 4 5 .  See Bernard S .  Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 M I C H .  L .  RE v .  520, 
5 24-25,  585-89 ( 1 990). 
146. See id. at 5 7 8 .  The targets are : (a) disclosure requirements imposed on holders of 
more than 5% of a class of securities under section 1 3 (d) of the Williams Act, 1 5  U.S .C .  § 
7 8m( d) ( 1 994 ); (b) liability of controlling persons for securities law violations of controlled 
persons under section 1 5  of the Securities Act, 1 5  U . S .C.  § 77o ( 1 994), and section 20(a) of 
the Exchange Act, 1 5  U .S .C .  § 7 8(a) ( 1 994); (c) short-swing liability for trading profits of 
1 0% holders under section 1 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 1 5  U.S .C .  § 78p(b)  ( 1 994) ;  (d) 
restrictions on capital structures and incentive compensation for advisors of investment 
companies under sections 1 8(d) and 23 of the Investment Company Act, see 1 5  U . S . C .  § §  
80a- 1 8(d), 23(a), 23(b)  ( 1 994);  and (e) portfolio diversification requirements under ERISA. 
See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1  COLUM. L. REv. 1 0, 
26-27 ( 1 991  ).  For a more broadly based attack on American securities regulation, asserting 
that it sacrifices governance effectiveness for l iquidity, see Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of 
Stock Market Liquidity, 34 1. FIN. ECON. 3 1 ,  33--45 ( 1 993 ) .  
147 .  See, e.g. , Anat R. Admati e t  a ! . ,  Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and 
Financial Market Equilibrium, 1 02 J. POL. ECON. 1 097, 1 1 0 1  ( 1 994); S teven Huddart, The 
Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1 407, 1 407-08 ( 1 993 ) .  
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incentive to take the lead in investing in monitoring and coalition 
building. 1 48 At the same time, the financial benefits of cost-intensive 
. relational investment remained underspecified. Underperforming 
· companies appropriate for coalition intervention tended to be publicly 
identified in the ordinary course, and institutions already were 
· informally (and cheaply) communicating their criticisms to their 
managers. 149 
The free rider problem and the gains specification problem 
had a disturbing implication in turn. Any institutional coalition 
building or block formation that actually occurred in practice carried a 
cognizable risk of perverse effects . The institutional monitor, rather 
than engaging in public-regarding monitoring and problem solving, 
rationally would look for compensation for its investment in 
information and intervention in the form of side payments from 
management. Since these by definition would not be shared with 
competing institutions in the shareholder group, they would solve the 
free rider problem as well as the returns specification problem. 1 50 
Comparative governance went to the leading edge of corporate 
law scholarship in the United States when proponents of delegated 
institutional monitoring and related law reform looked abroad for 
material with which to rebut these obj ections. It was hoped that 
practices in Germany and Japan would show that aggressive 
monitoring by investment institutions holding large equity stakes 
leads to financial rewards and need not be deterred by free riding. 1 5 1 
1 48 .  The explanation for such institutional activism as was seen in practice lay in 
selective incentives such as reputation. See generally Edward B .  Rock, The Logic and 
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 ,  473-74 
( 1 99 1  ) .  
1 49. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatoty Competition, 
Regulato1y Capture and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1 86 1 ,  1 905-06 ( 1 995) .  
1 50. See id. 
1 5 1 .  For a model of how to ameliorate the corporate free rider problem through the 
supply of screening and monitoring services, see Colin Mayer, Financial Systems and 
Corporate Governance: A Review of International Evidence, 1 54 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL EcoN. 143 ,  1 54 ( 1 998). For a basic theoretical work-up of bank monitoring, 
see generally Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 5 1  
REv. ECON. STUD. 393 ( 1 984). German banking practices expand on the basic borrower­
lender model due to the banks' shareholding role. German banks have a large voting 
influence at shareholders' meetings, as a result of their equity shareholdings (direct or 
indirect via subsidiary investment funds) and their role as depositories for the bearer shares 
held by their individual clients. See JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, B ANKS, FINANCE 
AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY 1 7 8-95 ( 1 994 ). This latter role is most prominent where, 
unusually for a German company, the shares are widely held. 
For a formal model of the bank-firm relationship, see Ludwig von Thadden, Long-Term 
Contracts, Short- Term Investment and Monitoring, 62 REv. ECON. STUD. 557  ( 1 995) .  This 
one-creditor model shows that relationship banking can reduce short-sightedness due to 
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The domestic agenda strongly influenced the shape of the 
comparative inquiry. Mark Roe ' s  leading study of Germany looks 
not at the blockholders who tend to control German firms but at the 
investment and monitoring practices of Germany' s  large banks . 1 52 It 
finds significant bank shareholdings and governance input, but not the 
sort of institutional monitoring being envisioned for institutions in the 
United States . 1 53 German bank monitors, as it turned out, do not take 
an activist role in effecting investment and divestment policies keyed 
to shareholder value. 1 54 When they do monitor they tend to take a 
lender' s  point of view, intervening on the fmancial downside . Later 
studies question even this observation. It has been asserted, for 
example, that German banks do not actually take an active role in 
downside restructuring. More generally, the studies question whether 
German bank incentives lie on the side of shareholder value creation 
at all. 1 55 
economies of scale. The argument is that banks, which possess good technology for 
obtaining information about firms, can strategically use their informational advantage to 
select long-term welfare enhancing projects over short-term projects. The question, of 
course, is whether anything like this ever occurs in practice. 
1 52. See RoE, supra note 6 ,  at 1 7 1-77 (including shareholding statistics on banks only). 
1 5 3 .  I t  should b e  noted, however, that the impact o f  bank monitoring in Germany has 
changed over time. See GARY GORTON & FRANK A. SCHMID, UNIVERSAL B ANKING AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF GERMAN FIRMS 6-9 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 
No. 5453 , 1 996). Table 3 distinguishes the role of the German banks in the 1 970s from their 
role in the 1 980s. Using 1 974 data on firm performance, Gorton and Schmid show that at 
that time firm performance did improve as a function of how much equity the banks owned, 
and that performance was unrelated to bank proxy voting and blockholding. Their 1 985 data 
show reduced bank lending and equity holding and no longer support a positive connection 
between bank equity holding and firm performance. The 1 985 data show blockholding to 
have become the most important factor affecting firm performance and also show that bank 
and nonbank blockholders were responsible for improved performance. See id. 
1 54. Baums asserts that while it appears that banks have a significant position in the 
German system of corporate governance (for example, three banks hold 37 positions of about 
23 1 positions reserved for stockholders on the supervisory boards of the 24 non-financial 
companies comprising the DAX 30), their actual influence is easily exaggerated. Their 
influence, says Baums, is limited by factors such as the co-determination regime and personal 
interlocks among all publicly held firms. Real influence, says Baums, tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals (approximately 45) that control 
more than half the positions available for equity available on the boards of DAX 30 
companies. It is unlikely that there will be sufficient incentives for these individuals to 
monitor each others' actions. See generally BAUMS, supra note 7 1 .  
1 5 5 .  A number o f  studies have yielded results that destabilize the received picture of 
productive relationship banking in Germany. 
(a) Borrower Dependence. It appears that German firms are no longer as dependent on bank 
capital as was once the case. Today, they rely in the main on retained earnings financing. 
See GORTON & SCHMID, supra note 1 53 ,  at 5 ,  42, n. 1 0 (arguing that if statistical comparisons 
are made based on flows of funds, then German firms have similar levels of debt to those in 
stock market based economies). Indeed, new studies assert that German banks provide 
similar levels of finance to their domestic corporate sector as do Anglo-American banks. See 
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R.G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence 
from International Data, 50 J. FrN. 1 42 1  ( 1 995) ; Jenny Corbett & Tim Jenkinson, The 
Financing of Industry, 19 70-1989: An International Comparison, 1 0  J. lAP .  & INT ' L  ECONS.  
7 1  ( 1 996). 
(b) Financial Distress. The evidence shows that German banks do not get very involved in 
firm rescue efforts. There is little evidence to suggest that German banks "reduce the costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy by close monitoring and control." EDWARDS & FISCHER, 
supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 1 7  5. This is accounted for by reference to the facts that 80% of bank loans 
to firms are secured and banks tend only to be involved in restructuring efforts when a 
portion of the distressed firm's loans are unsecured. See id. at 1 7 1 .  The evidence points to 
limited capacity of banks to detect financial distress at companies at an early stage through 
enhanced monitoring. See id. at 1 75 .  There also is little evidence to show that bank presence 
on supervisory boards leads to heightened monitoring efforts. See id. 
(c) Proxy Voting. There is no doubt that banks, acting as proxies, exercise voting control at 
supervisory board elections. See A. Gottschalk, Der StimmrechtseinflujJ der Banken in den 
Aktionarsversammlungen der Groflunternehmen, 4 1  WSI-MITTEILUNGEN 294 ( I  988) (the 
Gottschalk Study) (looking at a list of 1 00 firms and showing that in 32 firms with equity 
capital of DM 29.5 billion, among them the 7 biggest in Germany, the average size of proxy 
votes and direct shareholdings held by the three largest banks was 45 .2%, and that all the 
banks together on average represented more than four-fifths of all votes present at 
shareholder meetings and, with one exception, that they always had at least a majority of the 
votes). The question is whether they do so to productive effect. See M. Perlitz & F. Seger, 
Regarding the Particular Role of Universal Banks in German Corporate Governance 
(Mannheim Working Paper, 1 994) (on file with author) (arguing that the control exercised by 
banks through boards and proxy votes has been detrimental to German firms). Edwards and 
Fischer suggest that collusion between the banks and the managers results, noting that the 
voting rights of blockholders can be restricted by an Aktiengesellschaft 's  (AG's) charter and 
that banks have tended to support managers who propose these limitations. Bank control in 
the form of proxy votes has been wielded defensively in the context of recent takeovers. See 
EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note I 5 1 ,  at 1 92-93 . Franks and Mayer report that in the recent 
case of Continental's  defensive response to a bid by Pirelli, the banks strategically employed 
proxy votes to favor a management motion for a voting restriction on holders of 5% or 
greater. At the same time, they note that a predator firm can get around the banks by buying 
the shares in the open market and revoking the proxies. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 
Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations (London Business School 
and Oxford University Working Paper, 1 997) (on file with author). Finally, Gorton and 
Schmid assert that a bank faces conflicting objectives depending on how much equity it 
owns, the value of that equity, and its ability to extract private benefits. They suggest that 
this is in effect the same trade-off that managers face. The upshot is that when German banks 
play this insider role they will tend to take actions which benefit themselves at the expense of 
other shareholders, subject to the constraint following from their equity and debt positions. 
In other words, the lower the level of the bank's equity holding the more likely the bank 
pursues a private maximization course of action, with firm value enhancement being more 
likely when the bank holds a high level of equity. Cf GORTON & SCHMID, supra note 1 53 ,  at 
1 3- 1 4. 
Incidents of bank defection from the management interest also should be noted. Banks in a 
number of instances have assisted predators in hostile stake-building. The context is a very 
specific one, however. The subject firm has two or more large blockholders, none of which 
has a block large enough to effect control; the bank in effect assists in the development of a 
control block. See JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST supra note 26.  Note also that defection from 
the management interest in these cases does not by itself assure that the banks were pursuing 
value-creation for the shareholders as a whole. 
(d) Monitoring and Information. It is often argued that the bank's equity stake in the 
borrowing firm improves the flow of information for the bank and reduces the problems of 
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The comparison with Japan led to similarly awkward 
results. 1 56 Like the German universal bank, the Japanese main bank 
engages in crisis monitoring from the lender' s  perspective and does 
not act like the idealized shareholder monitor. 1 57 For enhanced 
asymmetric information. This proposition is doubtful in the case of German banks. For 
example, there is little evidence that banks use their representation on supervisory boards so 
as to assist in their loan decisions. See Eow ARDS & FISCHER, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 23 1 .  
Edwards and Fischer point out that while large banks tend to control proxy votes, there is 
little direct connection between their supervisory board representation, large control of proxy 
votes, and the incentive to monitor. Moreover, it appears that there is very little specialized 
skill within German banks to support sophisticated monitoring. The banks are highly 
specialized in transaction lending, and possess few incentives to acquire skills which could 
decrease their competitive position in the transaction lending market. See ARNOUD W.A. 
BOOT & AN JAN V. THAKOR, CAN RELATIONSHIP BANKING SURVIVE COMPETITION, (Center for 
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1 592, London 1 997). See also FRANKLIN 
ALLEl': & DOUGLAS GALE, A WELFARE COMPARISON OF THE GERMAN AND US FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS (London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 
1 9 1 ,  1 994) (employing an industrial organization approach and asserting that bank -based 
systems may be more suited to traditional industries where there is some consensus about 
how the firms should be managed, while stock markets, with their ability to assimilate 
information quickly and assess diverse views, may be better suited to provide checks for 
dynamic industries). 
1 56. This comparison looks to bank monitoring without telling us much about the wider 
organizational structure of Japanese industry. That, as described by Masahiko Aoki before 
Japan's  present economic crisis, involves interdependencies between vertically-related 
nonfinancial firms, nonhierarchical management practices, and a highly-articulated employee 
incentive structure that includes a norm of lifetime employment. Aoki contends that 
Japanese successes stem from the combination of these elements. See Aoki, supra note 33,  at 
1 8-22. For a partial rejoinder that retells the story of the Japanese lifetime employment as an 
incident of the settlement of postwar social discord, see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J .  Roe, 
Lifetime Employment in Japan: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate 
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 508 ( 1 999). 
1 57. See generally Hoshi et al . ,  supra note 5 1  (showing that the bank governance system 
plays a key role in providing funds to firms (permitting investment plans to proceed with 
diminished sensitivity to internal cash flows) and noting that main banks can be depended on 
to intervene in the activities of a firm before there are financial difficulties); Kaplan & 
Minton, supra note 54 (same). But cf Raj an & Zingales, supra note 4 1 ,  at 43-44 
(reinterpreting findings of Hoshi et al., as confirming that Japanese banks continue 
expansionary lending in the teeth of evidence of poor borrower cash flows and steady loss of 
corporate opportunities). 
Evidence is mixed on the question of whether Japanese bank-borrower relationships enhance 
firm value. On the positive side, see Jun-Koo Kang, The International Market for C01porate 
Control: Mergers and Acquisitions of US Firms by Japanese Firms, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 345-7 1 
( 1 993) (showing that firms with strong ties to Japanese banks are more likely to make more 
profitable acquisitions). For a study that questions whether the main bank system is superior, 
see JUN-KOO KANG & RENE M. STULZ, Is BANK-CENTERED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
WORTH IT? A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF JAPANESE FIR.t\1S DURING 
THE ASSET PRICE DEFLATION (Charles A. Ricke Center, Ohio State University Working Paper 
No. 97-6, 1 997) (showing that for the 1 990-93 period, firms which were more dependent on 
banks as a source of finance had poorer performance results than non-bank dependent firms, 
which is correlated with poor stock market performance for these firms during this period). 
See also David Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial 
System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan, 53 J. FIN. 635 ( 1 998) 
(showing that keiretsu borrowers that have a close relationship with a bank may have 
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returns on their equity holdings, Japanese banks are said to look to 
captive lender-borrower relationships 1 58 and insider trading, rather 
than to public-regarding monitoring. 1 59 The comparative focus 
accordingly shifted to a different Japanese phenomenon-cross 
shareholding (and resulting monitoring) among nonfinancial firms in 
keiretsu organizations . But this did not fit the bill either. 1 60 These 
relationships came to be described as a means to the end of stabilizing 
long-term relational contracts among members of vertical production 
combines. 1 6 1  As such they had nothing to offer in the way of 
precedent for financial institutions in the United States .  
The comparison, in sum, failed in its purpose of providing 
direct, cross referenced backing for United States law reform. 162 
Germany and Japan held out no institutional practices suited to fill 
America 's  monitoring gap. 
increased access to capital without enhanced profitability); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, The 
International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan, 8 7  AM. ECON. REv. 495 
( 1 997) (showing that Japanese banks misallocate investment capital through study of real 
estate investment practice in the early 1 990s showing heavy investment in deteriorating 
Japanese real estate and disinvestment from recovering real estate market in the United 
States). For general discussion of the pluses and minuses of relationship borrowing, see 
Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed Relationship and 
Arm 's Length Debt, 47 J.  FIN. 1 367-1 400 ( 1 992) (detailing trade-offs, including U.S .  
evidence that a borrower' s value is  related to its bank's  health). 
1 58. This is  changing in the context of Japan' s  current banking crisis .  Today Japan's  
banks do not have the ability to raise foreign currencies to service their clients ' needs. The 
clients are turning to foreign banks. See Jathon Sapsford, Citibank Sets Big Credit Line for 
Japan Group: Assurance of $600 Million Reflects Emerging Role of Foreign Institutions, 
WALL ST. J . ,  Oct. 2, 1 998,  at C 1 2 .  
1 59. See J.  Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 1 02 
YALE L.J.  2005 , 20 1 3- 1 4  ( 1 993).  
1 60.  Roe dismisses cross-holding shareholders in Japan as tending to p lay a protective 
function, insulating the managers in the groups from takeovers. See ROE, supra note 6, at 
1 8 1 .  
1 6 1 .  See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 8, at 874-7 5 .  For criticism o f  this explanation, see 
Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 8-58 (arguing that this explanation covers only a subset of 
cross-holdings and deciding that most can be explained only in terms outside of a strict 
rational expectations framework). 
1 62 .  Roe describes the participation of German and Japanese banks in terms of "power 
sharing," "interlock,"  and "Escher-like overlap": 
[A]n Escher-like staircase: while always walking downstairs, we wind up on top 
of the staircase from which we started. Banks own industry, but industry owns 
banks; managers direct employees; but employees sit on the supervisory board. 
The model resembles in some ways American political governance, with checks 
and balances. RoE, supra note 6,  at 1 84-85 .  
Complex interconnections such a s  these imply indivisibility. 
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B. Can Relational Engagement Emerge in a System Open to 
Hostile Takeovers? 
Barriers to cross  reference result in part from internal 
dependencies within governance systems. This Section, by way of 
example, compares the patient, constructive engagement said to 
distinguish the relationship between blockholders and firm managers 
with the arm' s  length discipline of the market system' s  hostile 
takeover. The question is whether both modes of monitoring can be 
incorporated in a single governance system. Just such a result has 
been a central aspiration of American corporate governance in the 
1 990s. American proponents of delegated monitoring envisioned 
relational engagement among firms and institutional shareholders 
even as they joined the rest of the corporate law academy in 
disapproving state law constraints on hostile takeovers. The question 
whether the two obj ectives plausibly may be pursued simultaneously 
never came up in practice, because the states were no more ready to 
roll back their anti -takeover statutes than institutional investors were 
ready to make significant investments in monitoring. But it retains 
importance in the evaluation of the cross reference hypothesis .  
Minimal hostile takeover activity may be a precondition of 
relational engagement between institutional shareholders and 
managers . If a hostile offeror holds out a significant premium over 
market price, institutional shareholders seeking good results for the 
year (and owing fiduciary duties to their clients) have an 
overwhelming incentive to defect from any relational commitments 
and accept the offer. An active possibility of defection in tum chills 
the managers ' ex ante incentive to cooperate with the institutional 
shareholders. Control in a blockholder, in contrast, disables the 
hostile tender offer as we have known it in the United States .  Indeed, 
stable Japanese cross-holdings have been accounted for as an anti­
takeover device . 1 63 
This does not mean that blockholders cannot defect from a 
relational commitment to the firm' s  managers by selling out. Given 
an offer at a substantial premium, any holder, block or not, has a 
powerful incentive to defect from management ' s  side. In a 
blockholder system, of course, such a control transfer probably would 
occur not through a tender offer made to the entire group of 
1 63 .  See RoE, supra note 6, at 1 8 1 ,  noting also isolated takeover activity in Japan. 
Unwinding of the blocks in the context of Japan' s  current economic crisis presents a different 
question. There have been reports of this  occurring. See Mitsubishi: The Diamonds Lose 
Their Sparkle, EcONOMIST, May 9, 1 998,  at 67.  
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shareholders but through a private block sale . 1 64 To see this 
possibility, hypothesize a firm with three large blocks, none of them 
large enough to enable unilateral exercise of control. An entrepreneur 
· could unilaterally negotiate the purchase of each of the blocks, take 
control, and replace the managers . 165 Were such control transfers to 
become an everyday event in a given blockholder system, the quality 
of the "relational engagement" between its managers and block 
shareholders presumably would deteriorate, 1 66 sacrificing some of the 
governance benefits of blockholding itself. Since such disruptive 
control transfers always are a theoretical possibility in a blockholder 
system, some stabilizing device would appear to be necessary. Side 
payments running from the firm to the blockholder nicely fit this 
bi11 . 167 The firm' s  managers in effect outbid the hypothetical offeror 
for the blockholder's loyalty, the bid (and the relational engagement) 
coming at the expense of small shareholders on the outside. 
There arises a negative inference for the American case for 
delegated monitoring. If the institutional blockholder is disabled from 
collecting the payment, as it would be to an extent in the United 
States due to reputational 168 and legal constraints, 169 then a cross 
1 64 .  For a discussion of the economics underlying this proposition, see infra text 
accompanying note 225.  
1 65 .  For a description of friendly takeovers in Japan, see J.  Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers 
in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology, and Corporate Control, 3 5  UCLA L. REv. l ,  2 1 -26 
( 1 987). 
Looking at the small minority of German finns that are not in the control of a majority 
blockholder, JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 26, have isolated 1 7  cases of hostile 
stakebuilding. Several insights emerge: (a) stakebuilders tend to operate in the same 
industry; (b) a takeover via stakebuilding is likely to occur when an existing coalition of 
blockholders has broken down; (c) the emergence of a hostile stakebuilder often paves the 
way for the exit of a blockholder; and (d) banks often play a crucial role in assisting predators 
to gain stakes in these firms. In cases where a control transfer is achieved, the firm gaining 
control can enter into a control or profit transfer agreement whereby the profits from the 
target are transferred to the acquirer. It also appears that protection for small shareholders in 
these firms is  weak, evidenced by losses being foisted onto them, group assets being sold at 
prices advantageous to the dominant shareholder, and later lowball offers for minority shares. 
Thus the ability to extract value from minority shareholders is one of the incentives that 
drives these transactions. 
1 66.  S ignificantly, JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 26, show that German banks 
take an active role in cases of behind-the-scenes hostile stake building. For a description, see 
, · supra note 1 55 .  
1 67. Cf Marco Pagano & Ailsa Roell, The Choice of Stock Ownership Stntcture: Agency 
Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, 1 1 3 Q.J. ECON. 1 87 ,  1 9 1  ( 1 998) (finding 
that an entrepreneur choosing between outside finance from private blockholders and going 
public will be more likely to choose private finance if a blockholder can be paid off to 
monitor less at the expense of the other minority shareholders). 
1 68. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 1 1 ,  8 1 7, 85 1 ,  855  ( 1 992) (contending that transparency 
will prevent members of institutional coalitions from collecting side payments). 
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reference scenario looking to institutional monitoring lacks a 
plausible incentive base. 1 70 More generally, it appears that you can 
have a system in which a vigorous corporate control market imports 
discipline or a system in which relational engagement imports . 
discipline, but not both. On this reading, the comparative exercise not · 
only fails to yield positive results for the United States '  domestic 
agenda, but has a strong negative implication for the case for 
delegated monitoring. 
C. Side Payments, Insider Trading, and the European Law 
Reform Agenda 
Relational engagement and side payments are closely linked, 
quite apart from the context of control transactions . As noted 
above, 1 7 1 blockholders do not sacrifice liquidity and invest in 
monitoring without extracting returns. To get these, they exploit their 
positions through insider trading and self dealing transactions. 1 72 It 
follows that the principle of pro rata treatment for equity holders as a 
group can play no significant role in a blockholder system' s  legal and 
normative environment. We note, however, that the pro rata principle 
does activate the investor protections identified in the economic 
literature as mainstays of market systems-maj ority-to-minority 
fiduciary duties, one share one vote, and the insider trading ban. 1 73 
An inference of indivisibility arises . 
It has been argued that pro rata treatment is not a necessary 
element of an environment conducive to dispersed equity ownership. 
According to a well-known precept of law and economics, non­
controlling holders of shares of block-controlled firms who are 
excluded from gain made available to inside holders-whether in the 
form of side payments or premiums in the case of block trades­
should not complain so long as shared governance benefits stemming 
1 69. The legal constraint is  the basic duty of loyalty. See, e.g ,  DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 ,  § 
1 44 ( 1 998).  But the duty leaves open room to siphon rents to insiders under the guise of 
contracting. For descriptions of the deals, see Edward B .  Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of 
Relational Investing, 1 5  CARDOZO L REV. 987,  1 004-06 ( 1 994 ) .  
1 70. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 49, a t  1 92 1 -24. But see Ian  Ayres & Peter 
Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 1 5  CARDOZO L. REv. 1 03 3 ,  1 04 1 , 1 060-
6 1  ( 1 994) (suggesting that blockholders could play the role of distinguishing good from bad 
takeovers). 
1 7 1 .  See supra text accompanying note 42.  
1 72 .  See supra text accompanying note 43 .  
1 73 .  These protections show up on the l ists devised to test the investor-friendliness of 
different national systems. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
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om the insiders ' arrangements exceed the costs of side payments in 
the long run. 1 74 The governance comparisons hold out a negative 
implication for this position, however. They show that conditions 
- ary for the realization of the hypothesized efficient result 
cannot be assumed to occur in the real world. The problem lies in the 
condition that the outsider shareholders be left in their ex ante 
position ex post the insider ' s  extraction of private benefits. Outsider 
shareholders need substantive rights and process rules that provide a 
viable means to enforce this condition. Blockholder legal systems 
:··_, tend to fail to provide such minimal protections . 1 75 
-� - The question as to the desirability of creating such a 
shareholder-protective legal regime is  presently being debated in 
Europe 's  blockholder countries. The proponents look primarily to 
· securities law reform as the means to the end of deeper equity trading 
markets, proposing regulations that would enhance transparency 
respecting both issuers and the markets on which their shares are 
traded. 1 76 The question is whether such disclosure and insider trading 
1 74. Ironically, it is a prominent proponent of the market system superiority, Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, who has argued most forcefully for abandonment of the pro rata norm in 
American corporate law. See Easterbrook, supra note 95 ;  Frank l Easterbrook & Daniel 
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 93 YALE Ll 698, 703- 1 5  ( 1 982). The argument, 
made in the context of the law of cash out mergers, may not carry over to the broader 
governance context, however. With merger gain, increased returns that presuppose a non pro 
rata rule are on the table in the present or near term. In the institutional investor context we 
deal with monitoring over a longer term. The small shareholder is being asked to abandon a 
range of claims for pro rata treatment on faith that returns in the long run are enhanced due to 
heightened institutional or blockholder attention. The problem is that in a non pro rata 
regime, the small holders make the exchange without a guarantee as to a minimum rate of 
return. Once the ready yardstick of pro rata treatment is abandoned, nothing stops the 
blockholder from splitting the whole pie of enhanced value with management 
Easterbrook also took up the case of the block trade at a premium. His analysis is now seen 
to be incomplete. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Ef icient and Inef icient Sales of Corporate 
Control, 1 09 QJ. ECON. 957 ( 1 994); Marcel Kahan, Sales of C01porate Control, 9 l L 
ECON. & 0RG. 368 ( 1 993). 
1 75. See Luca Enriques, The Law On Corporate Directors' Self Dealing: A Comparative 
Analysis 72-74 (Milan Working Paper, 1 998) (on file with author), which provides a detailed 
comparison of the fiduciary law of France, Germany, and Italy with that of Britain and the 
U.S . ,  and concludes that self dealing regulation is "less significant and less stringent" on the 
Continent France has the most rigorous of the three continental regimes. But it tends to tum 
on shareholder ratification. See id. at 62-63, 67-69. In a world of blockholders and cross­
holdings, shareholder ratification would appear to offer outside minority holders little 
practical protection. Enrique 's  survey of British fiduciary law provides a useful 
counterweight to the report in Miller, supra note 1 6, which understates its reach. 
1 76. See EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, THE SEPARATION OF 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A SURVEY OF SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (submitted to the 
European Commission on October 27, 1 997), which asserts that European blockholders 
impose non-transparent constraints on the corporate strategies devised by corporate managers 
and recommends greater transparency for the protection of investors and minority 
shareholders. The report asserts that self regulation will not produce the optimal level of 
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rules would suffice by themselves to foster an environment c 
to dispersed shareholding. Self dealing transactions 
blockholders and firms that do not involve purchases and sales 
shares on securities exchanges 1 77 may independently discoura 
dispersed shareholding. Accordingly, discussants in countries 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands have gone much farther 
suggested corporate law reforms. This agenda features direct c 
on blockholders, such as the one share, one vote rule, 1 78 self dealing 
information and stresses a need for mandatory disclosure. It  appears that firms presently 
avoid national disclosure mandates through the use of holding companies sited in third states 
which have no disclosure rules. The report also notes that European insider trading 
regulation at present imposes no significant costs on the holding and disposition of large 
blocks. Under the EU insider trading directive, large blockholders are not initially 
considered to be insiders because the directive does not provide any size thresholds. The . 
national securities regulator bears the burden of showing that any holder, large or not, is 
using inside information while trading. The upshot is  that, unlike United States law, the 
European directive has little impact on the distribution of large concentrations of shares. 
1 77 .  The European Union already has promulgated insider trading rules. But insider 
trading remains on the table for discussion because serious doubts remain about the 
effectiveness of national-level enforcement of the EU directive. See Berg I Of, supra note 1 7, 
at 1 07,  1 08 .  
The E U  enacted its Directive o n  Insider Trading i n  1 989.  See Council Directive 89/592 of 1 3  
November 1 989 Coordinating Regulations o n  Insider Trading 1 989 O.J.  ( L  3 34) 30 .  The 
Directive stated that the aim of the regulation was to promote investor confidence by 
ensuring equal market opportunities for all investors. The Council of Ministers passed the 
unified Directive on the grounds that the harmonized provisions would eliminate the conflict 
between certain countries and provide the basis for cooperation and enhanced enforcement. 
See id. Like U.S .  law, the Directive is concerned with the public disclosure of information 
that would have a significant effect on market-sensitive information. See Klaus Hopt, The 
Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 5 1  ( 1 990). Significantly, the 
directive ignores the fiduciary relationship between insider and firm and imposes liability on 
traders who possess inside information. The Directive was welcomed by most member states 
although Germany, due to domestic pressures from large banks which stood to lose, delayed 
implementing it until mid- 1 994. See Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep 
Across Germany: Bracing for Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. J. lNT ' L  L .  1 77 ( 1 995) .  
The enforcement problem is  shared with other EU directives. While the E U  monitors the 
implementation of directives into national law, directives are primarily enforced by member 
states, which make regulatory decisions within different institutional and political 
frameworks. In the case of the insider trading directive, member states are required to 
identify the regulatory agency designed to perform the task of enforcement and provide this 
body with the resources necessary to ensure the proper exercise of their functions. This 
institutional design could lead to lax enforcement, particularly where the governments have 
an incentive to minimize the goals of the directive. Furthermore, if this kind of decentralized 
enforcement is to be effective, then transparency is needed respecting each member states' 
regulations and their effects. A lack of transparency can undermine the level of trust required 
for the mutual recognition framework to function effectively. 
Very different levels of enforcement are thought likely to prevail respecting insider trading. 
For example, it  would appear that the passage of the Federal Securities Trading Act in 
Getmany in 1 994 has so far done little to alter the trading practices of insiders. See Insider 
Dealing Law Comes into Force, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, FTN. REG . REP.,  Dec. 1 995 , at 22-2 3 .  
Dutch compliance also i s  thought t o  be wanting. See Berglof, supra note 1 7, passim . 
1 78. See La Porta et al . ,  Co1porate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2, 
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-..� ,,TT,. · . to protect outside shareholders, 1 79 voting caps, and limits 
proportion of capital held by designated investors . 1 80 
� · Europe thus faces an intriguing choice implicating the 
�()n.nection between legal rules, corporate governance practice, and 
ttading market depth. If the objective is deep national equity ma�kets 
those in London and New York, an analogy to the legal regimes 
Britain and the United States suggests that stepped up disclosure 
· insider trading rules amount to only half of the needed loaf of law 
Both Britain and the United States add rules against self 
by managers and control shareholders, rules that contain 
opportunities to effect non pro rata distributions that reduce 
.returns on outside equity contributions. 
The problem is that meaningful reform following this lead 
could destabilize the incentives that sustain Europe' s  blockholder 
monitoring regime, 1 8 1 inadvertently causing the blocks to dissipate by 
·;cutting off the holders ' sources of return. An experiment in cross 
reference intended to deepen the market thus could imply a larger 
(and unintended) move to a market system. In contrast, limited 
reform that does not include self dealing constraints may fail to 
deepen the markets significantly. Thus, the question as to divisiblity 
is joined. Significantly, the comparative governance literature offers 
. no cogent advice on the likely outcome. 1 82 
IV. THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE 
CASE FOR INDIVISIBIL TY 
Economists working within the incomplete contracts theory of 
the firm have taken up the question raised upon the juxtaposition of 
systemic features of market and blockholder systems, as in Tables 1 
(one share-one vote will be ineffective, taken alone, so long as blockholders maintain control 
through pyramiding arrangements). 
1 79. See id. 
1 80. See Enriques, supra note 1 75 ,  at 93-94. 
1 8 1 .  Indeed, these initiatives have a negative implication for b1ockholding because 
deeper equity markets presuppose larger proportions of widely-held equity. BergliSf suggests 
stepped up withdrawals from European exchanges in recent years may be l inked to the 
appearance of greater investor participation. See Erik BergliSf, Co1porate Governance, in 
THE EUROPEAN EQUiTY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE 
MILLENNIUM 147, 1 73 (Benn Steil et a! .  eds. ,  1 996). 
1 82 .  For an extended discussion of the dangers for Europe of the importation of market 
system shareholder protection rules, see Bergli::if, supra note 1 7, at 1 1 4- 1 6. 
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and 2 : 1 83 Do the systems ' contrastin.? fe�tures imp �y unexploit�d 1 , 
complementarities or trade-offs? The mqmry results m an emphatic �. 
case for a trade-off description. The cumulated trade-offs imply " . 
indivisibility in tum. 
One line of incomplete contracts inquiry poses a concentration 
and liquidity trade-off. This analysis begins with the standard . ·  
assumption that blockholder control brings stepped up monitoring that :·� 
makes the firm more valuable. It goes on to assert that liquidity also : .. : 
enhances firm value by lowering the cost of capital . 1 84 The trade-off · �· 
results because concentration sacrifices liquidity even as it enhances 
monitoring; at the same time, dispersed ownership enhances liquidity 
even as it sacrifices monitoring. One of the basic assumptions of this 
trade-off analysis-that increased monitoring makes the firm more 
valuable-is scrutinized in tum in a second line of inquiry. This 
asserts that delegations of authority to managers have a positive 
impact on productivity because they import incentives to make 
productive investments. It fol lows that, although some monitoring 
may be a good thing, there can be such a thing as too much 
monitoring. There results a trade-off between monitoring and 
delegation: stepped up monitoring depresses management' s  incentives 
to make productive investments even as it imports productivity 
enhancing discipline . 
By hypothesis, to the extent these analyses identify stable, 
optimal (albeit second-best) trade-off points, they provide the 
beginnings of a blueprint for a superior, hybrid governance structure . 
Conversely, to the extent these analyses show that structural factors or 
incidental frictions are likely to prevent the realization of optimal 
trade-offs, they hold out a negative implication for the cross reference 
hypothesis. 
This Part shows that this theory's  cumulative results lie on the 
negative side and support the case for indivisibility. Private benefits 
are the key. The models show that absent private benefits and the 
incentives they import toward block formation, we can never be sure 
of the appearance of blocks when monitoring is needed. Moreover, 
1 83 .  See supra text accompanying note 5 6 .  
1 84 .  And, hence, raising the stock price, a l l  other things being equal. See Patrick Bolton 
& Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theo1y of Cmporate 
Ownership Structure, 1 54 J. lNSTITUTlONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 67,  1 73 ( 1 998) 
[hereinafter Bolton & von Thadden, Structure] . Empirical support for this proposition can be 
found in studies showing that the liquidity of a stock increases with the firm ' s  market 
capitalization. See, e.g. , Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Limited kfarket Participation and 
Volatility of Asset Prices, 1 02 AM. EcoN . REv. 933 ( 1 994); Marco Pagano, Endogenous 
Market Thinness and Stock Rise Volatility, 56 REv. ECON . STU D .  269 ( 1 989).  
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()_lJ ... ���- private benefits, such blocks will be unstable and will tend to · large. Once a system allows for private benefits ,  in 
there is no way to assure their provision to an incentive­
le degree. Furthermore, only some firms will need block 
(and hence limited private benefits provision) in the first 
It follows that a system either controls access to private 
for the purpose of protecting its liquid trading markets or 
not control private benefits so as to nurture its blocks . The 
.... "·"'�' of the firm holds out no hospitable middle ground. 
Incomplete Contracts Theory 
The various versions of the incomplete contracts model 1 85 
remit us to a second-best world, and there identify and explain 
barriers that prevent the evolution of first-best transaction 
structures . 1 86 This economic model holds, first, that transacting actors 
185 .  For overviews of the literature, see BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 1 75-1 88 ( 1 998); Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries 
of the Firm Revisited, 1 2  J. ECON. PERSP. 73 ,  75-79 ( 1 998). For precedent treatments in the 
legal l iterature, see A very Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 1 05 YALE L.J . 1 249, 1 278-79 ( 1 996); William W. 
Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 1 9  CARDOZO L.  REv. 409 
(1 997); William W. Bratton et a! . ,  Repeated Games, Social Norms, and Incomplete 
Corporate Contracts, in ASPECTS OF FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT 1 6 1 ,  1 64-7 1 (Chris Willett ed., 
1 996); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An A nalysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 2 1  J. LEG . STUD. 27 1 ,  272-73 ( 1 992); Oliver Hart, An 
Economis t 's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U.  TORONTO L .  REv. 299 ( 1 993) ;  Oliver Hart, An 
Economist 's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L .  REV. 1 75 7  ( 1 989). 
1 86 .  Incomplete contracts theory should be distinguished from transaction costs theory. 
Both recognize that contracting actors cannot be expected to negotiate complete ex ante 
solutions to all problems. Transaction costs theory, however, turns on the notion that the 
institution of ex ante contracting, broadly conceived, supports efficient transactional 
relationships. It makes three assertions toward this end. First, actors who put capital at risk 
can be expected to design ex ante governance structures that minimize the costs of future 
uncertainty. Second, even though legal decisionmakers must assist the parties by filling in 
omitted terms ex post, those terms may be cast from an ex ante time perspective, and, indeed, 
should be so cast in order to guard against disruption of the parties ' allocation of financial 
risk and to minimize future transaction costs. See Bratton et a!. ,  supra note 1 85 ,  at 1 66-7 1 .  
Third, and finally, there i s  a prediction: given proper containment of the agencies of state 
intervention, transacting actors can be expected to devise technologies that lower the 
transaction costs that cause incompleteness, thereby expanding the effective zone of 
contractual governance. Incomplete contracts theory places a greater stress on the ex ante 
impact of ex post problems of performance and enforcement than does the transaction costs 
approach. These three factors-computability, observability, and verifiability-intrinsically 
limit the operation of the institution of the ex ante contract. State intervention accordingly 
takes a place on its l ist of possible means to the end of improving suboptimal governance 
conditions. See Phillippe Aghion & B enjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private 
Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J. L .  EcoN. & ORG. 3 8 1  ( 1 990). 
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can create producing institutions that will certainly evolve toward the 
first-best only to the extent that they deal with contractible subject 
matter. Second, it holds that contractibility cannot safely be assumed. 
Noncontractibility may occur because the requisite transactional 
technologies may not yet exist. 1 87 Alternatively, even where an ex 
ante contract term can be devised in theory, ex ante agreement on 
that contract term will not be feasible if in practice a party' s  future 
performance of the term will be either unobservable by · the 
counterparty or unverifiable by the enforcing authority. 1 88 
Corporate capital structures provide second-best solutions to 
noncontractible governance problems. 1 89 Corporate contracts are 
famously empty at their cores, omitting important future variables due 
the difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description or ex post 
1 87 .  Unlike most law and economics, which tends to  include any voluntary economic 
relation within its notion of the ex ante contract, incomplete contracts theory restricts the 
reach of the ex ante contract to cases where actors make explicit specifications about the 
future. That is, to have "contract" terms that govern future states, those contingent states 
must be specified and the future outcomes must be computable. S ince many future states of 
nature clearly are not computable, transacting parties as a result lack the technology 
necessary to enable the negotiation and composition of a contract term ex ante. See Luca 
Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, 
1 09 Q.J. EcoN. 1 085  ( 1 994) .  
1 88 .  For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sanford Grossman & 
Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. PoL ECON. 69 1  ( 1 986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts 
and Renegotiation, 5 6  ECONOMETRICA 755  ( 1 988) ;  Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgram, 
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 
7 J .L .  EcoN. & ORG . 24 ( 1 992) (showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to 
verifiable measures can divert effort and attention from other more important but less easily 
measured aspects of performance). 
1 89. For a formal expression of  this point, see OLIVER HART, FrRMS, CONTRACTS, AND 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE ( 1 995). He notes that given managers who derive no private benefits 
from control of assets, first-best results easily can be achieved (in a taxless world) with an all 
equity capital structure and a simple incentive compensation system. In a two-period 
situation he would simply make the managers' compensation depend entirely on the 
dividend. That is, assuming investment at t = 0, and cash flows to be realized at t = 1 and t = 
2, incentive compensation I should = n(dt= 1 + dt=2),  where n is a small positive number. If 
the payment also covers liquidation proceeds, L at t = 2, then I =  n [dt=l + (dt=2, L)}, and 
the manager can be expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation at t = 1. If 
at t = 1, the expected L is greater than the cash flow expected at t = 2, the firm is liquidated at 
t = 1 and no indebtedness is needed in order to align management incentives. 
But managers do derive private benefits from asset management, and in Hart ' s  conception, 
the bribe n required to align their incentives with those of the outside security holders is 
unfeasibly large. Accordingly, a complex capital structure that includes control mandates 
must be interpolated. And, in a dynamic environment, a range of possibly optimal 
contractual formulas for setting the terms of that control transfer can be suggested; 
uncertainty makes it impossible to deem any one ex ante optimal. Restating this point, it is  
now the understanding that a simple one-period incentive contract that sets the firm's  capital 
structure based upon a particular projection of the appropriate direction for the agents' 
activities will not be optimal for all future scenarios. 
I 
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observation and verification. Shareholders, for example, contribute 
capital in the absence of terms governing such fundamental matters as 
investment policy, dividend payout rate, and management 
· · remuneration and tenure . Absent specific directives, outcomes 
· respecting these matters must of necessity be determined ex post, 
either by renegotiation or by the specification of an empowered party. 
More particularly, the contracts making up the firm's  capital structure 
deal with noncontractible future contingencies by providing open-
. ended processes that facilitate the allocation and reallocation of 
control. 1 90 These control transfer mechanisms are particularly 
important in bad performance states .  They determine whether the 
shareholders vote out the managers ; whether a blockholder emerges 
to put the managers under effective control; whether a tender offer 
occurs so as to effect needed change; and whether the bondholders 
· take control of the assets in distress situations. 1 9 1 
These ex post outcomes follow neither from the 
consummation of transactions facilitated by price mechanisms nor 
from the operation of ex ante contractual specifications .  They follow 
instead from the exercise of contingent powers to control the firm's  
assets, 1 92 powers in some cases vested by the basic terms of corporate 
law and in other cases vested by contract. Incomplete contracts 
theory asserts that with the diminution of space in which contractual 
specification is feasible, such power allocations play a progressively 
larger role in determining the firm's  productivity. 1 93 It further asserts 
that some power allocations work better than others and goes on to try 
to identify the properties of the better arrangements. Toward this 
end, it models the impact of particular provisions for control transfer 
on ex ante incentives to make firm-specific investments of human and 
financial capital. 
This approach is often referred to as the "property rights" 
theory of the firm because it isolates the collection of assets as the 
firm's  defining characteristic and studies arrangements for the assets ' 
ownership . Notably, "owner" is here specially defined as the party 
who has the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not been 
given over to contractual specification ex ante. Since ownership is 
1 90. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to 
Financial Contracting, 59  REv. ECON. STUDIES 473, 479 ( 1 992). 
1 9 1 .  There is disagreement within the incomplete contracts l iterature respecting the 
efficient location of control rights, in particular with respect to the debt/equity trade-off. See 
Raughuram U. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 1 1 3 QJ. ECON . 387 
( 1 998) .  
1 92. See id. 
1 93 .  See id. 
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control under this definition, the two cannot be separated, although 
they can be shared. 1 94 This concept has a counter-intuitive aspect in a 
world still characterized by the Berle and Means separation of 
ownership and control. But the concept, as applied in exercises that 
articulate the characteristics of this "shared" ownership, easily 
accommodates the management-controlled firm as we know it in 
practice. Managers are seen to share control with the equity, retaining 
"effective" control in most states subject to displacement by the 
shareholders in exceptional situations . 195 As thus extended, 
incomplete contracts theory comes to bear on production-specific 
aspects of firm governance-for example, a manufacturer ' s  decision 
to make or buy a component part 1 96-in addition to control transfer 
events like takeovers, proxy contests, and insolvency receiverships .  
The subject matter for examination in these extensions is not 
"ownership" of assets per se but the grant of access to assets owned 
by others. Here again the emphasis is on the identification of 
arrangements that encourage firm specific investment. 1 97 
B. The Liquidity and Concentrated Ownership Trade-Off and the 
Minimal Block Capital Structure 
Concentrated ownership sacrifices liquidity but enhances 
supervision, while dispersed ownership enhances liquidity but 
sacrifices supervision . 1 98 A theory of the optimal trade-off between 
the two should not, according to the economists Patrick Bolton and 
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, seek to determine whether concentrated 
or dispersed ownership is per se desirable. It instead should seek to 
determine how often and at what points in a firm' s  life cycle 
concentrated ownership leads to more productive results . 1 99 Bolton 
1 94. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 1 88 ,  at 695.  
1 9 5 .  See Mike Burkart e t  a l . ,  Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the 
Firm, 1 1 2 Q. J. ECON. 693, 696, 7 1 2 ( 1 997). 
! 96. See Raj an & Zingales, supra note 1 9 1 ,  at 4 1 9-20.  
1 97.  See id. at 387-90. 
1 98.  See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 52, at 754-55 (asserting that concentrated 
ownership solves the problem of shareholder disincentive to invest in monitoring that comes 
with high levels of diversification, but that the benefits of concentrated ownership must be 
assessed in terms of the significant costs, including loss of liquidity and private benefits 
extraction). 
1 99. See Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and C01porate 
Control, 5 3  J. FIN .  1 ,  2 ( 1 998) [hereinafter Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks].  The model 
appears in two versions. See also Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84.  
The Bolton-von Thadden model has a long ancestry. We can trace its origins to the classic 
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analysis of Armin Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 ( 1 972). That model looked into the incentive 
problems of team production and asked how the owners of the asset can induce the manager 
of the asset to cooperate. The model introduced two mechanisms to overcome the control 
problem-monetary incentives and a third party monitor�and assumed that the monitor 
could measure the agents' performance. Fama and Jensen later sharpened this story by 
centering on how the structure of ownership can be altered to limit externalities tied up with 
the incentive problems of joint production. More specifically, they argued that an ownership 
structure, such as a partnership, can be designed so as to produce an optimal outcome for the 
firm. The equilibrium result is asserted to follow from the role played by contractual 
constraints enforced by third parties. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 ( 1 983) .  For a new interpretation of 
these foundational models directed to the place occupied by constituency interests in the 
theory of the firm, see Margaret M.  B lair & Lynn A .  Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Cmporate Law, 85 VA. L .  REv. 247 ( 1 999). 
The inquiry into the relationship between ownership structure, team production, and firm 
. value took its next step forward when Bengt Holmstrom identified concentration of equity 
ownership as a critical factor. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 1 3  BELL J. 
EcoN. 324 ( 1 982). Holmstrom's model is concerned with techniques for disciplining 
production team members. It emphasizes that, given problems in monitoring individual 
contributions to firm output, there is no sharing rule which can achieve an equilibrium 
outcome. This is because the team members will always have an incentive to collude so as to 
facilitate shirking and therefore cannot enforce a sharing agreement among themselves. 
Hence, there must always exist a principal to enforce penalties respecting shirking. More 
particularly, the moral hazard problem with agents calls for an incentive scheme which 
"breaks the firm's budget constraint."  In other words, given bad news about team 
performance a budgeting authority must be in a position to cut off needed capital . 
Holmstrom suggests that shareholders with an ongoing contingent commitment to provide 
capital could perform this incentive function; with the occurrence of the contingency related 
to team performance they are released from their funding commitment. The problem left 
open for solution in the Holmstrom model, which relies on equity intervention, is the 
incentive that some owners have to free ride on other owners' efforts. From this monitoring 
perspective, then, it might be optimal to have a single owner. Thus the costs of 
independently monitoring the finn and pledging capital for financing give rise to a question 
respecting the optimal level of concentration of ownership. 
Holmstrom identified at a theoretical level the problem on which today's  comparative 
governance discussions devolve�the relationship between ownership concentration, 
liquidity, management agency costs, and investor incentives respecting governance. 
Holmstrom identified the problem and later discussants went on to confront the problems of 
the separation of ownership and control and blockholding. Shleifer and Vishny offered a 
model of an equity-financed firm in which there is one large shareholder and a number of 
small shareholders who free ride. In this model, firm value increases with the larger 
shareholder 's  presence. Consequently, in the model, the large shareholders are likely to have 
an incentive to retain their large shareholdings. The problem comes if the large shareholders 
ever get into a position to sell their shares anonymously in the trading market. Shleifer and 
Vishny found that would have every incentive to do so, sacrificing the benefit of their 
monitoring. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Co1porate 
Control, 94 J. POL ECON . 46 1 ( 1 986). See also Huddart, supra note 1 47 ,  at 1 408 (modeling 
the instability problem in a world where the blockholder's  risk profile differs from that of the 
wider shareholder population). 
A different perspective on the liquidity-control tradeoff can be found in Bengt Holmstrom & 
Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Pe1jormance Monitoring, 1 0 1  J. POL. EcoN. 678 ( 1 993) .  
This paper assesses how a firm's  ownership structure effects the value of managerial 
monitoring through the improved information content of the share price of the firm. 
Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the existing l iterature on managerial incentives poorly 
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and von Thadden, offer a model of the liquidity-concentration trade­
off that bears importantly on evaluation of the cross reference 
hypothesis. 
The Bolton-von Thadden model inquires into the conditions 
necessary for the formation of control blocks and into the concomitant 
costs in terms of reduced liquidity.200 It assumes that blocks can 
coalesce in two ways : either (a) there is a large blockholder in place 
ex ante who stays put and removes unsuccessful managers, or (b) 
where ownership is dispersed ex ante and the managers later fail, an 
entrepreneur shows up to put a block together by purchasing shares in 
the market by tender offer.20 1  The model further assumes a world 
where (a) blockholders can add to their returns through insider trading 
but commit no breaches of the duty of loyalty,202 and (b) blockholders 
incur net private costs due to monitoring and other activities incident 
to the exercise of control .  Taken together, these assumptions imply 
that block shares sell at a discount from nonblock shares on a per 
share basis, reflecting the monitoring cost.203 This result contrasts 
with the real world experience of block shares trading at a substantial 
premium over market price, of course . 204 But the dose of unreality 
understands how the stock market acts as a monitor of management: "the firm's  ownership 
structure," they say, "influences the value of monitoring through its effect on market 
liquidity." Jd. at 679. More particularly, they show that the informational benefits of listing 
and observing a quoted stock price are not well understood in terms of the costs and benefits 
of market monitoring. 
In this highly stylized model, it is the presence of liquidity traders which produces the 
incentives for other traders to invest in information. The informed traders are able to profit 
since they choose the profit-maximizing route given the expected behavior of the other 
investors. Holmstrom and Tirole nonetheless argue that someone will have to pay the 
speculator for making investments in monitoring. The cost of such investments in monitoring 
are borne ex ante by insiders in the form of a lower initial share price. See id. at 696-97. 
Without the monitoring fee, liquidity would be hard to sustain. Market l iquidity thus has its 
costs. Accordingly, say Holmstrom and Tirole, some degree of concentration of ownership is 
required. The Bolton-von Thadden model pick ups the problem at this point. 
200. This cost-benefit analysis covers not only the blockholder but the shareholder 
population as a whole. 
20 1 .  See Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84, at 1 88 .  
202. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 3. Here they proceed in 
contrast to many other incomplete contracts models of blockholding. For recent models that 
use insider trading and other private benefits as a permitted incentive to be traded off against 
gains from monitoring, see Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade­
Off between Liquidity and Control? 53 J. FIN. 65 ( 1 998); Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 
Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention, 53 J. FIN. 99 ( 1 998). 
203 . The implications of possibilities for gain through insider trading are examined in the 
model. See infi·a text accompanying note 22 1 .  
204. Extensive empirical l iterature documents this. See, e.g. , Michael Barclay & 
Clifford Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, 2 5  J. FIN. EcoN. 
3 7 1  ( 1 989). Bolton and von Thadden point out that the Barclay-Holderness study finds 
substantial premiums for blocks of greater than 25% and smaller premiums for blocks under 
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nonetheless enhances the model ' s  heuristic value for comparative 
· governance. In the real world, control premiums follow from the fact 
that control makes private benefits available absent a strict and 
perfectly-enforced regime of insider trading and fiduciary rules. The 
task for comparative governance, in contrast, is to test the proposition, 
put forward_ 
in 
-
�erican inst�tut�onal 
_
investor lit�rature, t�mt public­
regarding mstltutwnal �on_
ltonng IS economically v�able. If 
incentives for block momtonng can be shown to occur m a world 
entailing a liquidity trade-off but constraining private benefits, then 
the case for public-regarding monitoring emerges much enhanced. 
Such a result simultaneously would bolster the case for the 
coexistence of thick trading markets and effective blockholding in 
Europe. 
1 . The Optimal Block in a World of Trade-Offs 
For Bolton and von Thadden, the optimal trade-off between 
concentration and liquidity depends on a number of factors . The 
· factors include: (a) the degree of liquidity demand due to shareholder 
. impatience or desire to consume, with lower demand and patience 
favoring concentration; (b) the transaction costs of ownership and 
transfer, with high costs favoring concentration; (c) the level of 
monitoring costs, with high costs favoring dispersal; and (d) the 
expected variance of returns, with high variance favming 
concentration because uncertainty implies a need to accord more 
discretion to managers and thus an enhanced need for monitoring. 205 
The location of the trade-off point varies from situation to situation. 
But a clear set of alternatives emerges at the bottom line, despite the 
complexity at the trade-off point. If the factors signal concentration, 
then an optimal capital structure : (a) contains no more than one 
block, since duplication of the block position reduces liquidity; (b) 
includes a block containing no more than the minimum number of 
shares necessary for the exercise of control, since a larger block 
reduces liquidity (the "Minimal Block" or "MB"); and (c) includes 
outside shareholders each of which holds only a minimal number of 
shares, since any shareholding larger than the minimum also reduces 
liquidity (the "Minimal Block Capital Structure" or "MBCS").206 
25%. In effect, they say, their model contemplates blocks of I 0% to 20% that nevertheless 
exert control power. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 8-9 .  
205. See Bolton & von Thadden, Stntcture, supra note 1 84,  at 1 9 1 -93 . 
206. See id. at 1 90 .  In the model the minimum holding is one share. Substantial blocks 
smaller than the optimal size could carry the benefit of easing the cost of a tender offer, but 
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Under the model ' s  assumptions, the MB will sell at a discount 
per share from intrinsic value because monitoring is  costly and the 
cost cannot be passed on to the outside shareholders in the form of 
private benefits received by the blockholder. For the same reason, 
block formation through tender offer occurs only to the extent that the 
holder can buy the shares at a discount from intrinsic value . Under 
the model ' s  set up, such purchases can be made only from impatient 
liquidity sellers who are willing to sell at a discount. 207 Relative 
numbers of liquidity sellers and patient investors (who only sell for 
intrinsic value) thus can have a significant governance impact. 
We note some points at which the MBCS fails to synchronize 
with the main points on governance reform agendas . S ince the MB 
must command control, it, of necessity, has to be comprised of a 
substantial percentage of shares, even recognizing that control can be 
maintained with considerably fewer than 5 1 %  of the shares . 208 The 
insistence on a control block follows from a central assertion of 
incomplete contracts-that absent enforceable contract terms, 
productivity and related incentives depend on control transfer 
allocations.209 The American case for delegated institutional 
monitoring, in contrast, looks toward the lesser goal of ongoing 
participation in control through institutional coordination. The model 
accordingly raises a question as to whether the pursuit of a half a loaf 
is worth the cost. At the same time, however, it dovetails with a 
central point in the American case: monitoring requires much more 
concentration in institutional holdings than we presently see in the 
United States. 
The MBCS model has the converse message for European 
blockholding practices. For Europe, the problem is not undersized 
but oversized blocks, for the blocks in place there are larger and more 
numerous than the MB model predicts . 2 10  The model also shows that 
the European blocks carry a liquidity cost that diminishes the depth of 
national securities markets . A clear implication arises for European 
law reform: trading market depth approaching that of Britain and the 
United States depends not merely on transparency but on the 
unwinding of some of the blocks . This presumably could occur 
Bolton and von Thadden speculate that dispersion still will dominate due to liquidity benefits. 
See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 8 .  
207. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 3 .  
208. This result would be especially easy to effect where the firm goes public with a 
block in place. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 1 9 1-92. 
2 1 0 . The implication is that private benefits figure prominently in blockholder-firm 
relationships. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
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- without a negative governance impact so  long as  each firm emerged 
with a MBCS . 
Block Formation 
The MBCS model allows for the coalescence of blocks for the 
. "·>pUrpose of effecting .governance improvement at. badly ma�aged, \IW� publicly-held compames. But such block formatiOn comes m the 
�  mode of the traditional tender offer rather than in the mode of 
�,�,. delegated institutional monitoring. Block formation through tender 
offer depends in tum on the degree of uncertainty about the block ' s  
.•. · . appearance. If a block's  appearance is certain, no holder will sell into 
J:: ·· a tender offer for less than the firm's  intrinsic value with a block in �'( place. This kills the offer. Since monitoring is costly, the tender 
i��. offeror must get the shares at a discount from intrinsic value so as to i!!,1·,, be compensated for the cost of the monitoring. This means that block 
If ' formation can never be a sure thing : the tender offer proceeds only if 
a sufficient number of impatient liquidity sellers are willing to sell at 
the requisite discount. 2 1 1 Liquidity, which is enhanced by impatient 
selling, thus promotes block formation for a public company2 1 2  even 
as the block's formation reduces liquidity. Contrariwise, if it were 
absolutely certain that no block ever would appear, all shares would 
be discounted to reflect that possibility. This in tum would create a 
perfect arbitrage opportunity for a potential tender offeror seeking to 
put together a block. The model thus posits an equilibrium 
2 1 1 .  See Bolton & von Thadden, Stmcture, supra note 1 84 ,  at 1 88 .  
2 1 2. See also Maug, supra note 202, at 66 (noting that in this sense there is no trade-off 
between liquidity and control).  
Liquidity also can make block monitoring difficult to sustain. Whenever a closely held firm 
goes public while retaining a blockholder, the free rider problem arises. The holder, who 
reaps no private benefits, must spend to monitor but must share the proceeds with the 
shareholders as a whole. At the same time, the presence of the block depresses liquidity in 
the outside trading market. Not only are there fewer shares trading than otherwise would be 
the case, but, given anonymous trading, an information asymmetry arises between the 
blockholder and the outside shareholders-the blockholder could be secretly unwinding its 
position due to negative inside information and the outside shareholders might not realize it. 
See Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84 ,  at 1 78 .  The possibility that the block 
will be unwound independently depresses the value of the finn because it  implies a reduced 
level of monitoring. That threat always is present to the extent the blockholder' s  wealth is 
constrained : l imited wealth makes the holder vulnerable to liquidity shocks and the block 
unstable. Lower wealth levels thus favor concentration. See id. at 208. 
Just as liquidity makes blocks unstable, so it  faci l itates takeovers. A deep market driven by 
impatient l iquidity traders who do not hold out for the full, long term value of their shares is 
a market with minimal free-riding on monitoring gains yielded by a blockholder. Thus block 
formation by tender offer is favored. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 
3-4. 
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characterized by uncertainty about prospects for block formation by 
tender offer. 2 1 3  
The tender offeror only bids for shares on offer from impatient 
sellers because only these present an opportunity for an arbitrage 
profit. If all holders are impatient, the offeror will tender for as many 
of their shares as its level of wealth can sustain. The size of the 
emergent block thus very well can exceed that of the MB. Patient 
holders, in contrast, will demand a premium in exchange for giving 
up their free ride . As a result, if the process rules governing tender 
offers require the highest price offered to be shared with the entire 
group of offerees, then the bid fails whenever the offeror has to buy 
shares from patient shareholders in order to accumulate the minimum 
number of shares necessary in order to take control.2 14 
There arises a negative implication for transparency 
regulations, such as section 1 3(d) of the Williams Act,2 1 5 that tip off 
the holders as a group to the presence of a party interested in 
gathering a control block.2 1 6  Interestingly, however, this negative 
implication does not extend to all regulations appearing on the target 
list put forward by U.S .  proponents of delegated monitoring.2 1 7 
Regulations constraining the size of institutional holdings and the 
nature of institutional shareholdership, appear in a positive light in 
this context because they by definition promote liquidity.2 1 8 The 
model thus echoes the Chicago School policy position: emphasis on 
law reform to promote larger proportionate institutional holdings may 
be misplaced, and primary emphasis should be placed on reversing 
state level constraints on tender offers. The underlying reasons are 
quite different, however. Here the point is not that the market system 
is intrinsically superior to the blockholding alternative. Nor is the 
point that market regulation is intrinsically costly. 2 1 9 Rather, the point 
is that the market system' s  underlying incentive structure favors 
control transfer by takeover. 
2 1 3 .  Note also that uncertainty about block formation is the only equil ibrium result 
absent legal restrictions. Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84,  at 1 94 .  
2 1 4. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 4- 1 7. 
2 1 5 . 1 5  U.S.C. § 78m(d) ( 1 994). 
2 1 6. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 7 . 
2 1 7. See supra note 1 46.  
2 1 8. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 3-4. 
2 1 9 .  Bolton and von Thadden's  model implies a need for regulation at  a crucial point. 
See infra text accompanying notes 2 24-25 .  
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The Unwind Problem 
The same factors that make block formation problematic make 
the MBCS unstable once in place . Assume that a privately-held firm 
goes public but simultaneously places a MB with a third party holder 
who receives no private benefits. We have an optimal trade-off 
between concentration and monitoring. But will the MB stay in 
place? If it is absolutely certain that the MB will remain in place , 
- then the market price of the stock will be at a high level, reflecting the 
value of the MB holder' s  monitoring. But on this state of facts the 
. MB holder has an overpowering incentive to sell its shares p iecemeal ·
into the market-it is not, after all, being compensated for its 
monitoring expenses under the model ' s  assumptions .  If the MB 
' holder can sell into the market anonymously, the other shareholders 
'• never will be in a position to know whether or not the MB holder is 
imwinding its position. Given anonymity, then, the MB holder can 
exit at the higher price, recover its expenditures for monitoring, and 
leave the firm unmonitored and thus selling at a lower value. There 
results uncertainty respecting the stability of the block, a factor which 
will tend to depress the stock price. 220 Ironically, the more stable 
market actors believe the block to be, the more the MB holder has an 
incentive to unwind it. Intrinsic instability thus is a problem for 
blockholder systems, given anonymity respecting trading and changes 
in block positions.22 1 
A very different result follows where the MB holder' s 
ownership position and trades are made transparent. Given 
transparency, other shareholders will read the MB holder sales to 
220. This problem can be viewed in different ways. Kahn and Winton, accepting that 
trading profits yielded by the inside position are an intrinsic part of a blockholder's 
incentives, work them in as a factor in a model directed to predicting types of firms in which 
a blockholder emerges in the first place. Trading profits, they find, are likely to loom larger 
where the firm is small, young, and not very well known. With mature, thickly-traded firms, 
other motives will predominate when a shareholder becomes active. See Kahn & Winton, 
supra note 202, at 1 0 1 .  
22 L See Bolton & von Thad den, Stmcture, supra note 1 84, at 194-99. The unwind 
problem is discussed extensively in the literature. Others, somewhat implausibly, suggest 
that the firm lock in the blockholder with supermaj ority provisions in the charter. The idea is  
that the blockholder has to acquire the supermajority in order to get  control in the first place. 
The supermajority holder is more likely to intervene and suffers a larger l iquidity sacrifice, 
and thus has a heightened incentive to stay with the firm for the long term. See Maug, supra 
note 202, at 67. See also Kahn & Winton, supra note 202, at 1 02 (suggesting that firms place 
blocks of restricted shares); Admati et a! . ,  supra note 1 47, at 1 1 00-0 1 (obtaining a first-best 
block equil ibrium outcome assuming a Walrasian trading mechanism and blockholder 
commits to only one round of trading); Huddart, supra note 1 4  7, at 1 408 (noting the 
commitment problem and suggesting that all purchases and sales by the blockholder be made 
on the basis of pro rata offers) .  
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mean that either (a) the MB holder is unwinding because it has ;: 
become impatient and wants to cash out, or (b) the . MB holder is '­
unwinding because it has adverse inside informatiOn about the 
prospects �f th� f�. Either way, the sales will de:pres� the stock 
price, makmg 1t difficult for the MB holder to unwmd m the first 
place. Transparency thus has a tendency to lock in the blockholder, 
making the block more stable and thus more effective as a governance 
tool.222 
Bolton and von Thadden draw a regulatory conclusion from 
all of this .  Just as transparency respecting blockholder purchases, 
such as that mandated by regulations like section 1 3( d) of the 1 934 
Act, decreases the likelihood of block formation, so mandated ·· · 
transparency respecting blockholder sales, such as that incident to 
section 1 6(b) of the 1 934 Act/23 imports stability to a block 
monitoring system by preventing the blockholder who has negative 
information about the firm's  prospects from selling out on the sly .224 
S ignificantly, the MB holder is not absolutely locked in given 
transparency. If it encounters a need for liquidity it always can exit 
by selling its block as a whole. That sale will be at the MB holder 's  
pro rata share of the value of the firm as  block monitored net of 
monitoring cost, compensating the holder for its governance input if 
not depriving the other shareholders of their free ride. 225 
4. A First-Best Second-Best Hybrid Capital Structure 
Can the MBCS be endorsed as an all-purpose optimal capital 
222. See also Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67,  at 2 1 3- 1 4  (finding that b lockbolders will 
have an incentive to alter their stakes through trading absent complete transparency in the 
trading market and that transparency imports a stable ownership structure) . Cf ERNST MAUG, 
INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Duke University Economics 
Working Paper, 1 999) (visited Oct. 27, 1 999) <http ://www .duke .edu/-Maug/research> 
(arguing that in a situation where insider trading is not monitored and dominant shareholders 
can monitor companies, managers will have an incentive to disclose private information early 
to induce large shareholders to sell rather than intervene whereas if insider trading is 
regulated, the interests of the dominant shareholder and small shareholder converge; noting 
also that EC Insider Trading Directive may not be very effective because it requires 
information to be precise which creates a gray zone where information cannot be easily 
classified as inside information). 
223 .  1 5  U . S . C .  § 78p(b) . 
224. See also Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67 ,  at 208-09 ( finding that mandatory 
disclosure that makes private benefit extraction easy to detect encourages public offerings to 
the extent that they lower the monitoring cost that otherwise would be incurred). 
225. See id. at 1 97,  1 99, 207. The block is broken up in subsequent liquidity trading 
only if every holder becomes impatient. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, 
at 1 1 . 
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? As we have seen, a MB by definition leaves the largest 
ossible number of shares available for trading and thus best 
�ombines the monitoring advantages of blockholding with the thick 
trading of market systems.226 Generalizing from this point, Bolton 
and von Thadden assert that, given a number of nonblock shares 
'tending to infinity," blockholding will always dominate over 
Otherwise the choice between dispersion and 
· .concentration depends on the full range of trade-off factors. 
227 
Does this finding provide us a template for the optimal firm 
aD.d a supporting hybrid governance system? No, since the number of ·
shares outside of the block always is finite we remain stuck in a world 
of trade-offs. But it still plausibly can be suggested that real world 
.trade-offs heavily favor the MBCS as a practical matter. If the 
· optimal block was sufficiently small so that a very large number of 
dispersed shares were left in circulation, then a satisfactory level of 
. · liquidity could be maintained even as the holders benefited from the 
blockholders ' monitoring. Bolton and von Thadden take pains to note 
that control can be maintained with a block of 1 0  or 20% of the 
shares. 228 With a large capitalization firm, the 80 or 90% remaining 
available for trading should more than suffice to support a deep 
market. 
There emerges,  then, a picture of first-best second-best capital 
structure, characterized by a 1 0-20% block with the remainder 
publicly traded. This MBCS seems better suited to conditions in 
Continental Europe than in Britain or the United States. Although 1 0  
to 20% blockholders certainly have been known to exercise control in 
market systems, control does not inevitably attach to blocks of this 
size . The American experience has been that such a small 
blockholder is difficult to unseat if already in control of the board. 
But, at the same time, an outsider who newly acquires a 1 0  to 20% 
block has influence but will not necessarily possess unilateral control 
power.229 Thus the MBCS picture seems tailored for Europe, where 
blocks larger than 1 0  or 20% and not identical with the management 
interest already in place. 230 Presumably, the blocks ' size can be 
226. This result previously has been commended in  Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of 
Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 3 1  ( 1 993) .  
227. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 2 1 -22. 
228.  See id. at 8-9. 
229. This is the lesson of sale of control cases like Essex Universal C01p. v. Yates, 305 
F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1 962), in which a 28 .3% block implicates control .  
230 .  Note that in the United States, where a corporation has a I 0 to 50% blockholder or 
blockholders, there often is identity between the blockholder group and the firm's 
management group-as where a group of entreprenet'!"S bui lds a successful close corporation 
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reduced without materially disturbing existing control relationships. 
The United States, in contrast, lacks these existing blocks. 
Entrepreneurs would have to put the 1 0  to 20% blocks together 
through open market purchases .  No control transfer would follow so 
long as management remained opposed, necessitating the further step 
of a proxy fight or a tender offer for a 5 1 % block. 
5 .  Implications of Indivisibility 
Despite the problems, the MBCS model suggests a hybrid, 
block-based solution to the problem of optimal capital structure. It 
thus supports the cross reference hypothesis, but on an aspirational 
level. The model simultaneously offers incidental, but significant, 
support for a real world description of indivisibility. It does this at 
three points .  First, it is fundamental to the model that, absent a 
number of shares tending to infinity and given substantial demand for 
liquidity, a MB may fail to emerge even though it is needed to 
maximize the value of the firm. Here the insight is that in a world 
where all investors are impatient, liquidity is valued above all even at 
the sacrifice of gains from monitoring. We note a more than passing 
resemblance to investors and markets in the United States . 23 1  Second, 
as the model ' s  discussion of the incentives of the tender offeror 
shows, when such a control block does emerge in world where 
liquidity is highly valued, it likely will do so in the form of a 
suboptimally large block. Third, absent complete transparency in the 
trading market and private benefits, a MBCS will have a tendency to 
be unstable. 
Given these results, the model can be read to predict not an 
and later takes it public, continuing to run the business and retaining significant equity stakes. 
Such firms are not "blockholder" firms within the model, which contemplates separation in 
the identities of the blockholder and the manager. The importance of this  distinction is 
dramatized in Pagano & Roell ,  supra note 1 67 .  This  model shows that for an owner taking a 
firm public, completely dispersed shareholding maximizes returns even though entailing a 
suboptimally high level of monitoring. The owner avoids a capital structure entailing a 
higher level of monitoring because it chokes off her private benefits. See id. at 1 90 .  
Interestingly, the model also predicts that private benefit extraction wi l l  not tend to  be very 
wasteful for firms that do go publ ic-otherwise monitoring would be highly beneficial and a 
close corporate structure with a large outside investor-monitor woul d  make more sense . 
. Similarly, strict disclosure rules encourage dispersed ownership by making monitoring from 
an outside point of view more effective. See id. at 1 9 1 .  See also Burkmt et a ! . ,  supra note 22 
(predicting that concentrated ownership leads to high levels of monitoring and low 
management initiative). 
23 i .  No claim to originality accompanies the observation. See generally John C. Coffee, 
Jr. ,  Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 9 1  COLUM. L. 
REv. 1 277 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
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ideal hybrid system, but a world in which we are likely to see: (a) 
given legal controls on private benefits, intervention respecting a 
poorly performing widely-h�ld. firm in the f?rm of a tender offer for a 
majority or greater than maJonty stake, as m market systems; (b) the 
emergence of smaller, long-term control blocks only with the 
provision of returns through private benefits, as in blockholder 
. systems, and (c) hostile takeovers for maj ority and supermajority 
· stakes rather than optimal blockholding. The divergent results 
· .  strikingly resemble the divergent characteristics of existing market 
and blockholder systems. The results are doubly noteworthy because 
they are yielded by a model devoted to predicting the shape of a 
superior hybrid. 
Institutional Monitoring and the Free Rider Problem 
Bolton and von Thadden model a world in which 
blockholding without self dealing is profitable, replicating a result 
basic to the American case for delegated monitoring.232 Although 
they do not in terms address the subsidiary point respecting the 
formation of institutional coalitions, their model does not exclude the 
possibility. Indeed, elsewhere in the literature we learn that such 
shareholder cooperation presupposes two conditions : (a) stable 
interactions over time within the monitoring coalition, 233 and (b) 
232. See supra notes 1 68-70 and accompanying text 
233 .  Pagano and Roell suggest that such a cooperative pattern may make possible 
monitoring by institutional coalition. See Pagano & Roel l ,  supra note 1 67,  at 2 1 0  citing Jean 
Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations, 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: 
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS 1 5 1 ,  1 5 6 (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed. ,  1 992). We are skepticaL 
The problem facing all attempts at cooperative monitoring is how to enforce a 
noncontractible contract for monitoring. Pagano and Roel l ' s  solution is to suggest that even 
if there is no enforceable contract, the prospect of an equilibrium outcome is made possible 
by such mechanisms as reputation, which can facil itate long-run cooperative behavior. 
Following Tirole, supra, they propose relying on reputation as the foundation of 
enforceability of repeated interactions. The idea here is that given enough repeated 
interactions, trust will emerge and a party can invest without a contract More specifically, 
the repeated game works as a self-enforcing arrangement so long as there is a high 
probabi l ity that each round will be followed by a succeeding round, which deters defection 
and induces cooperation in the current round. The reputation model makes a number of basic 
assumptions. A player will invest in his reputation and cooperate so long as that player 
values the returns from cooperation over time higher than the short-term gains of 
opportunistic behavior. The player's self-interest serves as a mechanism for overcoming the 
collective action problem. We should note, however, that in many infinitely repeated games 
there is a very large (possibly infinite) number of outcomes which are better than the non­
cooperative outcome. See Bratton et aL, supra note 1 85 ,  at 1 77 .  These persistent multiple 
equilibria give rise to questions respecting the viability of the reputation effects model of 
cooperation . Quite simply, the number of equilibria predicted vastly outnumber the number 
288 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF T
RANSNA TIONAL LA W [38 :2 1 3  
substantial shareholdings, since incentives to free ride diminish as r 
stakes grow.234 But these conditions only return us to the incentive 
problems bound up in _
the liq��dity-co�trol tra�e-off. Stable 
interactions and substantial positiOns Will prevail only among 
investors who do not value liquidity highly. The shareholder free 
rider problem also comes to bear-the MBCS model never quite ., 
manages to make it go away. This could retard coalition formation 
among institutional investors even if coordination otherwise · . was 
desirable and investors had come to value liquidity less highly. Note 
also that, given the free rider problem, it is prospects for trading 
profits (as realized by a tender offeror in the MBCS model) that 
provide the incentive that brings a block into existence.  But, since 
trading profits mean selling as well as buying, they tum out to provide 
an unstable incentive base for long-term monitoring, at least absent a 
regulatory device that prevents blockholder sales. 
A model from Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton expands on 
this point. Kahn and Winton's set-up takes us a step closer to 
American practice. Here control transfer is not the only meaningful 
form of intervention: influence stemming from significant stakes can 
lead to productive changes in certain circumstances. More 
particularly, institutional ownership stakes below a critical level 
means that information about the firm developed by an institutional 
investor is most profitably used only for the purpose of speculative 
trading. Above the critical level, intervention in the firm ' s  affairs is 
the more attractive alternative, but only if special conditions exist. 235 
A large capitalization conglomerate in need of unbundling presents 
the archetypical attractive situation : it is informationally accessible, 
its stock has been bid down, the intervening institution knows what to 
do, and the intervention is quickly completed. In contrast, a firm 
where problems and solutions presuppose special knowledge, like a 
high technology firm, presents an unattractive case for intervention. 
Here the situation is opaque, intervention is more expensive, and tum 
we would expect to observe in the real world. This creates the problem of predicting an 
outcome. 
This approach is not without problems even on a practical level. If there is to be cooperative 
monitoring by a subset of shareholders, the level of cooperation sustained over time surely 
depends on the incentives of the parties. Institutional investors present a succession of 
different parties none of whom appears to be committed to maintaining a reputational interest 
in monitoring. Thus it appears that cooperation can be sustained only if it is possible to bind 
parties to the process by first persuading them that they have common interests. This  i s  an 
heroic assumption no matter how large the stock of companies that wish to invest in 
monitoring. 
234. See Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67 ,  at 2 1 0. 
235. See Kahn & Winton, supra note 202, at I 00.....0 I .  
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takes longer. Even an institution with a large stake resolves 
in favor of selling in the event of bad news .236 Given wealth 
.. limitations on institutions and the need to diversify, say Kahn and 
Winton, intervention will follow only in quick-fix situations where 
the critical level of ownership stakes is low.237 Given this  analysis, 
. ·"the economically sustainable pattern of institutional intervention 
• already has appeared in American practice . It takes the form of 
;·discrete (as opposed to relational) intervention against mature, large 
· capitalization firms that are manifestly ill-managed-actions like the 
"Just Vote No" campaign, the shareholder proposal against the poison 
•· pill, and the one-time, behind-the-scenes meeting between company 
· executives and select institutional representatives. Incentives for 
more sustained delegated monitoring appear to be lacking. 23 8  rt·,,. 
. The MBCS model, as thus supplemented, challenges the cross ' 
reference hypothesis as applied to the United States :  economic 
fundamentals rather than historical path dependencies may be the 
factor primarily responsible for the dearth of institutional monitoring. 
There follows an endorsement of the Chicago School ' s  policy 
recommendation, albeit from a different base of assertions. Recall 
'· that Chicago simultaneously holds to market system superiority and 
strong convergence by asserting, (a) that substantive convergence 
already has occurred because the same set of microeconomic factors 
can be drawn on to explain all national systems, and (b) that persistent 
differences among the systems completely can be explained as the 
results of legal intervention. 239 Here, in contrast, we get an economic 
analysis compatible with the equal competitive fitness hypothesis. 
The analysis indicates that not only has substantive convergence not 
yet occurred, but that interdependent financial incentives may stand in 
its way. Persistent differences among national systems can be as 
plausibly accounted for as either the results of free choice in a world 
of trade-offs or the perverse effects of interest group legislation. 
236. See id. at 1 1 9-2 1 .  The model has a strong regulatory implication. To the extent that 
quick institutional intervention can assist in company tum around, short-swing profit 
disgorgement under section 1 6(b) of the 1 934 Act has an unproductive side effect. 1 5  U .S.C. 
§ 78p(b). 
237. See id. at 1 20.  
238 .  For a description of the pattern seen in practice, see Bratton & McCahery, supra 
note 1 49,  at 1 906- 1 8 . 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99. 
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D. The Monitoring and Initiative Trade-Off 
[38 : 2 1 3  
American analyses of  blockholder systems have proceeded on 
the assumption, widespread in corporate law, that increases in a 
principal' s  effort to measure or verify an agent ' s  performance 
necessarily induce better performance. The incomplete contracts 
literature reconsiders this proposition,240 entering a caveat respecting 
monitoring. The caveat has powerful implications for both 
comparative governance and other exercises in incomplete contracts 
economics, including the MBCS.  Even if it were safe to assume that 
control passes to a 1 0  to 20% blockholder, the MBCS model ' s  signal 
of optimality cannot be taken as conclusive because it reflects only 
two factors, concentration and liquidity. Firm value may be sensitive 
to a wider range of governance variables. 
The variable now in question is a trade-off incident to 
monitoring itself. The concession of decisional authority to an agent 
means a potentially costly loss of control over proj ects, but it also 
entails a benefit. The agent' s  incentive to acquire and develop 
information-increases along with the scope of the delegation of 
authority. It follows that reductions in monitoring activity can 
encourage initiative in the agent, increasing the principal ' s  expected 
return.24 l The costs of monitoring however, can include a diminution 
in the value of firm-specific investments made by the firm ' s  agents . 242 
Just as stepped-up monitoring is a benefit of increased concentration 
in shareholdings, so is reduction in management initiative a cost of 
concentration. 243 
The trade-off implies a commitment problem. If management 
initiative is crucial for the firm's  success, maximal shareholder value 
requires an ex ante commitment to leave control in the manager. 
Given concentrated shareholdings ,  that commitment may be difficult 
to make credibly. Matters such as investment and monitoring policy 
are noncontractible : the equity holder cannot credibly commit ex ante 
to refrain from using its control rights in situations where it deems the 
exercise to be optimal ex post.244 The best available solution may be a 
240. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real A uthority in Organizations, 
1 05 J. POL. ECON. 1 ,  1 0  ( 1 997).  
24 1 .  See id. at 1 1 . The incentives of the agent, thus empowered, to communicate 
information back to the principal depend in tum on the alignment of incentives between the 
principal and the agent. See id. at 1 7- 1 8 . 
242. See Burkart et al., supra note 1 95 ,  at 694. 
243. See id. at 70 I. 
244. See id. at 700-0 I. At least, this statement is true according to the literature. A 
Corporations teacher at this point might make reference to the device of a shareholders' 
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reduction in concentration of shareholdings. The equity holder's  
incentive to monitor decreases as the level of holdings becomes 
dispersed. Cost and incentive barriers decrease the likelihood that 
dispersed shareholdings will coalesce into blocks ex post. 
Management' s initiative to invest productively is enhanced as a 
result.245 
. The point for comparative governance is not that monitoring 
� always is a bad thing and dispersed shareholding always superior to 
blockholding. This literature takes pains to stress that the optimal 
trade-off between initiative and concentration (and thus monitoring) 
may vary from firm to firm. For example, the trade-off point may 
vary depending on the availability of reliable means to measure agent 
performance. With a long-established, mature business ,  reliable 
measures of management performance may be found in conventional, 
short-term quantifications such as the stock price, the earnings results, 
the dividend payout pattern, or the performance pattern of the 
industry as a whole. Accordingly, strict incentive contracts may work 
well in tandem with limited monitoring and dispersed ownership. 
With a high-tech business engaged in a novel line of business, 
monetary incentives will be harder to design. Tighter control and 
concentrated ownership may be needed as a result.246 
A warning for comparative governance emerges from this 
analysis :  there may be such a thing as suboptimal overmonitoring. 
The warning gives rise to a question: does the intense blockholder 
engagement with management hypothesized in the comparative 
literature carry this risk of overmonitoring? The results of the 
informal governance comparison confirm the question ' s  salience. 
American academics went abroad searching for vigorous institutional 
agreement combined with an irrevocable proxy: assuming a small number of shareholders, 
complete delegation can be effected if either (a) the manager is given irrevocable control of 
the board, or (b) the board is abolished and a shareholders' agreement gives the manager the 
right to the Presidency and an irrevocable proxy to determine the results of shareholders' 
meetings. These arrangements do not solve the problem, however, because of the absolute 
nature of the delegation they entail . The more desirable middle ground of a continuing, 
conditional, and controlled delegation proves problematic because of the contractibility 
problem. 
245. See id. at 694, 70 1 . 
246. See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 240; Burkart et a! . ,  supra note 1 95 ,  at 7 1 8- 1 9. We 
note an apparent tension between this  line of inquiry and that of the Kahn-Winton model, 
discussed in the text accompanying supra note 237 .  Kahn and Winton intervene in the large 
capitalization firm and avoid intervention in the high-tech firm. Here we monitor the high­
tech finn and rely on published data on the large capitalization firm. In fact, it is the same 
story. Kahn and Winton' s  intervention is a low cost event, initiated by institutional holders 
who presumably are relying on published data and would never invest in the monitoring 
contemplated by Aghion and Tirole, whose monitor is a blockholder. 
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monitors-banks that scrutinize investment policy with a clear eye for 
shareholder value. 247 But, as noted above, comparative inquiries 
report that the benefits of European and Japanese institutional 
investor monitoring lie in downside intervention.248 These reports · 
correspond directly with the basic assertion of the incomplete 
contracts models : investor-manager arrangements are more likely to 
look to the transfer of control to remedy manager failure than to 
ongoing active participation in management control as a prophylactic 
that prevents management failure from occurring in the first place. 
In sum, we see an additional reason why control transfer 
trumps control sharing as a governance strategy for the equity 
interest-control sharing carries a risk of chilling management 
incentive.249 We also must modify the vision of optimality bound up 
24 7. See supra text accompanying note 1 5 1 .  
248. See supra text accompanying notes 1 52-62. The blockholders' inside access and 
reduced information asymmetries certainly create possibilities for constructive engagement 
on an ongoing basis. But comparative research has not yet yielded concrete evidence of such 
relationships. 
249. The Aghion-Tirole model has prompted a series of inquiries into the problem of 
overmonitoring. The fact pattern posited depicts an owner considering taking her firm 
public, facing a choice between holding a control block and an otherwise dispersed 
shareholder group, and holding a control block and admitting another large holder and an 
otherwise dispersed shareholder group. The former situation carries a risk of 
undermonitoring, where the latter carries a risk of overmonitoring. Pagano and Roell explore 
the possibility of a cooperative solution to the latter problem: the controll ing shareholder and 
the blockholder make a collusive contract in which they agree to an optimal level of 
monitoring activity. In the model, increasing returns to capital fol low if  the monitoring 
shareholders act together to set the level of monitoring activity. On the other hand, small 
shareholdings will be discouraged given the existence of the collusive contract between 
control l ing and large shareholder. This means that small stakeholders are l ikely to meet 
heavy discounting of their share stakes in subsequent trading. See Pagano & Roell ,  supra 
note 1 67 at 209- 1 3 .  
We have questions about Pagano and Roell ' s  approach, based o n  insights developed i n  a new 
theoretical literature in industrial organization that tests the effects of enforceable side 
contracts within the firm. See Tirole, supra note 233 ;  Jean-Jacques Laffont & David 
Martimort, Collusion and Delegation, 29 RAND J. ECON. 280 ( 1 998). Jean-Jacques Laffont & 
David Martimort, The Firm as a Multicontract Organization, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STG. 20 1 ,  
223-24 ( 1 997) [hereinafter Laffont & Martimort, Firm] point out that s ide contracting is 
possible but may be costly. A tractable model must explain how bargaining takes place, 
which party has more bargaining power, and whether the parties bargain under asymmetric 
information. It is suggested that, in the context of the principal-agent models,  the bargaining 
problems are further complicated by mechanism design difficulties. More specifically, it is 
pointed out that there may be several problems with the implementation of the contract 
offered by the principal (here the controlling shareholder). They stress that, in this regard, 
the modeler may have to make a choice between the assumption of a strongly collusion-proof 
allocation (which is robust to all equilibria in hidden games) versus a weakly collusion-proof 
allocation (that is responsive to just one equilibrium). See id. at 224. But they acknowledge 
that this distinction makes little sense when the agents bargain under symmetric information 
since they will, assuming joint rationality, bargain to the set of Pareto optimal outcomes. It 
follows that Pagano and Roell ' s  collusive contract will emerge if the contracting parties are 
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in the MBCS :  block capital structures are optimal only to the extent 
that the benefits of intense monitoring outweigh the costs of its 
effects on management initiative. More generally, the 
optimal capital structure may be asset specific. The question for 
. comparative governance is accordingly one to be addressed separately 
. and specifically to each different system world-wide : Is there any 
aspect of your practice or regulation that unnecessarily prevents given 
· .  firms, viewed as collections of assets and incentive problems, from 
maximizing their value? The answers could involve either 
·: deregulation or regulation depending on the circumstances. Cross 
reference and hybridization would or would not result depending on 
the answers . 
The Role of Private Benefits 
The informal comparison, as we have seen, tells us that 
.. blockholders look to yields from insider trading and self dealing 
transactions250 to recoup their investment in monitoring and sacrifice 
' of liquidity. In contrast, leading models of the concentration-liquidity 
trade-off and the monitoring-initiative trade-off tend to assume a 
world with constraints on private benefits .25 1 The assumption, while 
heroic, teaches an important lesson about the connection between 
private benefits and governance structures .  The more closely we look 
at the dynamics of the MBCS model, the harder it is to imagine a 
MBCS in a world without private benefits. In the MBCS world, as 
posed by Bolton and von Thadden, blocks appear only occasionally. 
narrowly rational and symmetrically informed. As a practical matter, however, parties are 
more likely to be imperfectly informed agents who, due to less than ideal conditions, bargain 
to less than efficient outcomes. 
The problem of asymmetric information is yet another serious barrier to the emergence of an 
equilibrium side contract Laffont and Martimort point out that the scope for a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium in the game of coalition formation "depends on what happens in the 
status quo outcome when one agent refuses the coalitional agreement." Laffont & Martimort, 
Firm, at 224. In conventional Bayesian theory, it is the substitution of different beliefs from 
prior beliefs that ensures the emergence of an equilibrium side contract. As with the standard 
Bayesian dynamic games, problems of multiplicity arise also in the game of coalition 
formation. One potential solution is to assume an uninformed and benevolent third party that 
suggests side contracts to the parties which jointly maximize their collusive activity. 
Obviously this model is more appropriate to regulated industries where delegation to third 
parties dominates. From the perspective of corporate law, it is unlikely that this second-best 
solution can be achieved. 
250. See supra note 42 and accompanying text 
25 1 .  See Bolton & von Thadden, Stntcture, supra note 1 84 and accompanying text See 
also Burkart et aL, supra note 1 95,  at 697 (monitoring vs. managerial-initiative model) .  
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Even then they are unstable so long as equity holders value liquidity 
highly and gains from monitoring are the only reason for block 
formation. Incentives for block formation diminish further once we 
interpolate the insight of the monitoring-initiative models : if block 
formation carries a cognizable risk of unproductive overmonitoring, a 
clear cut formation incentive emerges only in the case of control 
transfer due to poor management performance. We accordingly must 
make reference to private benefits if we are to account for the b locks 
that exist in practice (and dominate capital structures outside of 
English-speaking countries) .  Thus, these incomplete contracts 
models effectively refute the case for block monitoring based on a 
pure financial incentive. 
This point is made affirmatively in a new model from Lucian 
Bebchuk.252 Bebchuk interpolates private benefits so as to cause a 
volte face. Now it is dispersed ownership structures rather than blocks 
that are intrinsically unstable. The reason is straightforward. Absent 
effective anti-takeover devices and to the extent that private benefits 
are freely available to actors in control ,  a dispersed group of shares 
presents an intrinsically attractive opportunity for a takeover 
entrepreneur because the private benefit yield assures a payoff. Given 
this, there is no incentive for an insider to sell out by taking the firm 
public in the first place.  Such a move sacrifices the value of the 
private benefits, detaching it from the insiders ' control stake, only to 
leave it open for capture later by a tender offeror.253 
An important lesson results for Europe.  Clearly, private 
benefits must figure into the explanation of its existing blockholding 
pattern. Market liquidity comparable to that in Britain and the United 
States will come only with fewer and smaller blocks . One means to 
the end of reducing the blocks is a legal regime that effectively deters 
blockholder insider trading and self dealing and brings transparency 
to internal corporate affairs . The question is whether a partial 
regulatory package will suffice. More particularly, if self dealing is a 
mainstay of blockholder returns, then an effective insider trading ban 
252. See LUCIAN AYRE BEBCHUK, A RENT-PROTECTION THEORY OF CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (Harvard Law School, Center for Law, Economics, and Business 
Discussion Paper No. 260, 1 999). 
253 .  For a recent model that also considers the role of private benefits, see MIKE 
BURKART ET AL.,  BLOCK PREMIA IN TRANSFERS OF CORPORATE CONTROL (London School of 
Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 1 868, 1 998) . The assertion here 
is that tender offers are a preferable means of effecting control transfer to b lock transfers. 
Under this model, a controlling blockholder with a large stake internalizes more deadweight 
costs of extracting private benefits and thus gain less. To the extent that private benefits 
extraction decreases in the size of the block, tender offers are superior because they increase 
concentration and hence firm value. 
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-· will not suffice to bring high liquidity and present European reform 
. initiatives could fail in their purpose. This appears to be a serious 
. prospect: if sub�tantial _
rriva�e. benefits r�J?ain available, why should 
· a blockholder give up Its pnvileged position? But a tougher reform 
· ., package that constrains self dealing transactions gives rise to the 
· converse question: assuming (a) that a new regime discourages 
'blockholding by regulating both self dealing and insider trading, and 
.... (b) that blockholder monitoring does import benefits and a MBCS 
;{ should be the objective, how can it be assured that a single, optimally­
sized block will remain in place in each firm? Unless some private 
benefits are reserved for this remaining blockholder, it remains in the 
. same posture as the selling blockholders. In other words, the free 
rider problem shows up at exactly the same point where it presently 
' · determines results in market systems . 
F. Summary-Private Benefits and Indivisibility 
Let us suppose, with the American governance literature, that 
Bolton and von Thadden' s  model of the concentration-liquidity trade­
off more closely approximates the problem for solution in the real 
world than do models of the concentration and initiative trade-off. 
Given this assumption, the problem for solution concerns the interface 
between the MBCS and private benefits provision. That is, we take 
the MBCS and relax the assumption about self dealing transactions. 
A number of problems identified by Bolton and von Thadden become 
solvable as a result. Given the right amount of private benefits, free 
riders and gain specification need not present a problem and a clear 
cut incentive to form a block and monitor readily can be 
hypothesized. The block, once formed, remains stable. 
By hypothesis, then, an optimal trade-off between 
blockholding and ownership dispersal implies a subsidiary need to set 
an optimal level of self dealing and insider trading .  That optimum 
could be variously defined as, (a) an amount costing the minority 
shareholders just less than their pro rata share of the gain to the firm 
as a whole from blockholder monitoring, (b) an amount just sufficient 
to cover the costs of blockholder monitoring but no greater, or (c) an 
amount falling between these two extremes resulting from 
negotiations between the inside and the outside interests .254 
254. Cf Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 1 09 
Q. J. ECON. 957  ( 1 994) (discussing the costs and benefits of equal opportunity and free 
transfer rules respecting transfers of corporate control); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate 
Control, 9 J.L.  EcoN. & ORG. 368 ( 1 993) (same). 
296 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W 
A question then arises as to why we do not see real world 
governance systems directed to the achievement of this result. The 
answer must be that the subject matter is noncontractible .  Neither the 
per period cost of monitoring nor the per period gain to the firm from. · 
monitoring is suited to advance specification. Nor, given 
information asymmetry that prevails between blockholders and 
outside shareholders, do we have conditions favorable to ex post 
observation and verification.255 It follows that a choice thus must be 
made between prohibiting or granting private benefits at a systemic 
level .256 That choice can be seen in economic terms as turning on the 
relative value placed on monitoring and liquidity. It also legitimately 
can be described in political and historical terms. Either way, it 
appears to be fundamental and unavoidable. 
V. CONCLUSION-IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
We return to the corporate law system of the United States to 
offer a new view as to the message held out by corporate governance 
comparison. Certainly, there emerges no template for public­
regarding delegated monitoring, as observers once hoped to find. We 
reserve judgment on the assertion of market system superiority, but 
with a comment. We wonder whether triumphal cries of market 
superiority heard from American observers reacting to the distress 
across the Pacific could prove closely tied to transient stock market 
averages and turns of business cycles. We instead perceive a warning 
from comparative governance. 
The comparative exercise teaches again the old lesson that 
markets are only as deep as their legal foundations. Market systems 
have been built on foundations that compel transparency, prohibit 
255 .  Once we confront the difficulty of setting the right amount, it would seem that we 
can re-characterize the monitoring incentive problem as a species of the economics of 
management compensation. But the re-characterization holds out no quick solutions to the 
basic agency problems under discussion. Oliver Hart has argued that the management and 
shareholder incentives can in theory be perfectly aligned in a world without private benefits 
by giving management a set cut of the dividend payout stream. The problem, says Hart, is 
that amount that would have to be paid over is too large as a practical matter. See supra note 
1 89, for the formal presentation of this point. The same would appear to be the case for a 
blockholder in control .  Moreover, given anything but completely effective regime of  private 
benefits prohibition (which in turn presupposes complete transparency) the control-monitor 
on an optimal salary easily can double dip. See also Burkart et al . ,  supra note 1 95 ,  at 705-06 
(arguing for an analytical distinction between employment contracts, which encourage 
productive behavior with monetary incentives, and monitoring, which discourages bad 
behavior). 
256 .  In the alternative, contractually by individual firms within a given system. 
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trading, and police self dealing. Yet legal mandates that 
these foundations have been questioned in the United States 
recent years, with the questions following from the idea that 
tion means freer markets . 257 The comparison can be seen as a 
to this line of reasoning. From this point of view, markets 
legal investor protections go together in the real world. Where 
nrcnet;u·u are absent, one-sided deals flourish and outside equity 
either becomes more expensive or dries up altogether. Of 
course, the comparison also shows us that self dealing can have 
incidental productive benefits when leavened with relational 
engagement. It can even be built into a system that is equally 
competitively fit. But the system that results is materially different 
from ours . 
Furthermore, a nominally mandatory, market-protective legal 
system such as ours can be captured by the special interests that 
operate within. It can be manipulated for their benefit without �
simultaneous provision of processes adequate to facilitate corrective 
. self-help by the injured interests. This is precisely what has happened 
· in American corporate law during the past two decades. Management 
· capture of the state-based system has led to anti-takeover regulations 
and enervated fiduciary rules, without provision of processes 
adequate to facilitate contractual adjustment by shareholders . Politics 
· do matter, and, as Chicago School likes to remind us, it is not safe to 
assume that invulnerability follows automatically from the 
evolutionary survival of our system. 
So whenever someone suggests that we unwind one of our 
system's  legal supports, we need to ask whether we want to do so at 
the risk of · pushing the system in the direction of a market­
blockholder tipping point. Across that line, private benefit provision 
is so liberal as to make blockholding the only rational systemic 
alternative. The question, by virtue of its very existence, materially 
increases the burden on the deregulatory proponent. 
257. See, e.g. ,  ROMANO, supra note 1 29, at 85- 1 0 1  (arguing against the mandatory 
disclosure system). 
